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Combining a feminist post-structural methodology with a legal interpretive 
framework located in classical texts, this study analysed six fatwas on South African-
based Mufti Ebrahim Desai’s online fatwa platform, askimam.org, to provide insights 
into the discursive representations of women’s sexual agency.  By virtue of their 
potential to provide data on lived experiences of sex and intimacy in modern contexts, 
and the legal interpretive reasoning they prompt, the analysis of these fatwas revealed 
competing and complementary discourses on women’s sexual agency. Petitioners 
grapple with the dissonance created by their pietistic loyalty to the legal tradition of 
marriage, and expectations of mutuality within contemporary marriage. They rely on 
varying dimensions of health to argue for women’s choices in the sexual arena. In 
their responses, some muftis accommodate women’s sexual refusals and desires using 
an ethical framework, and they support mutuality using strategies of sexual 
communication and benevolent masculinity. Unlike other facets of health, which are 
managed in the juristic space as spiritual concerns, physical health concerns related to 
sex are managed within a biomedical ethical paradigm, thus linking sexual rights to 
physical health. The study shows the potential for muftis to link sexual rights to 
psychological and emotional facets of health and the possibilities to adopt an ethical 
paradigm that includes other medical and allied therapies. Amongst the fatwas 
produced by Desai and his students, Desai’s own fatwa, in the context of reform 
inclinations on his website, suggests this possibility. Although the online fatwas of 
askimam.org do not diverge substantially from the legal logic of Muslim marriage, 
they provide a glimpse into how Deoband muftis are thinking about the model of 
marriage, through an emphasis on mutuality and health and well-being, in order to 
preserve the marriage and maintain the stability of the contemporary Muslim family. 
The study proceeds to analyse how foundational sources, Qur’an and hadith, are 
utilised in this regard, and concludes with an analysis of how the online space is 
gradually reformulating traditional concepts and norms, thus facilitating new 
prospects for reconfiguring gender relations. 
 
 
Key Terms: Sex, sexual agency, sexual health, fatwas, Muslim marriage, online, 
Internet, muftis, Deoband.  
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INTRODUCTION: DESIRING SEX OR NOT? 
 
 
My first week into marriage, I developed “honeymoon cystitis”. I had told Zain that 
we needed to take everything slowly but he hadn’t listened. Before leaving for 
honeymoon, the doctor ordered that we refrain from having sex for at least a week. 
Zain was annoyed, but he didn’t say anything (Cassim 2015: 138). 
 
In the above account the Muslim wife’s desire to “take things slowly” in terms of the 
frequency of sex in the early days of marriage are not heeded until she develops a 
medical problem. She remarks that her husband is “annoyed” at her subsequent lack 
of sexual availability. The writer’s experience might be linked to internalised 
understandings of the legal framework of a Muslim marriage which scholars such as 
Kecia Ali (2006: 13) and Amina Wadud (2006: 236-241) maintain, is characterised by 
the prioritising of male sexual rights and female obedience, sexual availability and 
passivity. They assert that these female functions are often linked to financial 
controls. 
 
Amina Wadud further suggests that this type of marriage construct denies women 
control over their bodies and a deciding say on the terms of sexual intimacy. It 
engenders a “sexual politics of domination” (2006: 236) and creates a situation where 
women are made sexually vulnerable to HIV and AIDS and sexually transmitted 
disease. So while World Health Organisation estimates show that “80% of  
heterosexual women with A.I.D.S are monogamous and have only ever had sex with 
their husbands”, Wadud suspects that “the percentage would be even higher for 
Muslim women” (2006: 235). Against this backdrop, my study aims to provide 
insights into the discursive representations of women’s sexual agency in a case study 
of the fatwas on South African Deoband Mufti Ebrahim Desai’s fatwa forum, 
askimam.org. The objectives are to first identify the discursive construction of sexual 
agency in Desai’s fatwas on askimam.org, second to gauge to what extent and effect 
these fatwas enable the negotiation of women’s sexual and reproductive health 
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choices, and third to analyse to what extent foundational sources, Qur’an and hadith1, 
feature in the discursive representations of women’s sexual agency. 
 
I employ a feminist post-structural paradigm and analytical frameworks of both 
feminist discourse analysis and classical Islamic legal interpretive methodologies. 
Accordingly, I begin this thesis with a few definitions of ‘sexual agency’ that have 
been posed by scholars, to arrive at a place for further analysis of the concept within 
Muslim marriage. For some, “sexual agency is typically characterized as a woman’s 
decision to consent to sex because she desires it or to choose not to have sex because 
she does not desire it” (Geary, Baumgartner, Wedderburn, Montoya & Catone 2013: 
438). Others describe ‘sexual agency’ as “the possession of and control of ones body 
and sexual choice” (Akintola, Ngubane & Makhaba 2012: 389), and as “the ability to 
act according to one’s will in the sexual realm” (Crown and Roberts 2007: 386).  
 
By virtue of the fact that sexual agency is concerned with women’s understanding and 
learning about their own “desires, pleasures and experiences” in the sexual realm in 
order to negotiate and control their sexuality and sexual choices, inhibiting it results in 
limited capacity in sexual decision making. Consequently, and as Wadud indicates, in 
male dominated normative relationships of a Muslim marriage, negotiations for safer 
sex practices are constrained, exposing women to sexually transmitted diseases, HIV 
and AIDS, and unwanted pregnancy (Lesch & Kruger 2005: 481)2.  
 
Potentially, ‘sexual agency’ includes ideas of consent, sexual availability, sexual 
satisfaction, desire, submission, force, coercion, mutuality, knowledge and 
information about religion, sexual and bodily rights and concerns - ideas which 
feature prominently in the literature on Muslim marriage. Drawing upon these 
concepts, I also expand the scope to include Muslim marriage, because until now 
most scholarship on the concept ‘sexual agency’ has been in reference to young adult 
and adolescent women (Averett, Benson & Vaillancourt 2008; Bell 2012; Crosby, 
Diclemente, Wingood, Salazar, Head, Rose & McDermott-Sales 2008; Froyum 2010; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Traditions, sayings and deeds narrated from the Prophet Muhammad (Kodir 2007: 202). 
2 Lesch and Kruger (2005: 481) describes sexual agency in terms of both reflexivity and autonomy. 
Reflexivity “as the ability to use certain principles to reflect on the suitability of different options 
regarding sexual behaviour”; and autonomy “as the ability to envision and choose between different 
options and to act according to that choice”.  
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Geary, Baumgartner, Wedderburn, Montoya, & Catone 2013; Lesch, Kruger 2005; 
Quatch 2008).  
 
Cassim’s inability to effectively communicate her desire to refrain from frequent sex 
is mirrored in a marginal study of sexual agency within marriage which focuses on 
“sexual communication” as an important pre-condition to prevent coercive sex in 
young South Indian wives. The study was done in the context of related studies that 
indicated young married women had limited control over sexual experiences and that 
this was a key factor contributing to their vulnerability to STD’s, unwanted pregnancy 
and HIV and AIDS. It revealed that adequate sexual communication might permit 
women an opportunity to negotiate safe and voluntary sex. The researchers proposed 
that “policy makers seeking to enhance young women’s sexual communication need 
to consider providing sex education to young women before they marry” (Pande, 
Falle, Rathod, Edmeades & Krishnan 2011: 102). 
 
Consequently, in this study, based on the literature that follows, I locate ‘sexual 
agency’ in the capacity to choose when to have a sexual experience, with whom to 
have a sexual experience, to choose how to define and express oneself sexually, to 
choose how one wants to engage in sexual activity, and to be in a position to negotiate 
sexual choices that determine ones sexual health and well-being. 
  
Context and Grounding 
 
Easy access by Muslims to online muftis, also known as juris-consults who constitute 
part of a wide group of ulama (religious scholars), and the anonymity provided by the 
Internet, allows for the freedom to articulate intimate sexual issues and seek 
counselling and religious legal advice for these (Bunt 2003; Chawki 2010). In the 
offline world the patriarchal gendered perspectives of ulama based on traditional 
readings of foundational sources are mediated into society by means of popular 
religious literature and lectures. These are internalised and, as research shows, can 
lead to constrained religious personhoods with regard to sexual agency and 
subsequently hamper sexual reproductive health decisions (Shaikh, Hoel, Kagee 
2011; Hoel and Shaikh 2013). South African based research reveals that women’s 
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contemporary experiences and understandings of sexual agency are also ambivalent. 
Some women reject the mainstream perspectives completely, others internalise them, 
further constraining their experiences, and others resist them when they find 
themselves in perilous marriage situations (Shaikh, Hoel, Kagee 2011; Hoel and 
Shaikh 2013).  
 
The Internet has generated increased individualization and privatization of religion 
and new usages in activism and decision-making, but it has also entrenched 
conformity and compliance with religious authorities and dominant doctrines (Bunt 
2003; Campbell 2012; Kutscher 2009; Sisler 2011). Yet there is a paucity of research 
on how mediations between sexual agency and health needs related to sex happen 
online, and specifically how sexual agency is articulated and negotiated in online 
fatwas. Research on how authority figures and structures are combining contemporary 
social realities and the Internet with gender concerns, how Muslim women are 
applying the resources offered on the Internet and to what extent they are contributors 
to online content and not just content itself is also limited (Bunt 2003; Chawki 2010; 
Imtoual & Hussein 2009; Marcotte 2010; Piela 2010). 
 
Further to this, online religious interaction can provide a glimpse into offline social 
conditions and religious practices in changing contemporary social realities (Bunt 
2003; Campbell 2012; Kutscher 2009; Sisler 2011). An analysis of the interlocutory 
space of online fatwas, where petitioners provide “social data” and muftis use legal 
interpretive techniques to relate to that data, could provide insights into how fatwas 
constitute an aspect of the discursive Islamic tradition, and how ambivalent 
perspectives and experiences of sexual agency are mediated  (Campbell 2012; Larsen 
2015).  
 
In South Africa, debates between the ulama and the State on the regulation of Muslim 
marriages are on-going (Amien 2010; Rautenbach 2009). They include negotiating 
between classical notions of marriage, which are framed as women’s obedience and 
sexual availability contingent on financial controls, and contemporary notions of 
marriage specific to the South African social and legal context. Recent research 
confirms that online fatwas have the potential to destabilise normative forms of 
religious authority, establish a “new manifestation of a Muslim ummah” (religious 
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community) and inform and influence the legislative processes of incorporating 
aspects of Islamic law into the secular legal system for Muslims in minority contexts 
(Sisler 2009: 51; 2011: 1152-3), as well as contribute towards reforming trends in 
women’s sexual health (Kort 2005). Online fatwas can therefore provide insights into 
ulama’s “new ijtihād” (independent reasoning) perspectives on contemporary lived 
realities of ordinary Muslims (Kort 2005: 363).  
 
Further, Mohamed Shahid Mathee’s (2011b: 75) research on historical fatwas from 
Timbuktu suggests women’s agency in terms of their knowledge of sexual rights and 
obligations within a Muslim marriage can be revealed through an analysis of fatwas. 
Therefore, researching sexual agency in the online fatwas of a South African religious 
scholar who identifies with the Deoband legal school thought from India, where 
fourty per cent of South African Muslims have their roots (Omar 2004: 2; Kutscher 
2009: 39), provides insights into ways in which religious knowledge articulates with 
sexual and reproductive health concerns amongst Muslim men and women. 
 
Outline of Chapters  
 
In addition to this introduction and the conclusion, this study is comprised of ten other 
chapters. Chapter one examines the fatwa as a genre of Islamic texts and sketches 
mufti Ebrahim Desai’s institutional, historical and situational context. It provides 
further insights into the intellectual background of legal opinions generated by Desai 
and his students in response to the lived experiences of men and women in 
contemporary Muslim marriages. Chapter two is a literature review of scholarship at 
the intersections of Islamic law, and sexuality and the Internet. It offers a vantage 
point from which the main research questions can be answered by focussing on four 
themes: first on textual, ethical and legal contestations; second on social and political 
controls of Muslim women’s sexuality and rights with a particular focus on South 
Africa; third on Islam, the Internet and Muslim women; and fourth, research on online 
fatwas including askimam.org.  
 
Chapter three traces the history of feminist theory, and its fraught and tentative 
relationship with Islam, linking this to my own ontological position. It expounds on 
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the validity of feminist post structural theory for understanding why women in 
religious contexts accept subordinate subject positions and examines feminist research 
in a non-liberal tradition such as Islam where notions of freedom and agency do not 
align with liberal ideas. Chapter four explains the decision to use a collective case 
study design and sketches the analytical methodologies and the research design used 
in this study. A feminist post structural discourse analysis framework in conjunction 
with traditional analytical approaches of classical Islamic legal scholars is employed 
in order to produce the instruments, data, and to generate the analyses.  
 
Chapters five, six, seven and eight outline the four discourses identified in the 
selected fatwas. Chapter five finds the most prominent societal and institutional 
discourse, which is also internalized by ordinary Muslim men, women, and jurists, is 
the discourse of male sexual need. It examines its link to divine approval, and its 
consequence for women’s sexual agency. I also note how a reliance on textual sources 
affords muftis greater authority and credibility. Chapter six expands on the second 
discourse, that of the female right to sexual satisfaction, and illustrates how muftis 
navigate the fraught space between the legal logic which regulates sex in a Muslim 
marriage and the ethical-moral exhortation of female sexual rights discourse, using 
links with physical health and well-being. Chapter seven discusses the discourse of 
mutuality, relaying how petitioners and muftis deal with the dissonance between ideas 
of mutuality in modern marriages in contrast to juristic doctrine that proposes a 
marriage akin to dominion, by locating responses in the ethical logic of marriage and 
advocating strategies of sexual communication and a benevolent masculinity that 
prioritises a marriage imperative. Chapter eight explains the discourse of health and 
well-being in the fatwas, and its links to piety, through expressions of religiosity, 
which are implicit in both the petitions and the answers. It further analyses conceptual 
and theological aspects to reflect how participants in the fatwas contemplate physical 
health relative to their social, psychological and emotional concerns.  
 
In a second level analysis, chapter nine traces competing and complementary agency 
in the interplay between the four discourses identified in the selected fatwas. In 
addition it expounds on analyses relating to the second research question, to gauge to 
what extent women’s sexual health negotiations are enabled in the fatwas. I show that 
muftis refer to health and allied professionals only for physical health and not for 
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other health concerns. Further these responses are mainly reasoned in an ethical 
paradigm located in biomedical terms. But I also show that there is room for muftis to 
respond to non-physical health dimensions in an ethical paradigm located in 
therapeutic terms. Chapter ten offers insights relating to the third research question, 
namely the extent to which foundational texts are used in the representations of 
women’s sexual agency. It also exposes potential reforming trends and shifts 
permitted by the online space.  
 
The brief concluding chapter contains discussions, conclusions and recommendations 
for future research. It reveals that both muftis and petitioners experience a dissonance 
between modern expectations of marriage and the jurisprudential legal framework. In 
addition, both exhibit a loyalty to the latter, as arising out of their spiritual belief 
system. When called upon to resolve issues arising out of this dissonance, Muftis 
exhibit varying responses towards the ethical logic of marriage without diverging 
from its legal paradigm. I propose that the analysis of Desai’s fatwas on askimam.org 
reveals potential areas of transformation in the existing online fatwa space, 
demonstrating that muftis may be positioned to enact a fiqh (jurisprudence) partial to 
women’s concerns at the intersection of the ethics of marriage and health, thus 
facilitating possible reformulations of gender relations. 
 
A Discursive Tradition 
 
In line with the philosophical reflections of Talal Asad (1986), Islam in this study is 
viewed as “…neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of 
beliefs, artefacts, customs and morals. It is a tradition… [which]… consists essentially 
of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose 
of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history” (Asad 1986: 
20). 
 
The term “discourse” as used in this dissertation, is referred to in its Foucaldian 
designation as, 
  
…forms of knowledge or powerful sets of assumptions, expectations and 
explanations, governing mainstream social and cultural practices. They are systemic 
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ways of making sense of the world by inscribing and shaping power relations within 
all texts, including spoken interactions. Discourses are in turn closely associated with 
‘discursive practices’: social practices that are produced by/through discourses 
(Baxter 2003: 7) . 
 
In this vein, Asad calls Islam a ‘discursive tradition’, characterised by a conceptual 
reflection on the past through how a practice is instituted and established, and which 
is important for understanding and reformulating the future, in which the said practice 
and its goal can best be secured or modified or abandoned. This occurs through a 
present, which determines how the practice “is linked to other practices, institutions 
and social conditions” (Asad 1986: 20). Hence his argument is that within this 
discursive tradition, meaning–making occurs not just through scholarly commentaries, 
but also through the practices of ordinary Muslims within their present contemporary 
contexts. In this way the present can be made intelligible through a reflection that 
includes both “continuities with past practices, pedagogies and arguments as well as 
an understanding and reformulation of contemporary and future conditions and 
experiences” (Mahmood 2011: 115). As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the fatwas 
in this study form an important component of a discursive Islamic tradition and 
suggest how traditional pedagogies and practices are being reformulated to meet 
contemporary needs. 
 
Translation and Terminology 
 
Muftis and petitioners sometimes use Arabic or Urdu words and phrases when 
expressing themselves spiritually or religiously. Arabic is the language of the Quran 
and Urdu is a language medium often used in Deoband madressas3.  In instances 
where Arabic or Urdu terminology has been used, they will be italicized and 
transliterated, and I will provide an explanation either in the form of a footnote or in 
parenthesis the first time they appear, and continue to use them in the text thereafter. 
An exception to this will be frequently used terms like ‘fatwa’, ‘madressa’, ‘mufti, 
‘Hanafi’, ‘Deoband’, ulama, Quran and hadith, which will not be italicised or 
transliterated. I also employ a familiar anglicised plural of these words, hence 
‘fatwas’, ‘madressas’, ‘muftis’, ‘Hanafis’ and ‘Deobandis’. The plural of ‘hadith’ will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Religious schools or seminaries (Moosa 2015). 
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remain ‘ahadith’. All other Arabic terms are transliterated and italicised according to 
the table in Appendix 5. All quotes from the fatwas analysed in this study will also be 
italicised for easier reading. In addition, the fatwas will be quoted verbatim with no 
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This chapter first describes the fatwa genre as a form of legal interpretation and, 
second, sketches Mufti Ebrahim Desai’s institutional, historical and situational 
context. It provides further insights into the legal opinions generated by Desai and his 
students in response to the queries posed by men and women in contemporary Muslim 
marriages. 
 
1.1  What is a Fatwa?  
 
While the more theoretical aspect of the Shari’a is embodied in the literatures dealing 
with the ‘branches’ of substantive law (furū‘ al-fiqh) and with the ‘roots’ of legal 
methodology and jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), it’s more practical aspect is embodied 
in fatwas issued by muftis in response to questions posed by individuals in 
connection with on-going human affairs… The accumulation of fatwas issued by 
muftis in diverse social and historical settings served to stimulate the development of 
the sharī’a from below, in response to the specific needs of particular Muslim 
communities (Masud, Messick and Powers 1996: 4). 
 
Islamic legal interpretation is a specialized field in which fatwas are deemed the 
practical aspects of the sharī‘a (Islamic law). A fatwa means a verdict or judicial 
pronouncement given by a religious legal scholar (mufti) in response to a question 
posed by a petitioner (mustafti). Due to its moral nature it is neither binding nor 
enforceable and is generally not a verdict in a court of law. Its coercive influence 
depends on the authoritative status accorded to the mufti by the petitioner in Muslim 
minority contexts  (Chawki 2010: 166; Hallaq 1993; Hossain 2002: 1; Larsen 2015; 
Masud, Messick & Powers 1996: 3-32).  It is assumed that the fatwa-issuing mufti is 
pious and possesses superior religious knowledge so that his advice will be aligned 
with “Gods judgement”.  “A fatwa therefore plays an important role in the formation 
of the pious Muslim self “ (Larsen 2015: 201).  
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The structure of a fatwa comprises of both an enquiry and an answer. Questions or 
enquiries can pertain to all aspects of life, must be real and should not be theoretical.  
Scholarship on fatwas indicates that the enquiries are valuable and often used as 
sources of research because they provide insights into the actual problems and 
concerns of particular societies (Larsen 2015; Masud, Messick & Powers 1996). 
Fatwas thus “reflect the thoughts, feelings, experiences and ordeals of people. Any 
rejection of the worldliness of the fatwa genre …would make nonsense of their form 
and contents”. Fatwas tell stories about themselves and the ordinary men and women 
who appear in them (Mathee 2011a: 85).   
 
The question posed to the mufti immediately establishes a relationship between the 
parties in an interlocutionary space. It also constrains the scope of the interpretation of 
the question because the mufti must only rely on the facts before him and doesn’t 
usually probe any further into the facts (Hallaq 1993; Hossain 2002; Illar 2010; 
Masud, Messick & Powers 1996: 20-26). He can only rely on his own knowledge if it 
is “directly reflected in the articulation of the question” (Illar 2010: 579).  As Lena 
Larsen (2015: 201) notes, fatwas are “complex and can serve multiple functions” 
because questions can be divided into two main types that elicit varying responses. 
Generic petitions elicit informative answers where the “mufti’s authority is 
constructed by virtue of superior knowledge”; and personal petitions elicit answers 
that take “the moral responsibility of the individual for granted”. This suggests that 
fatwas serve a ‘therapeutic function’ too, where the mufti deals with pietistic concerns 
by not only providing information, but also providing guidance on refining the moral 
and spiritual growth of the petitioner.  
 
In his response, the mufti must fulfil two procedural criteria pursuant to Islamic law. 
First, he must understand the question and, second, he must consult with scholarly 
authorities within the legal schools. If a resolution is not still possible, he then uses 
historically established methods of judgment known as qiyās (analogical deductions), 
ijmā (consensus), and ijtihād. Answers are usually not arbitrary but set on some 
precedent found within the collections of fatwas found in the fiqh literature. Different 
legal schools have their own compilations of fiqh literature (Hallaq 1993; Hossain 
2002; Illar 2010; Masud, Messick & Powers 1996: 20-26).  
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Historically, fatwas from the different Islamic schools4 (madhāhib) were preserved in 
compilations for future reference and “individual muftis displayed varying degrees of 
juristic proficiency and different discursive styles” (Masud, Messick & Powers 1996: 
4). In this regard, Wael Hallaq (1994: 65) further attributes the development and 
continuous transformation of Islamic law as also contingent on muftis. 
 
…the juridical genre of the fatwa was chiefly responsible for the growth and change 
of legal doctrine in the schools, … [accordingly], our current perception of Islamic 
law as a jurists law must now further be defined as a mufti’s law. Any enquiry into 
the historical evolution and later development of substantive legal doctrine must take 
account of the mufti and his fatwa.  
  
Fatwas are sought on a range of issues by many Muslims living in minority Muslim 
contexts, where communities negotiate between local secular liberal state norms, 
which incorporate ideas of gender rights, and the social, political and juridical 
frameworks of Islam. Online fatwas in particular establish imams and muftis as cyber 
counsellors and jurisconsults (Chawki 2010; Kutscher 2009; Larsen 2015: 216).  
 
Larsen (2015: 216) puts forth that fatwas are components of a discursive Islamic 
tradition, constituting discourses between the petitioner and the mufti. Her view that 
they are “situated at the interface between worldly dealings and the process of 
theorising about them” is embedded in a subtext of piety. It can thus be argued that 
through petitioners’ queries and muftis’ answers, modern fatwas provide an interface 
between the pietistic concerns attached to worldly happenings and the pietistic legal 
and therapeutic devices used to theorise about them.  
 
1.2  Mufti Ebrahim Desai 
 
The very act of asking someone for a fatwa is the most explicit recognition of that 
person’s religious authority. Ebrahim Desai exemplifies a scholar who, although 
being trained in non- Azhari institution outside of the Arab world, gained global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Madhāhib is the plural reference to the four major Sunni schools of law (Ḥanafī, Shāfi‘ī, Mālikī and 
Hanbalī), which flourished and became widespread in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of Islam 
(Weeramantry 1988: 49). 
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recognition mainly through mass support accumulated via information and 
communication technology (Sisler 2009: 67). 
 
Desai is identified as the author and acknowledged religious authority figure of 
askimam.org, where every fatwa on the site is approved and sanctioned by him.5 In a 
description of Desai, Jens Kutscher states, “a mufti is a product of his environment - 
be it geographical or even more so ideological and educational” (2009: 39).  Locating 
Desai’s social, political and institutional context as well as his transnational reach 
provides insights into the content of approved and sanctioned fatwas on his website.6  
 
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick and David Powers (1996: 4) argue that 
there is a paucity of Western scholarship on muftis because of their unfamiliar non-
litigious role as well as their historically less institutionalized activity. In South 
Africa, the latter argument is possibly less relevant, because many muftis are known 
to be affiliated to `councils of theologians`, which are also defined according to 
specific legal schools, as is the case with Ebrahim Desai. They do however remain 
outside the structures of a liberal secular state and function in an institutionalised 
manner within community structures.  
 
The following section first traces the roots of the Hanafi7 Deoband legal school that 
Desai and his student muftis are affiliated with, paying particular attention to its 
history, educational institutions and curriculum, providing further context to the 
sources and mode of reasoning employed in the online fatwas in this study. I further 
sketch Desai’s various Deoband affiliations both in South Africa and India, by 
providing an overview of his training, his various iftā (fatwa-making) activities, and 
his effect and potential influence on different ulama structures in South Africa.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 About Us, askimam.org, [Online] Available at: http://askimam.org/about. [Accessed on 23 November 
2015]. 
6 In chapter four, an analytical framework depicting five strategies for analysing fatwas based on the 
treatises of classical Muslim legal theorists is outlined. One of these strategies includes an 
understanding of the institutional, historical and situational context out of which a fatwa arises which is 
provided here. 
7 Weeramantry (1988: 49) stipulates this as the first and largest of the four Sunni legal schools and 
named after jurist Abu Hanifa (700-67). 
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1.2.1  Background 
 
The majority of South Africa’s Indian Muslims comprise approximately fourty per 
cent of the South African Indian population (Omar 2004: 2) and are situated mainly in 
the provinces of Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) and Gauteng. Three “broad strands” of Islam 
have been identified in KZN: The Deoband tradition, Barelwi and Reformist (Vahed 
2006: 46). 
 
According to his website askimam.org (2011), Mufti Ebrahim Desai’s educational 
background in terms of his training, teaching and practice is located in the first 
tradition which also subscribes to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. He trained at 
two Deoband seminaries in India; first, Jamia Islamia, Dhabel for seven years, where 
he completed the basic Ālim Course, and a post graduate course in ifta. He then 
completed a second ifta course at another Deoband seminary under the guidance of 
the late Mufti of India and author of Fatawa Mahmoodiyya,8 Mufti Mahmud al-Hasan 
Gangohi. Currently Desai is based at Darul Iftaa Mahmudiyyah, in Sherwood, 
Durban, a training institute for muftis.9 
 
Goolam Vahed (2000: 59) stipulates that ultimately the kind of Islam that manifests in 
Durban depends on the training institutions the ulama train and teach at, both in South 
Africa and India. The madressas and Islamic seminaries are strongly influenced by 
North Indian culture, with the result that content is mediated through Indian history, 
culture and language. To illustrate, Desai’s Indian pedagogical heritage has an 
influence on the form and content of his madressa syllabus as seen in the inclusion of 
Urdu texts, as well as the heavy influence of the Deoband canon (described below) on 
the curriculum at Darul Ifta, where he currently teaches.10  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 GANGOHI, M. H. n.d. Fatawa Mahmoodiyah 25 Volumes Islamic books library [online] 
Available from: https://islamicbookslibrary.wordpress.com/2012/03/19/fatawa-mahmoodiyah-25-
volumes-by-shaykh-mufti-mahmood-hasan-gangohi-r-a/. [Accessed on 30 October 2015]. 
9 Askimam.org 2011, About Us. Available from: < http://askimam.org/about>. [Accessed on 15 
October 2015]. 
10  Daruliftaa.net 2013,Available from: <http://www.daruliftaa.net/index.php/courses-admissions>. 
[Accessed on 30 October 2015]. 
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1.2.2  The Deoband School of Thought 
 
In a summation of Barbara Metcalf’s (1982) substantive work on the Deoband school 
of thought, Abdulkader Tayob (1999: 70-71) states that the Deoband School is 
characterized by her as,  
 
An aloofness from the state but without overt opposition to it’s excesses, a careful 
balance between Sufism and legalism but with a puritan emphasis on the early 
authorities of Islam; and, more important, an alliance with the merchant class as 
opposed to subservience under political rulers. 
 
Spurred on by far-reaching changes in Northern India in the late eighteenth century 
such as the loss of Muslim rule through the demise of the Mughal dynasty, and British 
colonization, the ulama who until then had been concerned mainly with the ruling 
Muslim elite, instead sought to purge ordinary Muslims, who were now regarded as 
the repositories of faith, from the influence of Hindu norms and customs. Their 
intention was to establish a purer and more correct Islamic practice and a closer 
adherence to Islamic tenets and early authorities (Metcalf 1990; 2002; Moosa 2015; 
Sikand 1999). The reformist agenda of the movement created a “heightened sense of 
religious affiliation as the primary focus of social identity in a pluralistic society” 
(Metcalf 1990: 5).   
 
The influence of Sufi thought and practice was a rich and strong feature of the 
movement, with the resulting  “signature tropes” being a “blend of piety, devotions 
and politics” (Moosa: 2015: 105). “The original Deobands were both ulama and Sufis, 
offering ‘a composite form’ of religious leadership” (Metcalf 2002: 10). Today, Desai 
continues to be representative of this as illustrated by both the daruliftaa and 
darulmahmood websites, the former devoted to the sciences of tafsir, hadith and 
jurisprudence and the latter devoted purely to the tasawwuf  (Sufi) dimension of 
spiritual belief.11   
 
The emphasis on the internal over the external which is integral to Sufi thought 
contributed to the movement’s “political adaptability” and strategy of accommodation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Daralmahmood.org 2015, Available from: < http://tasawwuf.daralmahmood.org>. [31 October 
2015]. 
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so often observed in the apolitical stance of contemporary Deoband movements. This 
stance enables a coexistence with secular and liberal traditions and implicitly fosters 
the privatization of religion associated with the modern liberal state  (Metcalf 2002: 
16). But the orientations of Deoband graduates are varied and diverse. Some are 
politically active, while others choose to remain apolitical, concentrating mainly on 
internal moral reform (Moosa 2015: 105). Vahed suggests the latter orientation is 
mirrored in contemporary South African Deoband seminaries where “the lack of 
sustained intellectual development may be due to the fact that theological debate is 
discouraged” and apoliticism and non-controversy promoted.  No attempt is made “to 
develop an Islamic view to respond to the problems facing Muslims” (Vahed 2000: 
59-60).12  
 
Metcalf’s (1982) third characterisation of the movement, as being closely aligned to 
the Indian merchant class, is also reflected in South Africa. Vahed submits that the 
movement is usually funded by the Indian trading class who came from the state of 
Gujerat in India. Examples of this funding are in the establishment of the KwaZulu-
Natal Jamiat ul Ulama or ‘Council of Theologians’13 in 1955 (Vahed: 46) as well as 
in the example of Madressa Inaamiyah, in Camperdown, where Desai was head of 
hadith studies for ten years, and which as the website states is funded by a wealthy 
trader family.14 
 
1.2.3  The Deoband Madressa 
 
Central to the Deoband reformist plan of transforming society was the focus on 
education through proselytizing, pamphlets, books and the creation of a religious elite 
through the training of ulama as community leaders.  These leaders were considered 
as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Vahed argues that the main strategy in dealing with contemporary challenges in Muslim minority 
contexts is to blame both Western imperialism and secularism as contrary to Islamic values, for the 
economic, social and political challenges of society and to also condemn them as the main culprits in 
the moral laxity of western Muslims. The thrust of this line of reasoning is that contemporary problems 
are due to Muslims not relying on authentic and proper teachings. He says: “many Muslims believe that 
once they gain access to Islamic knowledge through the ulama, conform to the sacred scriptures, and 
return to the true form of Islam, a purified Islamic culture will emerge and that this will lead to the 
upliftment of Muslim civilization “(Vahed 2000: 60). 
13 Meaning ‘Council of Theologians’. 
14 Madressa al Inaamiyyah. Available from: < http://www.alinaam.co.za>. [Accessed 30 October 
2015]. 
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…educated in the classical disciplines, the heirs of the medieval legal traditions 
(mazhab) in religious law (fiqh), as well as the heirs of the medieval sufi orders 
(silsila) in inner knowledge and personal experience (tariqa) (Metcalf 1990: 5).  
 
The key Deoband institution became the madressa (Qasim Zaman 1999: 294), which 
according to Ebrahim Moosa became the “hegemonic player in madressa franchises in 
the late 19th century…[and]..evoked theological partisanship, which in turn spawned 
rapid growth of diverse madrasa networks” in the 20th century. Today, there are 
numerous Deoband seminaries all over the South East Asian subcontinent and in 
minority contexts like South Africa (Moosa 2015: 106).  
1.2.3.1 Phases of Education 
 
In the fourth of five phases of curriculum reform in Islamic education on the Indian 
subcontinent, the Nizami curriculum of the 18th and 19th century Deoband reformist 
movement incorporated 14th century texts and a pedagogical approach that 
emphasised theological debate and the rational Muslim tradition. This proved to be 
“…the most successful and durable version of the long established knowledge 
tradition”, and was given the status of a “canon in the madrasa tradition” (Moosa 
2015: 128).  
 
In its early iteration the Nizami syllabus centred on subjects like philosophy, logic and 
theology, but in the fifth phase of iteration, during the 20th and 21st century, Moosa 
says it was ‘tweaked’ in a different direction. The newer iteration emphasised the 
sciences of tafsīr (Quranic interpretation), Hadith and fiqh, and also minimized the 
“philosophical edge of the curriculum” (2015: 84). Desai’s Daruliftaa curriculum also 
reflects a noticeable absence of philosophy.15  
 
This shift signals a move away from the cultivation of a scholar who would have been 
able to “function in the world as a humanist intellectual” (Moosa 2015: 120-121) 
toward one who takes “refuge in a debilitating dogmatism”, so that “intellectual 
mediocrity” is recycled and portrayed as piety (Moosa 2015: 134).  This argument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Daruliftaa.net 2013, Available from: < http://www.daruliftaa.net/index.php/courses-admissions>. 
[Accessed 30 October 2015].  
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aligns with Vahed’s assessment above, of the existence of a counter-reformist trend 
within South African madressas through diminished sustained intellectual 
development and a discouragement of theological debate. 
 
Moosa also observes that despite the obvious liability, some important and valuable 
features of the earlier scholastic traditions have been retained in contemporary 
madressas like the embracing of “didactic texts”, the fostering of “hermeneutical 
skills”, the imparting of a “core of knowledge of foundational teachings in every 
discipline” and the notion of apprenticeship and a “master teacher” (2015: 121). 
 
The website of the Darul Ifta mufti training institute, which was set up by Desai, also 
attests to this inclination. So, for example, the curriculum outline for the post graduate 
mufti courses include both numerous Hanafi Deoband texts by renowned master 
teachers in the Deoband school like Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Hadhrat Shah Saheb, and 
certain sourcebooks and classical texts like those of Qurtubi’s Ahkāmul-Quran, Tafsīr 
Baydāwī and Tafsīr ibn Kathīr.16 In addition, the “about us” page of askimam.org 
states that Desai also teaches “Sahih Bukhari Shareef, Mishkat al Masabīh and Al 
Hidayah at Madrasah Nu῾māniyyah, Chatsworth, Durban”.17  
 
This brief perusal of the genealogy of the current Deoband madressa curriculum and 
the sourcebooks used provides insights into the extent to which the answers provided 
by Desai and his students in the online fatwas diverge from or comply with normative 
Deoband trends.  
1.2.3.2 Master Teachers 
 
In the madressa tradition, “master teachers” and their texts are valued and integral to 
the scholarly formation of apprentice students. Moosa describes three characteristics 
of the ideal “master teacher” as, first, being an example of acting on his knowledge, 
second, training students in the way Prophet guided his companions and, third, 
assisting a student to “imitate and internalize the exemplary conduct of the master- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Daruliftaa.net 2013, Available from: < http://www.daruliftaa.net/index.php/courses-admissions>. [30 
October 2015].  
17 Askimam.org 2011, About Us. Available from: < http://askimam.org/about>. [15 October 2015].  
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teacher”. In addition, some master teachers are authors of their own texts, which are 
then equally valued and emphasised (2015: 126).    
 
Desai was afforded an opportunity for apprenticeship with firstly Mufti Ahmad 
Khanpuri Saheb of Dhabel and then another master teacher, the late Mufti of India 
and author of Fatawa Mahmoodiyya, Mufti Mahmud al-Hasan Gangohi. Moosa, who 
was also taught by Gangohi in the late 1980’s, describes him as a well travelled “Sufi 
master”, who received many visitors and answered their questions “skilfully, 
humorously and pithily”.  Desai himself is arguably “master teacher” to the students 
of Darul-ifta al Mahmudiyyah, the institution where he teaches and from where all his 
fatwas are generated. A survey of the structure of the fatwas on askimam.org (2011) 
reveal that while Desai’s students hail from different geographical locations, they 
generate the bulk of fatwas, and as master teacher he is the final authority, as 
indicated by the closing line at the end of each fatwa: “checked and approved by 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai”. In the foreword of his online publication Contemporary 
Fatawa volume 2, which is a compilation of selected online fatwas and accessible as a 
free download on the daruliftaa site, Desai says, “…most of the fatwas [herein] were 
answered by the students of the Darul Iftaa as part of their training in becoming 
Muftis” (Desai n.d.).  
 
Fatwas on Desai’s site often include the Arabic sources, and sometimes the English 
sources are listed at the end to provide the mufti’s rationale. They sometimes cite 
from Gangohi’s multi-volume text, Fatawa Mahmoodiyya and other foundational 
Hanafi texts.  Notably, the Arabic sources are usually listed after Desai’s signature 
line. The form and content within individual fatwas vary depending on the intended 
recipient. Following the norms of iftā, the Arabic sources are not meant for the 
petitioner but rather a means by which the student apprentice explains his reasoning to 
the master teacher,18 who in this case is Desai. This sheds more insights into the 
student-teacher relationship and provides a better vantage place for analysis of the 
fatwas answered by Desai’s students in this study.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Masud, Messick and Powers point out that in line with the classical adab al- mufti treatises, answers 
are more formal and all reasoning is provided when a particular mufti addresses another mufti. Muftis 
who are “commonly affiliated with particular schools of law, cite authors and authoritative works 
specific to those schools”. A mufti muqallid should accept the opinion of the best jurist of his school 
and “attribute his answer to him” (1996: 25). 
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It can be argued further that Desai is a master teacher by virtue of his affiliation with a 
host of inter-linked teaching institutions and websites which provide an online 
religious space for ordinary Muslims and other scholars. The websites are listed as 
idealwoman.org, daruliftaa.net, and darulmahmood.org. Another affiliated website in 
which his fatwas, advice and talks are found is the UK-based Darulfiqh.com. Herein 
Desai’s additional credentials are listed as:  
 
Executive member of KZN Jamiatul Ulamā (The Council Of Muslim Theologians), 
Secretary of Jamiatul Mufteen (The Council of Muftis) – This is an organisation 
comprising of the senior Muftis of South Africa from 12 Darul Iftaa’s, Head of the 
Fatwa Department of KZN Jamiatul Ulamā (The Council Of Muslim Theologians), 
Head of the Judicial Committee of KZN Jamiatul Ulamā (The Council Of Muslim 
Theologians), Official Arbitrator of commercial and marital mediations/arbitrations. 
19 
 
1.2.4  Muslim Personal Law (MPL) 
 
As a master teacher, Desai is amongst a few key scholars and organisations who 
influence the contentious processes for the recognition of Muslim marriages in South 
Africa.   
 
The KZN Jamiat Ulama joined the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) of Cape Town, 
the Deoband Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal (Johannesburg based), the Sunni Jamiatul 
Ulama and the Sunni Ulama in 1994, to form the United Ulama Council of South 
Africa UUCSA - a body whose main purpose was to “unify, coordinate and represent 
Muslims of South Africa on a national and international level”. Notwithstanding the 
general apolitical stance of the South African Deoband movement, one of the main 
issues taken up by UUCSA was the recognition of Muslim Personal Law in mitigation 
of the numerous applications by Muslim women to the South African courts, for relief 
from unjust experiences in marriage and divorce  (UUCSA 2011; Vahed 2000: 65). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 DarulFiqh. 2012. Profie of Mufti Ebrahim Desai . Available from: < http://darulfiqh.com/profile-of-
mufti-ebrahim-desai-daamat-barakatuhum/> [Accessed 29 November 2015].  
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South African Muslims are a minority religious community and Muslim marriage and 
divorce law to date has not been codified in South African law. This has meant that 
consequences arising out of these marriages, including divorce, death of a spouse, 
inheritance, maintenance, are not ordinarily state-regulated (Amien 2006; 
Rautenbach, 2009). The end of Apartheid marked a new phase in the attempted 
recognition and regulation of Muslim marriages, underpinned by the strong 
community debates that fluctuated between androcentric patriarchal notions of 
Muslim women’s agency in marriage and a more gender equal, egalitarian one. In 
addition to this there had been extensive critiques and debates in terms of the potential 
conflicts arising out of the two Constitutional imperatives: freedom of religion and 
right to equality in terms of legislation (Amien 2006; Amien 2010; MacDonald 2010; 
Rautenbach 2009; Jeenah 2004). The state is bound by the Constitution to 
accommodate religious diversity, but it has to do this in a way that does not conflict 
with other Constitutional provisions like the right to equality. The traditional religious 
practice and understanding of a Muslim marriage encompasses discriminatory 
practices that do not meet these imperatives (Amien 2010: 745). 20  These 
discriminatory practices speak to issues of sexual and reproductive self-determination 
and women’s control over their bodies and the capacity to consent to sex. Further to 
this, as a signatory to CEDAW21, South Africa has also committed to ensuring the 
sexual reproductive health rights of all women (Department of Health 2011).22  
 
UUCSA along with other Muslim bodies made numerous submissions to parliament 
on the contents of the various draft bills including the latest Muslim Marriages Bill, 
reaching some level of consensus with Muslim civil society movements on the need 
for state recognition, codification and regulation of Muslim marriages.23 One of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Correlating with other documented research (Ali 2003; 2006; Mir-Hosseini 2009), Amien (2010: 
745) describes these discriminatory practices as: “dower in exchange for sexual access and 
reproductive faculties; tamkīn (submission of wife in exchange for a unilateral obligation on the 
husband of maintenance); a husband’s right to polygyny without a wife’s knowledge, presence or 
consent; the unilateral divorce by a husband” (which as Ali and Mir Hosseini point out, is linked to 
dower and sexual access). 
21 An acronym for the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ 
22 Refer to draft document on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights: Fulfilling our Commitments, 
2011-2021 and beyond. 
23 UNITED ULAMA COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA. 2011. Letter to Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development Available from: 
<http://www.uucsa.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6:letter-to-minister-of-
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main points of contention raised by UUCSA was that authority should be given to 
Imams to arbitrate in marital disputes.  
 
Against the backdrop of Desai’s theological affiliations, a study of his fatwas on 
women’s sexual agency might provide a peek into how ordinary Muslims realise ideas 
of sexual agency in their petitions to the ulama. To what extent can we note possible 
shifts, displacements, reforming trends, and the potential to inform the on-going 
legislative processes where Muslim marriages remain unregulated and where online 
fatwas are generated and sanctioned by a venerated and highly respected ‘master 
teacher’ of the Deoband Hanafi tradition like Mufti Ebrahim Desai remains to be 
seen.  
 
1.3  Conclusion 
 
The introduction conveyed the background, context and real world problem 
underlying the research problem and it exposed the lacuna in the research on women’s 
sexual agency within Muslim marriages. This chapter explored the common 
understanding of what a fatwa is. Mufti Ebrahim Desai’s institutional, historical and 
situational context was sketched and a brief synopsis done of the roots of the Deoband 
school of thought, the madressa seminary as the key Deoband institution, the 
genealogy of its syllabus, and the geographical and institutional links between it and 
South African Indian Muslims. This backdrop to Mufti Desai and the askimam.org 
fatwas on sexual agency inform the analysis that follows of legal opinions generated 
by Desai and his scholars in response to the lived experiences of men and women in 
contemporary Muslim marriages.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
justice-and-constitutional-development&catid=2:muslim-marriages-bill&Itemid=5 > [29 November 
2015]. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW of LITERATURE 
 
 
…The vast majority of Muslim wives, those with gentle husbands, husbands of 
polygyny (open or secret), husbands of violence and abuse, upright husbands of 
moral standing, and husbands of A.I.D.S., open their legs to their men as they are not 
only expected, but commanded to do by that which is most popularly understood as 
‘Islam’ (Wadud 2006: 236). 
 
The purpose of this review of literature is to create a vantage point from which the 
main research question can be answered by first focusing on textual, ethical and legal 
contestations of sexual agency in the Islamic foundational sources, second on social 
and political controls of Muslim women’s sexuality and rights with a particular focus 
on South Africa, third on Islam, the Internet and Muslim women and sex, and fourth 
on online fatwas including askimam.org.  
 
Section one examines reformist responses to aspects of sexual agency reflected in the 
foundational Islamic texts and the classical legal system of Muslim marriage. The 
approach aligns with Asad’s argument that a study of Islam should begin with how 
Muslims approach their tradition.  
 
One should begin as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that 
includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Quran and the Hadith (Asad 
1986: 20). 
 
Section two surveys contemporary religious, social and political controls of women’s 
sexual agency, and to what extent modern Muslim contexts both internationally and 
locally rely on androcentric interpretations of foundational texts. Tensions between 
these controls and Muslim experiences of changing social realities in the context of 
sexual reproductive health rights are explored, with a particular focus on South 
Africa.  
 
Section three provides a synopsis of literature at the intersection of Islam, the Internet 
and Muslim women. It provides an account of Islam as a discursive tradition within 
the virtual space of the Internet, which proves to be an instant gateway into the 
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contemporary Islamic landscape. The Internet’s potential for new usages and practices 
particularly in activism and decision-making is highlighted and the limited range of 
scholarly work on contemporary Muslim women’s online sexual health concerns is 
related. 
 
Section four provides an appraisal of current research on fatwa sites and online fatwas 
in minority contexts, with a particular focus on mufti Ebrahim Desai’s website, 
askimam.org.   
 
2.1  Sexual Agency in Foundational Discourses 
 
Bearing in mind that religious texts are employed in formulating normative discourses 
around sexual health and agency, scholarship highlights the ways in which historical 
treatises on a wife’s duty to be sexually available produce a classical legal discourse 
in tension with contemporary ethical discourses (Ali 2006: 13; Wadud 2006: 236-
241). Alternative reformist responses offer interpretations of primary texts, which 
recognise a wife’s choice and agency in sexual decision-making and posit a 
reformulation of the classical legal system of Muslim marriage away from dominion 
and towards mutuality and reciprocity (El Fadl 2001; Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & 
Rumminger 2015; Shaikh 2004; Shaikh, Hoel Kagee 2011). 
 
In Muslim communities around the world, conservative forces and actors linked to 
the religious right rely on selective interpretations of Islam to oppose sexual diversity 
and gender equality (Helie and Hoodfar 2012: 3). 
 
These conservative interpretations of foundational scriptures co-exist with 
emancipatory ones, resulting in varying standpoints. The combination of these 
different interpretations with “diverse and locally defined cultural values” and 
contemporary social realities can lead to the promotion or abjuration of sexual and 
bodily rights for women (2012: 4).  
 
Notably, emancipatory interpretations arise from within the foundational sources of 
the Islamic tradition and not necessarily from elsewhere. Anisa Helie and Homa 
Hoodfar in a survey of sexuality in varying historical and contemporary Muslim 
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contexts assert that the sexual plurality prevalent in Muslim culture prior to its 
encounters with the West reveals the extent to which women and sexual minorities 
had, and continue to draw on, existing Islamic traditions for empowering and 
transformative strategies and reforms in the domain of sexual rights, undermining the 
reductive widespread belief that these are necessarily Western- inspired reforms (2-3).  
 
In keeping with this trend within the house of Islam, Ali (2006) in her intrepid work 
Sexual Ethics and Islam provides a critical overview of traditional and contemporary 
interpretations of the Quranic verses and hadith dealing with sex, towards the 
formulation of an “Islamic ethics of sexual intimacy”. Ali (2006: 116) points out that 
there are numerous verses in the Quran attesting to the moral and spiritual equality of 
both genders, rendering men and women “ontologically equal as human creations”, 
even as other verses render them unequal in the social realm. In making sense of this 
differentiation, modern interpretive trends move away from traditional modes of 
thinking about men as superior to women, towards a neo-traditional24 more palatable, 
but in some views also problematic approach, which stresses the complementarity of 
male and female roles and responsibilities (Ali 2006: 184; Mir-Hosseini 2009: 17; 
Wadud 2006: 28). 
 
Scholars also provide other explanations for the differential treatment of genders, 
ranging from Asma Barlas’ (2009: 199) argument that, “difference is not always 
unequal”, to the argument that the 
 
…ontological equality of all human beings takes precedence over the earthly, 
temporally bounded regulations that privilege men over women…[so that] specific 
discriminatory regulations which are discriminatory towards women need not apply 
always, or in every context (Ali 2006: 116).  
 
Ali questions the efficacy of these interpretations in creating an ethics of sex. Verses 
on sexual intimacy are similar to those on marriage and divorce in so far as they both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Mir-Hosseini (2009: 17) argues that Neo traditionalists diverge in approach from traditionalists both 
in the sources they use, and their “mode of argumentation”. Quran and hadith are used alongside 
western psychological and sociological scientific proofs, whereas overly gender-biased fiqh texts are 
downplayed.  Attempts to reveal a less patriarchal Islam and accommodate women’s aspirations of 
equality in post- colonial contexts resulted in a complementarity approach which was both oppositional 
to western values and apologetic in its attempts to explain away gender bias in Islam’s foundational 
texts, further accentuating “internal contradictions and anachronisms in fiqh rules”. 
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speak to men about women, but dissimilar in  “content and tone”. She asserts that 
those relating to marriage and divorce guide men to create ameliorative measures for 
better conditions for women, enabling and encouraging certain marital freedoms and 
agency, but the ones on sexual intimacy continue to give men absolute control over 
sex and contraception. 
 
In summary, foundational sources such as Quran and hadith are employed in 
formulating normative discourses around sexual health and intimacy, in ways that 
give men control over women. I now turn to an overview of three sets of Quranic 
verses and some hadith texts in this regard, including reformist responses to them.   
  
2.1.1  Quranic Verses 
 
Three sets of Quranic verses are often identified by scholars as assuming female 
passivity and dependency and assigning male control over female bodies and 
sexuality which Ali (2006:116) describes as not wholly misogynistic but certainly 
androcentric. These are  Q 2:18725, Q 2:222-22326 and Q 4: 3427. 
Ali argues these verses point to a decided “asymmetry in Gods speech” as men are 
spoken to about women, commanded to “behave in a particular way towards them”, 
and appear to have a “degree of control over women’s bodies”. In spite of this, Ali 
(2006: 112-113) stresses that a higher ethical standard is implied in the text, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives. They are your garments 
and ye are their garments. Allah knoweth what ye used to do secretly among yourselves; but He turned 
to you and forgave you; so now associate with them, and seek what Allah Hath ordained for you, and 
eat and drink, until the white thread of dawn appear to you distinct from its black thread; then 
complete your fast Till the night appears; but do not associate with your wives while ye are in retreat 
in the mosques. Those are Limits (set by) Allah: Approach not nigh thereto. Thus doth Allah make clear 
His Signs to men: that they may learn self-restraint (Quran 2:187, Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali 
1989). 
26 They ask thee concerning women's courses. Say: They are a hurt and a pollution: So keep away from 
women in their courses, and do not approach them until they are clean. But when they have purified 
themselves, ye may approach them in any manner, time, or place ordained for you by Allah. For Allah 
loves those who turn to Him constantly and He loves those who keep themselves pure and  
Your wives are as a tilth unto you; so approach your tilth when or how ye will; but do some good act 
for your souls beforehand; and fear Allah. And know that ye are to meet Him (in the Hereafter), and 
give (these) good tidings to those who believe (Qur’an 2: 222-3 Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali). 
27 Men are the protectors and maintainers (qawwamūna) of women, because Allah has given the one 
more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the 
righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have 
them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct (nushūz), admonish 
them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to 
obedience, seek not against them Means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, great (above you all) 
(Qur’an 4:34 Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali). 
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illustrated in Q 2: 187, because even as men yield superior control and agency in 
sexual relationships, they are simultaneously subject to divine oversight and scrutiny. 
 
With respect to verse, Q 4: 34, scholars have rendered a wide range of meanings. 
Some sustain androcentric viewpoints, favouring male authority and female 
obedience. Others produce more egalitarian notions of the marital bond, stressing 
complementarity and limiting male power over wives (Abou El Fadl 2001; Ali 2006; 
Barlas 2009; Chaudhry 2013; Doi 1989; Esposito 2001; Hidayatullah 2014; Shaikh 
2007; Silvers 2006; Wadud 2006).  
 
In particular, the notion of qiwāma 28 arising out of the word ‘qawwamūn’ meaning 
“protectors, maintainers, guardians”, has been used to assert a husband’s right to 
command and discipline wives. Added to this, a wife’s sexual availability and sexual 
obedience is linked to the normative interpretation of the word nushūz 
(recalcitrance).29 Scholars have re-appraised both concepts from within the Islamic 
tradition, according with Helie and Hoodfar’s (2012: 1-2) thesis that transformative 
strategies and reforms in the area of sexuality arise out of the Islamic tradition itself 
(Ali 2006; Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015).  
 
Regardless of the varying interpretations of Q2: 222-223, each interpretation 
concludes with male dominance and control of sexual relations, and presumes female 
passivity. Nonetheless, they simultaneously assert that the Quran protects women, by 
dictating male restraint during sex (Ali 2006: 130).  
 
One dominant interpretation of the verse is to locate it in the context of the 
(im)permissibility of contraception. Some fundamentalist scholars like Maududi30 
emphasise the sanction against contraception, an opinion that curbs a woman’s right 
to choose to have children.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015, Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim 
Legal Tradition, for a critical engagement with the notion of qiwāmah, from within the Muslim 
tradition, towards an egalitarian reconstruction and reform.  
29 See Mernissi (1996: 13) for the normative androcentric definition of nushūz (generally referred to as 
recalcitrance and for Mernissi as rebellion) and Ali’s (2006: 120-121) and Wadud’s (2006) more 
nuanced analysis which allows space for a more egalitarian construct.  
30 Maududi explains the metaphor of harth as “man being the tiller and the woman the tilth” with the 
only objective being procreation and careful cultivation (Sachedina 1990: 109). 
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This is increasingly contradicted by alternative perspectives which allow for “rational 
participation”31 in deciding to contracept or not (Saleem 1969: 258). Numerous 
contemporary discourses also indicate that sex in Islam is also viewed in terms of 
non-procreative purposes, mutual pleasure and fulfilment and that contraception 
should be mutually negotiated (Shaikh 2011: 355). Another interpretation of these 
verses allows for differential sexual positions and the proscribing of anal sex and sex 
during menstruation, a protective measure which promotes male and female sexual 
health through the curbing of forms of sex which are deemed risk factors in the spread 
of HIV and AIDS (Balogun 2010: 461).  
 
Fatima Mernissi, in her seminal feminist reading of historical Islamic texts (1991: 
146-147), mentions the ambiguous nature of these verses, and their susceptibility to 
numerous interpretations, which requires exegete Imams to be extra-vigilant. She 
critiques contestations in the work of classical Sunni exegete Tabari, sketching the 
conflicting variances in Tabari’s reasons for revelation (aṣbāb al-nuzūl) of these 
verses, which prioritise questions of sexual positioning. Like Saleem (1969), she notes 
the interpretation of women as objects, whose bodies are controlled by men 
precluding their right to protest. Citing Tabari’s extensive accommodation of 
questions about the (im)permissibility of sodomy of wives, she criticises classical 
scholars like him for their lack of courage in codifying sexual ethical principles which 
recall the equality, free will and agency of both partners. 
 
It was this timidity on the part of the Imam toward the necessity to evolve principles 
that makes the verses so malleable, and makes opportunism in their interpretation a 
structural, almost institutional feature in Islam (Mernissi 1991: 147). 
 
By far the most controversial interpretation of Q 2: 222-223 is the perceived 
sanctioning of a male licence for sexual access to wives whenever and however a 
husband wants.  Subsequent to which, the verses can be interpreted in terms of 
women being the sexual property of men, so that forceful and violent sexual coercion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mohammad Saleem (1969: 258), in a critical analysis of orthodox perspectives of this verse, doesn’t 
indicate if this “rational participation” is only open to husbands or to women too, but acknowledges 
that if a deduction as to the “status of women in Islam” is to be made from this one verse alone, then 
women as objects for procreation might be surmised. He argues like others (Barlas 2009) that the verse 
has to be understood in relation to others.   
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is regarded as legally sanctioned by Qur’an (Ali 2006; Barlas 2005; 2009; Bennet 
2004; Hidayatullah 2014; Izugbara 2001). 
 
As a case in point, in the Dutch film Submission, Q 2:223 is written onto a woman’s 
back and translated as, “a man may take his woman in any manner, time or place 
ordained by God”. Noting the inflammatory potential of this interpretation Barlas 
responded: “I don’t think there’s a more powerful or troubling way to suggest that 
Muslim women’s oppression is codified in the scripture itself” (Barlas 2005: 16).  
It has also been suggested that these perspectives of women’s sexual passivity and 
lack of consent in relation to these verses can be used to justify marital rape and 
sexual coercion, making women vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases (Bennet 
2004; Balogun 2010; Izugbara 2001).  
 
In an attempt to unearth the ethical ethos underpinning these verses, Barlas (2009: 
160) widens the semantic scope of the word harth and argues these verses cannot be 
read on their own, but within a wider context with other verses 32  prescribing 
mutuality, intimacy and reciprocity in marital relations. She suggests that the Quran 
requires uncorrupted and non-violent sexual behaviour between spouses and 
precludes marital rape and forcing women into sex.33 In a divergent, less palatable 
analysis, Ali insists that the choice of metaphor of a field denotes the passivity of an 
object, not that of an active consenting participant even if it is read alongside others 
on marriage (2006: 130). Her argument is that while women are given a certain level 
of agency in the verses on marriage and divorce, the verses on sexual intimacy like Q 
2:222-223, place men in control over sexual intimacy and contraception (2006: 125-
130).  
 
Regardless of how these verses are interpreted, whether in relation to contraception, 
sexual positions or sexual availability, Ali (2006) like Mernissi (1991) before her, and 
Aysha Hidayatullah (2014) later, insists that they preclude a woman’s sexual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Barlas (2009: 160) refers to Quranic verses Q 9:71 and Q 30: 21 in this respect.  
33  Barlas (2009: 160-165) argues that according to Q 5:6, lawful sex is neither “lewd nor lustful”, and 
that while it doesn’t refer to the wife’s will or to “the idea of consensual sex”, by virtue of imputing 
“will” as moral agents in other verses like Q 4:19, it imputes will on women as sexual beings, because 
“this moral agency is not sexualized by the Quran” (160).   
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freedoms, and simultaneously place all sexual relations, including men’s access to 
women’s bodies, within the “scope of divine regulation” (Ali 2006: 129).   
 
Scholars draw on the work of modern philosophers like Fazlur Rahman, Nasr Abu 
Zayd and Mohammed Arkoun to propose new gender-just possibilities to androcentric 
verses like the ones featured above (Ali 2006; Hidayatullah 2014; Mir-Hosseini, 
Sharmani & Rumminger 2015; Rhouni 2008; 2010). Some also propose the 
incorporation of Sufi thought, focusing on core concepts related to the human soul’s 
innate spirituality and the God-human relationship (Shaikh 2012; Silvers 2006).  
 
But honesty about the inherent androcentrism in the verses on sexual intimacy, and an 
acknowledgment of the strength of interpretations that favour male dominance and 
control, is regarded as the first step towards reform efforts to create egalitarian ethical 
Quranic interpretations for gender justice (Ali 2006; Hidayatullah 2014; Mir-
Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 2015; Rhouni 2008; 2010). Referring to an essay 
focusing on Q: 4:34 by Esack (2001), Ali (2006: 126) states:  
 
Esack demonstrates that while classical commentaries oversimplify the matter of 
women’s devotion to God and obedience to husbands, modern apologetics and 
feminist analyses frequently overlook the very clear authority delegated to men over 
women’s bodies. 
 
In a similar vein, Hidayatullah in a radical critique of exegetical approaches employed 
by female exegetes, argues that they fail to “rescue” the text from an inherently male 
bias, have not managed to account for verses that disallow women sexual freedoms, 
and have been “reluctant” to hold the Quran, which is regarded as the unadulterated 
word of God, responsible for its “misreading”. Thorny androcentric meanings are 
instead attributed to “interpretive errors” or “linguistic difficulties” of human beings, 
or to “problematic hadith” (2014: 132-133). She adopts Ali’s (2006: 133) stance and 
warns against imposing on the text what it does not intend.   
 
When exegetes of feminist tafsir claim that their interpretive results are what the 
Quran actually “says” or really “intends”, they risk making pronouncements that are 
just as authoritarian as those that they seek to combat (Hidayatullah 2014: 143).  
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Summarily, while 20 years ago Mernissi criticized classical scholars for their timidity, 
which led to the malleability of androcentric verses, others today (Ali 2006; 
Hidayatullah 2014; Rhouni 2008) are asking feminist interpreters of Quran to be 
honest about the inherent male bias in the verses on sexual intimacy; they call for 
clearer, more serious definitions of principles of justice, kindness, and love; and for 
“theorising afresh concepts of equality and sexual difference using a discursive rather 
than a definitive approach to ideas of equality, and to the Quran as text” (Seedat 
forthcoming 2016: 7). Some propose new gender-just possibilities gleaned from the 
work of modern philosophers, while others propose the incorporation of Sufi thought.  
 
2.1.2  Hadith  
 
Varying and competing discourses of sexual agency in the hadith also inform Muslim 
sexual praxis as several well-known hadith traditions assert sexual availability as a 
wifely duty and a husband’s right (Bennet 2007: 376; El Fadl 2001: 213-215; Hoel 
and Shaikh 2013: 79; Kodir 2007: 67-90). Khalid Abou El Fadl (2001: 211-212) 
asserts that the hadith traditions play a greater primary role than the Quran in 
determinations of spousal obedience, contribute more to “the general denigration of 
the moral status of women” and have drastic normative “theological, moral and social 
consequences”, requiring a “conscientious pause” 34  for further theorizing and 
reflection in order to accord better with the Quranic ethos of marriage, which he 
argues is mutuality, reciprocity and harmony.  
  
These hadith35 vary in details, telling wives to sexually comply, whether cooking or 
“on the back of a camel”. In some, where husbands invite wives to bed and wives 
choose not to engage in intercourse, non-compliant wives incur the curse of angels. In 
one hadith God’s wrath is incurred by non-compliance and only alleviated by pleasing 
one’s husband. The message in these hadith “place women’s sexual duties to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Abou El Fadl (2001: 94) proposes a “faith-based objection” as an option for dealing with a crisis of 
conscience which arises out of a conflict between one’s personal faith conviction and the 
determinations of the text (both Quran and hadith). He proposes a “conscientious pause”, not as a 
“whimsical” dismissing of the text, but instead affording a “responsible and reflective” person the 
opportunity for further reflection and intense investigation of the text, “suspending judgement until 
such a study is complete”. If the impasse is intractable then, “Islamic theology requires that a person 
abide by the dictates of his or her conscience”.  
35 See Kodir (2007: 67-90), Ali (2006: 11), and El Fadl (2001: 211-216) for an overview of these   
ahadith.  
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husbands under the ambit of divine concern, and divine approval is contingent on a 
husband’s approval” (Ali 2006:11). 
  
In his crucial work Hadith and Gender Justice, Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir (2007) 
provides a gender sensitive critical re-interpretation of some hadith, without 
compromising on the “exacting methods required by hadith scholarship” (2007: 26). 
Utilizing the Quranic concept tawhid36  as an analytic lens, he advocates for a 
contextualised critique to reveal historical socio-cultural objectives of gender 
insensitive hadith, emphasising foundational Islamic principles of justice and welfare. 
Vastly different interpretations are revealed, for example, in his linguistic comparison 
of classical scholars’ records of the hadith37 that supposedly calls for a wife to be 
sexually compliant even when cooking. Kodir illustrates a difference in readings, 
which “does not assert a wife’s total obedience in fulfilling her husbands needs”, and 
instead makes space for a wife’s rights to sexual enjoyment  (Kodir 2007: 74).  
 
2.1.3  Fiqh  
 
Notwithstanding contemporary reformist responses, foundational texts are also 
consistently employed in jurisprudential (fiqh) works to create a normative 
perspective of male sexual dominance. Ali (2010) locates hierarchical discourses on 
consent and sexual availability in the classical legal framework of marriage, which is 
characterized by an exchange of dower for sexual access and continued sexual 
availability for financial support. She argues this system of marriage was developed in 
a socio-historical context predicated on an analogy to slavery and other normative 
forms of ownership. Modern Muslim notions of marriage still uphold the spousal 
rights and privileges of the classical legal model but provide new rationales, which 
obscure the linkages to ownership and slavery in order to tie in better with 
contemporary social norms of partnership reciprocity in marriage. Essentially, Ali 
argues that the classical framework continues to undergird Muslim discourses on sex 
and marriage today, and mitigate against the attainment of mutuality in marital sexual 
interactions (Ali 2003; Ali 2006: 13).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Kodir (2007: 211) defines tawhid as the “belief in or affirmation of the oneness of God”. 
37 For a reference to this hadith see Kodir (2007: 182). 
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Leila Ahmed in her formative book Women and Gender in Islam suggests  
 
…two distinct voices within Islam, and two competing understandings of gender, one 
expressed in the pragmatic regulations for society… the other in the articulation of an 
ethical vision (Ahmed 1992: 65-66). 
 
Ahmed theorises that Muslim women have internalized these two Islamic voices; the 
pragmatic legal voice, in which marriage is deemed an institution of sexual hierarchy 
and the ethical voice, “virtually unheard by rulers and lawmakers” and which 
“stressed the importance of the spiritual and ethical dimensions of being and the 
equality of all individuals” (1992:66).   
 
Building on Ahmed’s theories, other scholars have offered a complete overhaul of the 
legal tradition of Muslim marriage away from dominion and towards mutuality and 
reciprocity as a possible remediatory measure. Contemporary legal theoretical reform 
efforts are propelled by the idea that Islamic legal theory is pliable, and reactive to 
social, political and ideological forces (Ali 2006; El Fadl 2001; Mir-Hosseini 2009). 
For example, Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2009: 1-3) points out distinctions in Islamic legal 
categories. The first is between fiqh and sharī‘a. Fiqh is regarded as “human, 
mundane, temporal”, open to juristic reasoning, speculation and extrapolation and is 
therefore “malleable to changing socio political and historical contexts”, while 
“sharī‘a is divine, sacred and universal and cannot be changed”. The second 
distinction is between muāmalah, which, regulates relations between humans and is 
open to “rationalizations” and “social forces”, and ibādah, which regulates God-
believer relations and is limited in scope for rationalization and change. Gender 
relations, like those in marriage, belong mainly to the legal category of muāmalah.  
 
Like Ali, Mir-Hosseini is of the opinion that there is a dissonance between the legal 
framework of marriage, which she describes in terms of an exchange of tamkīn 
(wifely obedience and sexual availability) for nafaqa (maintenance), and the ethical 
ethos framework of marriage based on the ontological equality and mutuality of men 
and women. The latter is articulated in modern experiences and understandings of 
mutuality and reciprocity in marriage. The dissonance can be alleviated by moulding 
a new fiqh, based on the idea that “when social reality changes, then social practice 
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will effect a change in the law” (2009: 3). This change is more easily achievable in 
the realm of human relations, muāmalah.   
 
Arguably, when gender relations veer from the category of muāmalah to ibādah as 
will be noted later in this chapter, and where dominant perspectives of primary texts 
deem women’s sexual availability under the ambit of divine concern and approval by 
enmeshing gender relations with the sacrality of God believer relationships, then 
reform efforts may prove more difficult.38 Added to Ali’s compelling claim that 
contemporary Muslim marriage is still based on a classical framework of sexual 
availability in exchange for support, the enactment of marriage reforms within the 
existing framework appears unfeasible. Modern piecemeal modification of the 
existing marriage framework in order to render analogous rights based on mutuality 
and reciprocity will not succeed. Instead, what is required is a divergence from “the 
overall framework of gender differentiated rights and duties set forth by classical 
jurists” (Ali 2006: 13).39  
 
We indicated above that foundational Islamic texts simultaneously promote male 
dominance and control of sexual relations and protect women by dictating male 
restraint during sex, promoting a wife’s sexual satisfaction and encouraging a 
husband’s obligation to satisfy her (Ali 2006: 9-13, Kodir 2007). This last notion of 
Islam as a sex positive tradition has also co-existed with two conflicting views. 
Firstly, female sexuality is considered a potential source of corruption (fitna) and 
potentially dangerous for society. Paradoxically, the second view is divine concern 
and approval of male sexuality, which is more potent than female sexuality and must 
be “satisfied through a wife’s constant sexual availability” (Ali 2003: 12).  
 
Fatna Sabbah (1984: 116) describes this construct of a dangerously potent female 
sexuality as the “omnisexual woman”,40 further suggesting that women are impacted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This is illustrated by Hoel and Shaikh in “Sex as Ibadah: Religion, Gender, and Subjectivity among 
South African Muslim Women” (Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 1; 79-81). 
39 Ali states: “For as long as the legal tradition views marriage as a an exchange of lawful sexual access 
for dower, and continued sexual availability for support…to the extent that these doctrines still inform 
Muslim discourse, mutuality in sexual rights cannot be a requirement, merely an ideal” (Ali 2006: 13). 
40  Fatna Sabbah (1986: 34-43) traces the interplay between erotic and orthodox discourses in the 
creation of the construct, which she describes as the “omnisexual woman”. The negative and dangerous 
female sexual potency of the omnisexual woman is a threat and danger to society.  
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negatively by it, because it justifies onerous societal controls and restrictions on them, 
while male potency justifies societal sanction of polygyny and unilateral repudiation 
of wives. In addition, these notions also favour a “sexual politics of domination” as 
suggested by Wadud in chapter one, which severely inhibit women’s sexual choices 
and their ability to decide the terms of sexual engagement (2006: 236).  
 
Having provided an overview of varying, contradictory and competing interpretations 
of women’s sexual agency in foundational texts, from normative androcentric notions 
to reformist ones, and the link between the textual, ethical and legal aspects of the 
Islamic tradition, in the next section I survey contemporary social and political 
controls of women’s sexual agency. I note the extent to which these interpretations are 
relied on, and their impact on sexual reproductive health rights in modern Muslim 
contexts both internationally and locally. I explore tensions between these controls 
and Muslim experiences of changing social realities in the context of sexual 
reproductive health rights, with a particular focus on South Africa.  
 
2.2  Sexuality and Social Control 
 
 A study of the role of religion in constructing the context of women’s sexuality must 
include an analysis of the interaction of particular religious schools and customs with 
the socio-economic conditions and politics in a particular geographic location at a 
particular time (Ilkarracan 2001: 11).  
 
Pinar Ilkarracan (2001) suggests that the most powerful tool of patriarchy in most 
societies is the control over women’s sexuality through collective political and social 
measures. The socio-economic and political landscape of different Muslim 
communities dictate which mechanisms are used to maintain this control. If religion is 
used in constructing women’s sexuality, then an analysis of the interaction of the 
particular religious schools with the socio-political and economic landscape is needed.  
 
In Turkey, dominant discourses on women’s sexual agency using the primary sources 
of Islam have resulted in contradictory constructions of female sexuality, correlating 
with Ali (2006) and Sabbah (1986) that positive sexual experience and the attainment 
of sexual pleasure is encouraged, but women are construed as an irrational, emotional 
	   36	  
source of fitnah (social chaos) and men as rational, capable of self-control and having 
to assert control over women’s sexuality (Ilkarracan 2001: 1). This binary perspective 
of male and female rests on ideas of duality and polarity in the philosophical construct 
of human beings as body and mind and is further reflected in a Nigerian study.  
 
Using a post-structuralist theoretical model, C. Otutubikey Izugbara (2004: 16-18) 
notes how the normative discourse of male sexual dominance and privilege and 
women’s “sexual self- donation” 41  are played out amongst the Hausa Muslim 
community. Focusing on “sacred narratives”, he observes how Prophetic traditions 
and Quranic verse 2:223, are used to encourage androcentric notions of male and 
female sexuality and sanction male control of women’s sexuality.  
 
Linda Rae Bennet (2007) explores the gap between religious doctrine and social 
experience in Indonesia, and illustrates how androcentric views arising out of 
religious doctrine are being challenged by egalitarian readings of Quran. In a section 
on zina (illicit sex), she refers to contestations in Indonesian society on what 
constitutes marital rape. Various interpretations of the primary Islamic texts elicit a 
range of interpretations from dominant sexist ones, such as a man has the right to hit 
his wife if she refuses sex, to more egalitarian notions of sexual agency, such as her 
right to negotiate consent or even outright refusal (Bennet 2007: 376; Kodir 2007: 67-
76).  
 
Recent research in Australia (Marcotte 2015: 9; Piela 2010)42 and South Africa has 
made valuable contributions to gauge the extent of changing social realities and the 
associated sexual praxis of Muslim women negotiating between religious and social 
experience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Izugbara argues that the dominant narrative of Q 2:223 combined with that of numerous ahadith that 
“good women do not refuse their husband sex”, is internalized by women themselves, placing them in a 
self-coercive position.  
42 I will refer to this research later in a survey of Muslim women’s online sexual health concerns.  
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2.2.1  South Africa 
 
South African studies comprise theological, ethical and sociological analyses of 
women’s narratives. They deal with the tensions created between asymmetrical 
gender constructs and the lived experiences of Muslim women by centralising 
women’s experiences in the process of knowledge production, and highlighting social 
and political controls on sexuality. They demonstrate women’s responses to the 
uneven gender dynamics of marriage, and how these impact on decision-making 
regarding sexual reproductive health (Hoel, 2012; Hoel 2014; Hoel and Shaikh 2013; 
Hoel, Shaikh and Kagee 2011; Shaikh 2007; Shaikh, Hoel & Kagee 2011) 43.  
 
Sa’diyya Shaikh and Nina Hoel’s studies correlated with others (Ali, 2006; Izugbara 
2001; Ilkarracan 2004; Bennet 2007; Piela 2010) in identifying three dominant 
religious discourses that led to tensions and ambivalences in women’s experiences of 
sexual intimacy and agency. Namely, sexual intimacy is related to the spiritual realm 
so that piety is expressed in ways that stress the sacredness of the sexual act, Islam is 
sex positive and sex affirming, and a good Muslim woman is obedient, sexually 
available to her husband and subject to divine oversight (Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 79-
81).  
 
While discourses of positive sexuality confront the body/spirit dichotomy of sexuality 
(Ali 2006; Anwar 2006; Ilkarracan 2001; Izugbara 2004; Sabah 1986), they are not 
“accompanied by affirming views of women” because “the same traditional Muslim 
discourses that contain positive evaluations of sexuality are also embedded in 
hierarchical gender power relations” (Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 79).  
 
In the case of asymmetrical relations that are abusive and devoid of compassion, 
discourses of positive sexuality, as well as approaches to the God-believer 
relationship which link God’s will and approval with that of a husband’s can lead to 
psychological coercion and physical and emotional abuse (Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 85). 
This ties in with both Bennet’s (2007) and Wadud’s (2006: 239) analyses that rape, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The research report (Shaikh, Hoel and Kagee 2011) was generated from data collected from 262 
women through the means of questionnaires and focus groups in different communal locations. Other 
papers explored personal narratives in semi structured in-depth interviews. 
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abuse and Muslim women’s vulnerability to HIV can be linked back to religious 
understandings of women’s bodies and sexuality. 
 
The researchers also found women’s responses to be ambivalent in terms of the 
paradoxical relationship between religious expressions of mutual sexual reciprocity 
and the emphasis on women’s sexual availability. It was noted how this ambivalence 
impacted their health decisions.  
 
Firstly, internalized “gendered understandings of the God-believer relationship” 
informed many women’s personhood, resulting in a constrained sexual agency and 
inability to insist on preventative measures to HIV and AIDS, and STD’s in situations 
of increased risk as in the case of a first wife who is unwittingly enlisted into a 
polygynous union which arises out of her spouses infidelity (Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 
69; Hoel, Shaikh & Kagee 2011: 122).44 Secondly, some women do not subscribe to 
the dominant sexual availability discourse, believing instead in their right to consent, 
mutuality and “a healthy and fulfilling sexual life”, and thirdly, some challenge and 
contest the dominant discourses and subvert these towards more egalitarian and 
ethical ones, mainly when personal social realities become difficult and imperilled 
(Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 77). 
 
 This third response aligns with an earlier study by Shaikh (2007) who demonstrates 
how women in abusive marriages engage in a “tafsir of praxis” to displace 
mainstream understandings of sexual availability. Likewise, in a study on the 
hypothetical uptake of microbicidals, women indicated that if faced with spousal 
infidelity they would use microbicidals without consultation (Hoel, Shaikh and Kagee 
2011: 122). They displayed resistance to mainstream perspectives and relied on the 
God-believer relationship through the theological concept of khalīfa 45 in which they 
enact moral agency through an internalized perspective of Islam as life preserving and 
life-affirming.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hoel, Shaikh and Kagee (2011) cite research by Bangstad (2004) which demonstrated that male 
infidelity was the main reason for polygynous marriages amongst Cape Town’s Muslims, and Toefy 
(2002) who found that the main cause of Muslim women asking for a divorce was also their husband’s 
infidelity.  
45 See Wadud’s definition in Inside the Gender Jihad (2006: 32-37) where she says being khalifa is 
“equivalent to fulfilling ones human destiny as a moral agent”, resulting in the responsibility to create 
and partake in a just society.   
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Hence, the research indicates that women’s tenuous personal life experiences, the 
availability of alternative discourses, and the potential expression of “dianomous” 
modes of moral agency (Bucar 2010),46 may lead to ambivalent perspectives of sexual 
agency (Bennet 2004; Balogun 2010; Izugbara 2001; Shaikh, Hoel, Kagee 2011). 
These generate a more ethical sexual praxis (Shaikh 2007; Hoel and Shaikh 2013) 
thereby demonstrating that South African women’s lived experiences can provide new 
understandings, potentially leading to reform of contemporary fiqh rules from within 
the Islamic tradition as suggested by Mir-Hosseini (2009: 3).   
 
2.2.2  The Ulama in South Africa 
 
Three themes emerge in the study of gender and ulama in South Africa; tensions 
between traditional norms and contemporary realities, the hierarchical authority of the 
ulama and, lastly, their gendered ontological assumptions of women, which entrench 
male privilege. Tensions between traditional norms and contemporary realities 
become evident when ulama formulate religious legal prescriptions using classical 
legal doctrine, while government proposes legislation for the recognition and 
regulation of Muslim marriages informed by contemporary human rights approaches 
to sexual reproductive health rights (Amien 2010; Department of Health 2011). 
Studies indicate that the epistemological privilege and the authority of the ulama play 
a significant role in women’s health decisions and choices. The microbicidal study 
cited earlier also noted that women believe that an ulama sanction of microbicidals 
would encourage its uptake (Hoel, et al, 2011: 101). In addition, women’s experiences 
of the ulama during divorce proceedings confirms that ulama locate themselves at the 
apex of a hierarchy of religious authority, and their gendered ontological assumptions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Adding to Mahmood’s (2011) theory on the agency of the pious female subject outside of the liberal 
humanist framework, Bucar (2010: 666) investigates religious women’s agency in a way that 
comprehends  women’s intentional or even unintentional “creative ruptures in obedience to  tradition”, 
thus  making space for  women’s “innovative” and “ambiguous” “enactment of religious traditions”. 
She demonstrates how the neologism dianomy, diverges from autonomy, theonomy and heteronomy 
and is a viable approach which “recognises that both an individual and her community are important; 
that agency is shaped within specific conditions and yet can also point beyond them, and that there is a 
possibility of creative compliance that is not necessarily intentional resistance”. See Bucar 2010 for a 
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entrench male privilege and impact sexual reproductive health choices (Hoel 2011: 
129). Women were expected to accept unjust and potentially dangerous marital 
relationships in the “spirit of reconciliation” even in instances of abuse and infidelity, 
were unable to get assistance in exiting marriages, and abusive husbands were ignored 
by some ulama. This lack of agency in terms of divorce, directly affects women’s 
ability to make healthy sexual choices in the context of abuse in marriage which when 
combined with the reality of HIV and AIDS in instances of infidelity, becomes a key 
determinant of their sexual reproductive health rights. 
 
This raises two concomitant and interrelated areas of concern in South Africa. Firstly 
the negotiation between the ulama groups and government (with regard to the MPL 
process) mirrors the “social and political” measures in place to control women’s 
agency as problematized by Ilkkarrakan (2001: 1). Secondly, the on-going 
disagreements over the contentious Muslim Personal Law (MPL) process has retarded 
law-making and leaves ambiguous the legal nature of women’s autonomy with regard 
to decision making in marriage and divorce.   
 
The role of the ulama in health rights and decision-making is significant because the 
fatwas that form the focus of this research are generated by a member of the South 
African Deoband Hanafi ulama who participates in mufti councils and ulamā 
structures that bear an influence on MPL debates. When combined with Ali’s (2003, 
2006) and Mir-Hosseini’s (2009) more radical contentions that a classical system 
which is not conducive to mutuality underlies contemporary Muslim marriage and 
sexual legal discourses, it becomes important to understand the place of religious 
authority in the MPL legislative process in South Africa.  
 
As already mentioned in chapter one, ulama bodies have been active participants in 
the legislative processes involving the current Muslim Marriages Bill (2010). The bill 
has been criticized for lack of adequate regulation and flawed procedures (Shura 
Yabafazi, Legal Aid Clinic, Nadel 2006). Ulama bodies have made submissions to the 
Bill that place more emphasis on controls by religious leaders, going so far as to argue 
for a state-backed religious arbitration process and an independent judicial bench for 
	   41	  
Muslim marriages47 (UUCSA 2011). This relates Mir-Hosseini’s (2009) argument 
that through the codifying of Muslim family law through procedural rules, 
governments introduced reforms, although the substance of classical laws remained 
unchanged. “This gives the classical fiqh construction of gender rights a new life and 
unprecedented power. It could now be imposed through the machinery of the modern 
nation-state” (2009: 27).  
 
The remediatory approach to the dissonance between the legal construct of marriage 
and the ethos of the sharī‘a, offered by Ali (2006: 13) and Mir Hosseini (2009: 3), is 
to allow for Muslim social practices and experiences within contemporary contexts to 
mould a new fiqh, shifting the normative hierarchical gender paradigm to a reformist 
one. The implications of this for MPL in minority contexts like South Africa is that 
this may open the possibility of the enactment of Muslim marriage laws which may be 
more in line with both South African constitutional imperatives and what reformists 
argue are Quranic sharī‘a imperatives of equality, justice and fairness.  
 
According to Masud, Messick and Powers, “the sharī‘a developed by means of 
human juristic efforts into a comprehensive and detailed corpus of law that was 
continuously adjusted to changing circumstances” (1996: 4). They argue that the more 
practical aspects of sharī‘a, are embodied in fatwas, indicating the importance of 
analysing them as well as the individual mufti’s discursive styles within different 
contexts and changing circumstances. Through an analysis of my primary sources, the 
online fatwas of South African mufti Ebrahim Desai, I explore to what extent 
contemporary experiences and practices of sexual agency have the potential to mould 
the fiqh arguments of the ulama in line with this suggestion.  
 
To summarise, this section details the religious and political controls of sexual 
reproductive health rights of Muslim women in South Africa and elsewhere, and to 
what extent these rely on normative interpretations of foundational textual sources. 
An overview of the tensions between these controls and modern Muslim experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 UNITED ULAMA COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA. 2011. Letter to Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development Available from: 
<http://www.uucsa.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6:letter-to-minister-of-
justice-and-constitutional-development&catid=2:muslim-marriages-bill&Itemid=5 > [29 November 
2015]. 
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and understandings of mutuality and rights within the sexual arena, particularly in 
Desai’s geographical context, South Africa, was provided. This section also alluded to 
proposed remediatory options arising out of mechanisms found within the legal 
interpretive space to resolve these tensions. These proposed mechanisms rely on an 
account of Islam as a discursive tradition. With this in mind, the next section surveys 
existing literature on Islam, the Internet and Muslim women, noting both the online 
potential for new usages and practices particularly in activism and decision-making, 
and the limited scholarly work on contemporary Muslim women’s online sexual 
health concerns.  
 
2.3  The Internet and Muslims 
 
…‘traditional’ Islamic landscapes and environments in contemporary contexts must be 
recorded and analysed, but if a holistic contemporary understanding of Islam is sought, then 
part of that interpretive process has to include … a discussion about the Internet (Bunt 2003: 
4).   
 
Scholars have shown that the Internet facilitates the production of diverse Muslim 
discourses by providing a space for transforming religious expression and 
understandings, activism, networking, decision making and information (Alwi 2009; 
Anderson 2003; Bunt 2003: 2-6; Chawki 2010; Kutscher 2009; Marcotte 2015; Piela 
2010). 
 
The combination of new media [like the Internet] and new contributors to religious 
and political debates, fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse 
ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created and feeds into new senses of a 
public space that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to 
formal institutions recognized by state authorities (Eickelman & Anderson 2003: 2).  
 
But the extent of “the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created” 
depends too, on the degree and scope of participation of ordinary Muslims. 
Christopher Helland (2005: 3) makes a clear conceptual distinction between religion 
online (where traditional pre-existing religious traditions are the primary reference 
point) and online religion (where people are living their religion on and through the 
Internet medium as another space through which religious meaning and activity 
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extends into). This conceptual distinction clarifies the variety and extent of religious 
participation on the Internet, as most religious websites fall somewhere in the 
continuum between these two points, leading to disparities in opinions on the 
Internet’s revolutionary potential on the practice of religion in Western contexts.  
 
Initial speculations that traditional religious authorities would be displaced and 
challenged were offset by later arguments that this potential has not been fully 
achieved because of the controlled and limited range of online religion. Religious 
authorities and old establishments adapted to the new communication medium and 
found new ways to establish influence through propagation and control. While 
technologically capable of making sites more interactive and closer to the ‘online 
religion’ model, they chose not to, instead limiting and controlling users’ 
communication and interactions (Anderson 2003; Bunt 2003; Campbell 2012; 
Helland 2005: 295; Sisler 2011: 1153).  
 
In terms of Muslim experiences, Gary Bunt explains (2003: 2):  
 
The extensive application of the Internet as a means of projecting Muslim authority 
and disseminating religious opinions represents a long-term and technologically 
adept integration of religious symbolism and traditional notions of power…  
 
But he concedes that the Internet also “breaks the monopoly of traditional Islamic 
scholarship and leadership”, partly due to non-traditional centres of scholarship, 
authority, organisations and individuals entering into the information marketplace and 
“influencing traditional regions of Islamic learning”.  
 
Others argue that the increased individualisation and privatization of faith48 in the 
democratic virtual world has created opportunities to undermine established religious 
authorities and inform state policies in minority contexts (Campbell 2012; Ho, Lee & 
Hameed 2008; Kort 2006; Sisler 2011).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Surfers in Singapore reveal that Muslim Internet usage is more linked to personal issues of religiosity 
and less concerned with traditional religious institutions and activities (Ho, Lee & Hameed 2008). 
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As Muslims have become more educated with increased access to religious texts, the 
authority of the ulama and what is seen as legitimate and authentic ijtihad changes 
(Kort 2009: 366). 
 
Therefore, scholars suggest that even though the Internet “asserts conformity and 
compliance with established religious authorities” (Sisler 2011: 11153) it has also 
simultaneously engendered “new usages and practices, which could significantly 
shape the production and consumption of knowledge” (Sisler 2009: 59), particularly 
in decision making and activism - two principle sectors in cyberspace (Anderson 
2003; Bunt 2013; Chawki 2010; Kutscher 2009; Sisler 2011: 69). 
 
In addition, a study of the nexus between religion and the Internet in Western contexts 
suggests that the Internet provides a peek into the personal realities of religious lives 
and practices that until now has not been possible. It is also an indicator of the current 
contemporary state of religion in society, illuminating “the social reality of life in a 
networked society” (Campbell 2012: 3-5), where online trends are just a reflection of 
the changes happening offline and not necessarily the cause. Online practices are 
clearly embedded in the values and systems of offline culture, providing “an 
interesting and important microcosm for studying trends within religious practice and 
meaning-making in society” (Campbell 2012: 3).  
 
Analogous studies on online interactions of Muslims attest to Helen Campbell’s thesis 
(Ho, Lee & Waipeng, 2006; Imtoual & Hussein, 2009; Marcotte, 2015; Piela, 2010). 
In line with the above assertions, the Internet by virtue of its fluidity and easy 
accessibility can provide an instant portal into the discursive contemporary Islamic 
landscape. 
 
2.3.1  Muslim Women, the Internet and Sexual Health 
 
Research on Muslims and the Internet has increased over the last twenty years with 
studies on a virtual ummah, CIE’s (Cyber Islamic Environments), E-jihad and online 
fatwa sites (Anderson, 2003; Bunt 2000; 2003; 2009; Chawki 2010; Illar 2010; Kort 
2006; Sisler 2011). Alexis Kort (2006: 365) suggests that an exploration of gender in 
online religion would demonstrate the extent of reforming trends on the Internet. 
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Scholars note the limited research on how authority figures and structures are 
combining contemporary social realities and the Internet with gender, as well as on 
how Muslim women are applying the Internet, and the degree to which they are 
“content originators”, and not just “simply content” (Bunt 2003: 210; Chawki 2010; 
Imtoual & Hussein 2009; Marcotte 2015; Piela 2010). In particular, it has been 
documented that there is a dearth of online research on issues of sexuality and the 
sexual health of Muslim women (Chawki 2010; Imtoual & Hussein 2009; Marcotte 
2015; Piela 2010).   
 
The few existing studies point to the Internet as a unique, innovative and democratic 
space for such research because firstly, it “obscures the line between public and 
private spaces” (Kort 2005: 367), opening the latter to marginalised audiences like 
women, who have been traditionally excluded from male-dominated spaces of public 
Islam, thereby fostering a sense of community and belonging (Bunt 2003; Chawki 
2010; Imtoual & Hussein 2009; Kort, 2005). Secondly, the Internet enables 
engagement about sexuality, sexual health, gendered identities and religiosity in an 
uninhibited way due to the anonymity of online dealings, allowing for easier access to 
health seeking advice from jurisconsults on fatwa sites, and to other community 
members in vibrant online forums (Read Kort 2006; Piela 2010 Marcotte 2015). It has 
also been argued that the mufti acts not only in the traditional role of jurisconsult, but 
also as a cyber-counsellor (Chawki 2010; Illar 2010; Sisler 2011). 
 
Current research on gender relations and sexual health concerns on online forums and 
fatwa sites further provide insights into the challenges and debates that arise out of 
changing social realities of contemporary Muslim society, and echoes Campbell’s 
hypothesis that what is happening online is a reflection of offline understandings, 
challenges and practice. It can also potentially inform sexual education practice and 
policy (Marcotte 2015; Piela 2010; Kort 2006). The dynamics of the online space also 
exemplifies Asad’s (1986) view of a discursive Islamic tradition which links 
traditional (past) discourses with future, alternative discourses on sexuality through 
interactions with (present) contemporary social realities.  
 
Kort’s (2006: 367) analyses of online interpretations of Q 4:34 and other pedagogical 
and edificatory material on domestic abuse on four Muslim websites is a case in point. 
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The Internet  (what she refers to as Dar-al cyber Islam) enables the change and 
reformulation of traditional concepts of umma, ulama and ijtihād, contributing 
towards a “gradual process of reform” with regard to domestic violence, thereby 
empowering women. This reform occurs not by the inclusion of “radical or overly 
liberal views” but in a gradual process of “re-intellectualization of Islamic discourse”. 
Kort’s assessment of the notion of a “cyber-ummah” correlates with Ali Mazrui’s and 
Alamin Mazrui’s (2001) thesis that “new technology will give Islam a chance to 
realise its original aim of transnational universalism” (quoted in Kort 2006: 367). I 
attend to her thesis further in detail below. 
 
Adding to this, Anna Piela (2010: 250) explores Muslim women’s discursive online 
interactions on gender relations and maintains that the Internet provides an “agora” 
where women explore each other’s Islamic identities, and “piety is fostered through 
online interactions with Islamic knowledge” and in the “cyber umma”. A strong sense 
of belonging and a supportive accepting online community in which women are 
willing to “coexist and collaborate” is thus created.  
  
This signals a departure from localized Islamic identities and a potential to negotiate 
new, global ones based on a celebration of commonalities and an awareness of 
differences, [further enabling the generation of new and alternative discourses] (Piela 
2010: 433-434).  
 
In spite of these alternatives, women still tend to make choices that make them 
complicit in their subordination in a form of “patriarchal bargaining”.49 In a study of 
what the researchers call “ the myth of the happy celibate”, Alia Imtoual and Shakira 
Hussein examine the range of competing and contradictory online gendered 
discourses on female desire and celibacy, illustrating how disparities between 
contemporary realities and conservative discourses on sexual purity, desire, consent, 
and chastity conflates with faith identity, and results in “Muslim women making 
choices which reduce autonomy and bolster patriarchal constructions of womanhood” 
(Imtoual & Hussein 2009: 29). This resonates with Hoel and Shaikh’s (2013) 
argument mentioned earlier, about how normative understandings of the God believer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Kandiyoti (1988) quoted in Imtoual & Hussein (2009: 29). 
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relationship generated internalized ambivalent religious subjectivities that limited 
Muslim women’s sexual health.  
 
The extent to which young Muslims in a minority context unproblematically 
subscribe to this normative position, and paradoxically combine it with contemporary 
understandings and attitudes on sexual issues, was the focus of Roxanne Marcotte’s 
(2015) “crypto ethnographical” study on another online space where Muslim women 
negotiate issues of sexual health space, the popular Australian Muslim online site: 
Muslim village. As another example of the discursiveness of the sexual health online 
landscape of Muslim women, she explored to what extent a “virtual environment can 
lend itself to expressions of more creative, indigenous and hybrid gendered discourses 
(2015: 65). Through discussions on sexuality (including marital rape), ordinary 
women’s opinions matched those of renowned academics Ali (2006) and Mir 
Hosseini (2009), and interrogated the theoretical-legal perspectives on consent and 
sexual agency. Women noted the dissonance between their modern notions of 
marriage, inclusive of consent and mutuality, and a classical framework in which 
consent and sexual agency is tenuous; with the result they rejected traditional binary 
discourses of female sexuality.50  
 
What is especially noteworthy for my research on online fatwa’s and sexual health is 
the trend noted by both Marcotte, and Imtoual and Hussein of male forum 
contributors ignoring Muslim women’s sexuality by “interpolating a Muslim male 
audience for their comments and thus ignoring Muslim women or by sexualizing non-
Muslim women and by default de-sexualising Muslim women” (2009:  35). It remains 
to be seen if the male participants on women’s sexual agency in my research on the 
fatwas of Ebrahim Desai are similarly inclined. Particularly in Marcotte’s study, 
women responded to male gendered discourses that downplayed their sexual health 
concerns, by accessing fatwas which upheld the over-riding principle of not 
perpetrating undue harm and ensuring protection of one’s body as part of faith, 
thereby exercising agency. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Women in Marcotte’s study rejected the binary discourse of the chaste, virtuous virgin or wife, 
versus the licentious, lustful, divorced or widowed temptress also reflected in Ali’s (2006), Anwar’s 
(2006) and Sabbah’s (1986) synopsis of classical Islam’s paradoxical portrayal of male and female 
sexuality.  
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In summation, this section briefly surveyed the field of limited scholarly work on 
contemporary Muslim women’s online sexual health issues within a discursive 
Islamic tradition, showcasing the tensions between women’s modern expectations and 
experiences of sex as including of mutuality and reciprocity and traditional notions 
located in textual sources and classical juristic doctrine. It detailed the Internet’s 
potential for new usages and practices particularly in activism and decision-making, 
and clarified its role as a democratic, innovative and easily accessible space providing 
anonymity and ease in health seeking behaviour, particularly around sex and 
sexuality. The assertions in this section point to the Internet’s ability to provide a 
portal into the contemporary discursive Islamic landscape, of which fatwas “constitute 
an important aspect “, by virtue of providing us with “insight into the dynamics of 
continuity and change in the Islamic tradition” (Larsen 2015: 202).  
 
In the next section, I provide an appraisal of current research on online fatwas within 
minority contexts. I also detail the importance of online fatwas as accounts of 
women’s sexual reproductive health concerns, culminating with an overview of recent 
research on the fatwas of mufti Ebrahim Desai and his website, askimam.org. This is 
because the primary sources utilized in this study to gather information on Muslim 
women’s sexual agency in contemporary contexts are Desai’s online fatwas on his 
website askimam.org.  
 
2.4  Online Fatwas 
 
It is precisely the imaginary space of transnational umma (Muslim community), 
enhanced by the Internet and communication technologies, where the traditional 
Islamic law regains its significance and relevance to the daily life through constant 
discussions, inquiries and admonitions (Sisler 2009: 56). 
 
Because of their non-binding nature, fatwa websites enable individualisation 
promoting voluntary adherence to Islamic law (Chawki 2010; Hossain 2002). 
Cyberspace can be a great help in issuing fatwas, all of which may enrich people’s 
lives. Numerous help-seeking questions posed to cyber-counsellors on existing sites 
are of an extremely sensitive nature, often pertaining to issues of a sexual or marital 
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nature, which could be difficult to discuss in an offline encounter with a religious 
authority figure (Bunt 2003; Chawki 2010). 
 
It is useful here to contemplate the link between the attainment of piety (by pleasing 
God in all worldly interactions and activities) and sexual intimacy as revealed by Hoel 
and Shaikh (2013) in their nuanced analysis of the sacredness of sex. Scholars suggest 
the moral juridical nature of fatwas means that they are sought by individuals 
including women, towards the attainment of piety even in sexual dealings. This 
accords with the two qualifiers already mentioned for studying gender and sexuality 
online, namely a democratic open space for deeply personal and sensitive doctrinal 
issues to be raised, and the anonymity afforded by the virtual realm (Marcotte 2010; 
Piela 2010; Kort 2006). The Internet, as already noted, functions as a mediator of 
religious practice, where some religious opinions and questions are easier to articulate 
in cyberspace than the physical world.  
 
Ensuing from this, my research on the sexual agency of women in online fatwas 
intends to delve into this relatively unexplored area. In addition, scholars note too that 
the enhanced interactivity and depth provided by Internet sites and the transnational 
audiences they attract allow fatwa sites to influence and shape Muslim opinion in 
transnational contexts and contribute to the transformations of religious 
understandings and expressions in relation to existing norms in those contexts 
(Kutcsher 2009; Mazrui and Mazrui 2001; Bunt 2003).   
 
Amongst some of the concerns in existing research on online fatwas is that it is 
difficult to gauge the impact of the fatwas because of the fluid nature of the Internet, 
and the implications of placing sensitive information online where the contexts are not 
entirely understood by participants. Other considerations include questions on how 
the mufti’s process and access the information. In relation to the fatwas of mufti 
Ebrahim Desai, the effect or influence of the mufti’s advice cannot be gauged (Bunt 
2003) but the interlocutionary space provided by the fatwas can still tell stories of 
ordinary people’s lives, thus tying in with both Campbell’s (2012) thesis above on the 
nature of online religion as an indicator of societal realities, and Mathee’s (2013) 
description above of the story-telling nature of a fatwa. The clear benefits for ordinary 
people to be able to access scholarly opinions on issues of Islamic jurisprudence can 
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also pose a threat to classical jurisprudential rules. The proliferation of cyber fatwas 
results in “fatwa shopping” which creates “confusion, uncertainty and discordance”, 
and “deharmonizes Islamic jurisprudence online”. In addition, the tensions created 
between modern practices and classical doctrine lead to competition between the 
different juriconsults for their political legal interpretations to be authoritative and 
legitimate over each other’s  (Illar 2010: 591). 
 
In the offline world, the process of asking for a fatwa on intimate personal issues, 
characterised in the exchange between the question of the questioner and the answer 
of the mufti, is a regular occurrence, but the information is not publicly available for 
study. Only a few studies have been done in South Africa on the content of 
contemporary fatwas, one of these on gelatine (Mitha 2012) and another on ulama 
divorce records (Toefy 2002). In the online world, fatwas are more easily accessible 
and available for research and those in minority contexts further accord with 
previously mentioned research on Islam and the Internet: increased individualisation 
and privatization of faith, an undermining of established religious authority, 
displacing of traditional authority structures, and potentially influencing educational 
and legislative policies.  
 
Vit Sisler’s work on “Islamic cyber-counselling” on four minority context fatwa 
websites demonstrates that since the Internet enables fatwas to be generated 
depending on the amount and type of petitions websites aggregate, it allows for a 
“bottom-up approach”, permitting ordinary Muslims, the petitioners, to “set the 
agenda for the issues to be discussed on most …websites”, and constituting “a new 
manifestation of a Muslim umma where there is independence from traditional 
religious authority and institutional hegemony…” (2011: 1152-1153).  
 
In an earlier study on the conflicts and negotiations in fatwas between Islamic law and 
European legal systems, Sisler argues that through the new public sphere of the 
Internet, “different and often conflicting concepts of coexistence between Islam and 
the state are negotiated” (2009: 51). The concepts that emerge out of these 
interactions can subsequently inform and influence the legislative processes involved 
with incorporating aspects of Islamic law into the secular legal system, like the 
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already present incorporation of mediation and arbitration institutions for Muslim 
marriages into European legal systems.  
 
Other research on online fatwas include the difference between private and state 
mufti’s (Kutscher 2009) and analytical comparisons of private websites in minority 
contexts, including the fatwa sites of mufti Ebrahim Desai (Bunt 2013: 167-179; 
Chawki 2010; Kort 2006; Kutscher 2009). The most recent research by Larsen (2015) 
dealt with fatwas on spousal rights and roles in Western European contexts where 
marriages of mutuality and shared responsibilities prevail. Larsen showed how 
petitioners grappled with the dissonance between their modern lived realities of 
marriage and the legal norms dictating wifely obedience stemming from foundational 
sources. Mufti’s answers, in turn, reflected attempts to promote reconciliation, to 
protect the “stability of the Muslim family in the West” and to stay “within the 
parameters of the dominant legal opinions in transnational Muslim fatwa discourse 
delineat [ing] the boundaries within which they can deliver new fatwas” (Larsen 
2015: 216). 
 
2.4.1  Askimam.org 
 
Ask-imam represents a Muslim institution/individual in a minority context, which 
has acquired a broad global audience for its opinions, which are sought from a 
variety of religious perspectives. Several new ‘fatwas’ emerge on the site everyday, 
making this a site likely to receive substantial return visits from interested surfers. 
The questions themselves indicate some of the challenges facing Muslims today, 
although it is not possible to quantify the effect or influence that this information has 
on individuals or communities (Bunt 2003: 171). 
 
Sisler (2009: 65) argues that askimam.org appears to be “a technically-updated 
mirror” of the site ask-imam.com, which is described by Bunt (2003: 167-172) as well 
organized and easily searchable, presenting “English language resources and 
opinions” and giving a local South African Imam international prominence. Through 
his website Desai has acquired a global audience and generated numerous concise 
fatwas in categories like marriage, prayer, women and health and wellness (Bunt 
2003: 167-168).  
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Answers on the website reflect the religious outlook of the Deoband Hanafi school of 
thought and are concise, do not always provide substantial textual analysis and 
justifications, and acknowledge the difference between ijtihād and fatwas.51 His 
approach “follows casuistic and legalistic interpretations of sharī‘a (Islamic law) 
focussing more on individual deeds and their requirements” (Sisler 2009: 65).   
 
The range of questions on his site reflects many themes addressed on other sites, and 
are handled with “seriousness and sensitivity” (Bunt 2003: 167-68). Answers though 
tend to diverge from those on Muslim majority sites, reflecting more the 
contemporary challenges of Muslims in minority contexts (Bunt 2003; Chawki 2010; 
Kutscher 2009; Kort 2006). This is salient since scholars have noted that some fatwa 
sites in Muslim minority contexts are more open and pragmatic in dealing with 
contemporary challenges and others are more conservative and limited (Kutscher 
2009; Chawki 2010). Studies on Desai’s online fatwas make arguments for both 
conservative (Kutscher 2009: 39) as well as reforming trends (Kort 2006: 378-380), 
the latter particularly on the issue of domestic violence.  
 
In an analytical comparison of fatwas dealing with Muslim perspectives of non-
Muslims in a minority context, Kutscher describes askimam.org as “conservative” and 
“supporting counter-societal developments” probably due to the “mufti’s ideological 
geographical and educational environment”. He contends the apartheid system of 
“non-integration” may have somewhat contributed to the Desai’s conservative and 
mono-doctrinal orientation (2009: 39).  
 
In contrast, Kort (2006: 378) demonstrates reforming trends in Desai’s fatwas relating 
to domestic abuse. Referring to a particular fatwa generated on the earlier site, ask-
imam.com, she states: “Desai powerfully comes out and says to men that it is totally 
unacceptable and un-Islamic to harm their wives in any way, regardless of what the 
Quran may or may not say”. She calls this the “most revolutionary step towards 
Islamic reformation on the issue of violence against women”. In Kort’s assessment, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Bunt (2003: 172) asserts that Desai and his team don’t regard themselves as mujtahids (those 
scholars who engage in ijtihād). Their process of iftā is regarded by them instead as taqlīd  (the practice 
of following the opinions of others, or even of an established school of law).  See Chapter four on the 
typologies of muftiship.  
	   53	  
Desai promotes “self-accountability, reform and a no-harm approach”, affecting a 
strong move away from traditional conservative perspectives on domestic abuse.  
 
In summation, this section provided an overview of fatwa sites and online fatwas as 
an important feature of the discursive Islamic landscape by virtue of providing 
insights into the changing relationship between legal argument and interpretation and 
people’s social realities as portrayed in them. The anonymity provided by the online 
space allows for the generation of fatwas on a range of issues including sexual 
reproductive concerns. Recent research on askimam.org argues for both conservative 
and reforming trends on the website. Kort’s study on domestic abuse which took the 
latter position, was the only one I located which focused on sexual health within the 
fatwas of mufti Ebrahim Desai on askimam.org, exposing a substantial gap in the 
research on how South African-based online fatwas are “telling stories” (Mathee 
2011: 26) on women’s sexual health and to what extent contemporary experiences and 
social realities influence these fatwas.  
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
This study has the potential to expand the scope of ‘sexual agency’ by focusing on 
Muslim marriage, the classical legal construct of which entails gendered provisions, 
which bring a woman’s right to self-determination, sexual agency and autonomy 
under the dominion of her husband, where it is potentially curtailed and where sexual 
availability is linked to financial controls. Foundational religious texts are employed 
in jurisprudential works to create a normative perspective of male sexual dominance 
and female sexual passivity. These exist alongside contrasting notions of a positive 
sexuality and a potent dangerous female sexuality, which in turn, justify onerous 
societal controls and restrictions of women. Alternative reformist readings and usage 
of foundational texts have proposed a reformulation of the classical legal system of 
Muslim marriage away from dominion, towards mutuality and reciprocity. In minority 
contexts, women’s lived experiences exist in tension with mainstream readings and 
subsequent societal controls, and can provide new understandings of foundational 
texts, potentially leading to reform efforts in terms of legal rulings.  
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The literature further indicated that in South Africa, debates between the ulama and 
the State on the regulation of Muslim marriages are ongoing. They too include 
negotiating between classical notions of marriage, which are framed on non-mutuality 
and sexual availability, and contemporary notions specific to the South African legal 
context. I add here a notable gap in the research that is outside the scope of my study, 
which is to gauge independent Muslim women’s lived experience, understandings and 
practice of contemporary marriage in South Africa, in relation to their perspectives on 
the proposed Muslim Marriages Bill. 
 
Recent research also confirms that the Internet has generated increased 
individualization and privatization of religion, new usages in activism and decision-
making and that online religious interaction can provide a glimpse into offline social 
conditions and religious practices and potentially change offline religious 
manifestations in changing contemporary social realities. In particular, online fatwas 
have the potential to undermine other forms of religious authority and inform secular 
legislative processes and policies for Muslims in minority contexts as well as 
contribute towards reforming trends in women’s sexual health issues by providing 
new perspectives on contemporary lived realities of ordinary Muslims. 
 
Easy access by Muslims to online jurisconsults and the anonymity provided by the 
Internet allows for freedom to articulate intimate sexual issues and seek counselling 
and religious legal advice. There is a paucity of research on how these mediations on 
sexual reproductive health needs happen online, and specifically how sexual agency is 
articulated and negotiated in online fatwas. Research on how authority figures and 
structures are combining contemporary social realities and the Internet with gender 
concerns, how Muslim women are applying the resources offered on the Internet and 
to what extent they are contributors and not just content subjects is also limited.  
 
The assertions in this section point to the Internet’s ability to provide a portal into the 
contemporary discursive Islamic landscape, of which fatwas “constitute an important 
aspect”, by virtue of providing us with “insight into the dynamics of continuity and 
change in the Islamic tradition” (Larsen 2015: 202). Researching sexual agency in the 
online fatwas of a South African religious scholar who identifies with the Deoband 
legal school thought from India, where forty per cent of South African Muslims have 
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their roots, provides insights into the mediation of religious knowledge with sexual 
and reproductive health concerns amongst Muslim men and women. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This chapter describes the theoretical research paradigm of this study. It traces the 
history of feminist theory, and its fraught relationship with religion, particularly 
Islam, linking my own ontological position. It explains feminist post structural theory 
for investigating women’s religious experiences in a non-liberal tradition, where 
notions of freedom and agency do not align easily with liberal ideas. 
   
3.1  Reflections 
 
In this section I contextualize my motivations, experiences and ontological 
(re)positioning in order to highlight personal, social and geo-political influences on 
this study. Keeping in mind that intellectual rigour through constant self-reflexivity 
rather than the attainment of complete objectivity is a feature of the post structural 
research paradigm, my personal location also informs my intellectual work, and must 
be declared at the outset.   
 
Shaikh (2003) notes that Muslim women’s experiences of Islam within varying social, 
economic and cultural milieu fall somewhere on the continuum of a just ethical Islam 
and an expression of Islam that marginalizes and oppresses. In this respect, my 
experience as a middle class South African Muslim woman of Indian ancestry has 
been one of tension and dissonance between an ethics of justice and equality which I 
read in Islam’s primary texts, and my experience of a patriarchal communal Islam 
characterised by gender conservatism and exclusion. This has motivated my rejection 
of androcentric normative trends in search of a more inclusive public Islam. My 
personal intellectual and spiritual pursuits are influenced by the exposure in Quranic 
study groups (halaqāt) to the writings of a wide range of modernist and feminist 
Muslim scholars. Through these readings I was further emboldened by a reading of 
Islamic history which engaged with issues of gender justice. 
 
The socio-political context of apartheid South Africa formed the backdrop for my 
engagement with the Islamic ideals of social justice and equality of all human beings, 
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made salient within the progressive Muslim movement in South Africa. This further 
informed my activism in the quest for gender justice within my community where I 
was involved in what Margot Badran52 describes as “movement activism”53 within the 
structures of the Muslim Youth Movement. Further, I have engaged in grassroots 
women-led initiatives, particularly to promote women’s access to the mosque and 
Eid-Gah54, which challenged masculine spiritual privilege and promoted inclusion of 
women in sacred spaces.  
 
Muslim women’s responses to masculine bias have been varying and diverse. It has 
been documented that some women adopt a secularist stance in a complete rejection 
of religion, perceiving patriarchy and androcentrism to be so integral to faith that any 
reforms can only happen outside of religion; others internalize the sexism inherent in 
normative expressions of Islam and promote these as Islamic; while others in varying 
contexts, regard faith as integral to an uncompromising realization of ideals of gender 
justice and equality (Rhouni 2008; Seedat 2013; Shaikh 2003; Zine 2004; 2006). It is 
in the latter group that I locate myself as a believing Muslim woman. 
 
With this ontological position, I feel it prudent to qualify my use of feminist theory 
due its contested nature, both within the house of Islam and within the field of 
feminism itself. My use of feminist theory is cognisant of the contentions of the field 
of feminism, the uncertain position of religion in feminist theorizing, and the fraught 
relationship between Islam and feminism.  
 
3.2  Feminism and Islam 
 
There is not a single definition of “feminism” because the feminist movement 
comprises various articulations such as liberal, radical, Marxist, socialist, 
psychoanalytical, post-modernist and postcolonial. Feminist critique of patriarchal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Margot Badran, “Feminism,” in The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, ed. John 
Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
53 Shaikh (2003: 157) states that Badran describes three types of feminist expression amongst Muslim 
women, namely feminist writing, everyday activism and movement activism which includes “political 
and even confrontational movements for women’s emancipation”.  
54 “An open space usually on the outskirts of the city where the Prophet preferred to perform the Eid 
Prayer” (Ismail 2002: 36).  
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values and interests in social theory displaces the normativeness of the experience and 
knowledge of the rational unitary male subject who sets the standard for all other 
knowledges and experiences (Gandhi 1998; Hesse-Biber 2013; Mama 2002; Weedon 
1987). The focus on women’s experience in the process of knowledge production 
highlights the asymmetrical gender constructs within various locations in society. 
(Appelrouth & Edles, 2010: 331).  
 
In the late 20th century, the critique of feminists of colour and third world feminists 
showed the feminism of its time to be permeated by a “liberal individualism” which 
undermined its project (Hooks 1984: 8). Interrogating the interconnectedness of 
categories of difference amongst them, such as race, class, and nationality, they 
provided insights for women beyond the white middle class subject of Western 
feminism. They challenged the universalizing assumptions of a homogenous 
“common oppression” which mystified and obscured working class and third world 
women’s struggles (Fourie 2001; Harding 1986; Hooks 1984; Mama 2002; Mohanty 
1988; Mohanty 2003; Zine 2002).  
 
In response to these critiques by third world women and through interactions with 
movements like post colonialism and post modernism, the diversity and plurality of 
women’s experiences was included by Western feminist theorists and feminist 
research took a turn towards “difference research” (Hesse-Biber 2013: 6). Despite 
attempts to record the experiences and realities of third world women, these 
endeavours were nevertheless regarded by third world feminists as lacking in rigour, 
meticulous research and nuance, instead homogenizing the plight of third world 
women and producing a ‘monolithic’ object; a woman whose cultural and religio-
political contexts rendered her passive and without agency and voice.  
 
Western feminists alone become the true ‘subjects’ of this counter history. Third 
world women on the other hand never rise above the debilitating generality of their 
‘object’ status (Mohanty 1988: 80). 
 
This insular approach of Western feminists to third world and black women has 
nowadays been re-inscribed to Muslim women against prevailing imperialist and neo-
colonial reductive narratives of a misogynistic oppressive Islam, so that Muslim 
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women are similarly cast as a homogenized, monolithic subjugated entity in need of 
saving (Abu Lughod 2002; Hoel 2013; Shaikh 2003; Thobani 2005; Zine 2002). 
There appears to be a lack of astute analysis and meticulous research of the 
experiences and perspectives of Muslim women by Western scholars who ordinarily 
regard themselves as cognisant of questions of diversity, so that distortions that 
entrench and support negative stereotypes of Muslim women are favoured. 
 
This reductionism, says Shaikh, is connected to an increasing global presence of 
Islamophobia (2012: 287), providing the rationale for why even some third world 
feminists who contest Western essentialising tropes of themselves, produce an 
analogous treatment of Muslim women and Islam. As a case in point, Shirin Edwin 
(2007) argues that African feminists in shaping a place for African feminist thought, 
are guilty of bias against Islam and its role in the lives and experiences of many 
African women. Through an analysis of the work of Nigerian novelist Zaynab Alkali, 
Edwin (2007) notes how African feminists paradoxically discredit Islamic marriage 
practices while defending similar practices like polygyny and dower in traditional 
African societies.  
 
In addition to the current cultivation of Islamophobia, racism and “Othering” of 
Muslims post-911, historically a “vexed” relationship between Islam and feminism 
has existed, borne out of the latter’s’ historical association with Empire (Mahmood 
2011: 1). Discourses on Islam, feminism and gender rights are embedded in a history 
of Christian/Muslim conflict, “colonial and neo-colonial civilizing missions in 
Muslim territories, nationalist responses to colonialism and orientalist scholarship” 
(Shaikh 2003: 149).  
 
As Shaikh (2003:149) argues, the consequences to the reductive xenophobic and 
racist misrepresentations of Muslims has been a “reactive siege mentality” and 
“defensive posturing towards the West” or alternative counter representations of the 
West as a monolithic immoral and greedy entity. Because feminism, due to its 
imperialist colonialist legacy has been discredited and heavily stereotyped within 
Muslim communities, women who don its label or use its tools are similarly maligned 
and discredited. Muslim women and men with feminist commitments thus find 
themselves in a minefield, 
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…having to navigate the terrain between being critical of sexist interpretations of 
Islam and patriarchy in their religious communities, while simultaneously criticizing 
neo-colonial feminist discourses on Islam. The fact that Muslim women resist both 
narratives while sometimes moving between their critiques is a consequence of the 
way in which they are situated within this larger minefield (Shaikh 2003: 155) 
 
A complexity is thus created in how and where women are situated within both 
narratives. Particularly, Muslim women who do feminist work, like myself, are wary 
of these geo-political and communal landscapes in which our work is undertaken and 
how our communities perceive the use of theoretical lenses like feminism.  
 
Jasmin Zine suggests that by revealing and challenging some of the oppressive power 
dynamics in our societies, rupturing and interrogating patriarchal and hierarchical 
gender constructs, we risk being co-opted by the imperialist agenda and understood as 
further entrenching and supporting the current political climate of rampant 
Islamophobia and racism on the one hand, while simultaneously within our 
communities, accused of being agents of Western imperialism (2006: 11-15). Zine 
quotes Khan (2001) and states:   
 
As researchers we must be not only responsible for what we write, but also ‘examine 
how our work might be read given that racism and imperialism influence out lives’ 
(Zine 2006: 15).  
 
Therefore the convergence of Islam and feminism is cautious and fraught and there is 
no single set of principles that can be defined as an essential monolithic Islamic 
feminism. 
  
Amongst Muslim women who do gender work, some operate from outside a faith 
paradigm rejecting Islam altogether as a means for reform, while others whose gender 
affirmative work arises out of a faith imperative have varying and conflicting 
positions amongst themselves. Amongst these, some adopt the label, others eschew it 
but make use of feminist tools, others internalize paternalist discourses and defend 
them using the apologetic neo traditional rhetoric of complementary roles, and others 
easily adopt the “feminist” label without the “Islam” qualifier (Abu-Lughod 2002; 
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Badran 2005; Hoel 2013; Seedat 2013a; Seedat 2103b; Shaikh 2003; Zine 2002; Zine 
2006: 11). 
 
In accommodating these various positions, Fatima Seedat (2013a; 2013b) in her 
recent scholarship on the convergence of Islam and feminism, argues for a tentative 
productive space between the two paradigms. This avoids “easy conflations or 
inflations of the space between them”, and maintains instead “a critical view of how 
and why they may or may not converge”. The conundrum that Muslim women face, 
says Seedat, is not their “inability to articulate their position”, or what to call their 
equality work, but rather how to “locate this work given the pre-existing discursive 
frameworks that insist on claiming all struggles for sex equality within the framework 
of feminism” (Seedat 2013b: 43). Seedat's assertion resonates, as does her view that 
Islamic feminism is most valid when it is self-critical, aligns against empire, and is 
embedded in a broader critique of inequality and injustice. Taking into cognisance my 
geographical, ideological and spiritual positioning as earlier outlined, Islamic 
feminism is thus relevantly described for me by Shaikh as, “one of the most engaged 
contemporary responses to the core Quranic injunction for social justice of our time” 
(2003: 159). 
 
Shaikh insists that the term “feminist” is valuable to retain because it “situates 
women’s praxis in a global political landscape”, provides for collaboration and 
alliances for shared strategies between feminists in varying locations, and it creates a 
shared vocabulary for  “critical consciousness surrounding gender politics”. By not 
embracing the term and rejecting it as a Western concept, we are conceding that 
gender rights discourses belong to the West and this marginalises the “indigenous 
histories of protest and resistance to patriarchy by non-Western women” (2003: 155). 
 
Shaikh’s argument for retaining the term is augmented by recent positive trends that 
are beginning to contribute to the further transformation of the contours of feminism. 
Generally, the inclusion of women’s religiosity within dominant feminist discourses 
(Hoel 2013: 75) has not adequately integrated “women’s faith commitments and 
participation in non-liberal traditions” like Islam (75). Saba Mahmood’s (2011) work 
on women’s agency and freedom within the pietistic movement in Egypt is a case in 
point. Mahmood illustrated how the secular liberal framework of feminism could not 
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embrace the agency of pious believing women. But as Hoel argues, critiques by 3rd 
world women and believing women particularly those in non-liberal traditions, is 
beginning to result in a multiplicity of articulations of feminism. In this way the 
contours of feminism continue to be reconstituted and become increasingly varied, 
versatile and nuanced, incorporating “broader questions of diversity, location, and the 
fluidity of multiple subjectivities”, through the introduction of new “productive 
conceptual and analytical methodologies” as well as incorporating the “liberatory 
potential” of non-liberal faith traditions, thereby extricating “feminist theorising from 




It is in this vein that I turn to feminist post-structural theory as an appropriate theory 
for my study of women’s sexual agency in online fatwas. It provides space to engage 
in gender affirmative work from within a non-liberal faith paradigm and allows me to 
both expose oppressive gender power dynamics and to uncover potential liberating 
and transformative impulses that arise from within this paradigm.  
 
3.3  Feminist Post Structural Theory 
 
Feminist post structural theory (FPST) came about as a response to the critique that 
women’s experience alone is not a sufficiently rigorous measure of analysis. It was 
offered as a theory with an agenda to transform knowledge production and women’s 
access to knowledge, through an understanding of their experience as it relates to 
power within society (Appelrouth & Edles 2010; Chopp 1996; Mama 2002; Weedon 
1987). It is a theory that accommodates different and competing subjective positions 
without necessarily having a particular “truth value”;  
 
… It is not enough to refer unproblematically to experience…we need a theory of the 
relationship between experience, social power and resistance…Theory must be able 
to address women’s experience by showing where it comes from and how it relates to 
material social practices and the power relations which structure them. It must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Hoel (2013: 80-81) refers to productive methodologies like ‘intersectionality’, ‘situated knowledges’ 
and ‘politics of location’, by Crenshaw (1995), Haraway (1991) and Rich (1986) respectively.  She 
argues that these more nuanced feminist lenses “cultivate a fertile ground for the study of religion, 
religious lives and feminist approaches to religion in particular”.  
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able to recognise and account for competing subjective realities and demonstrate the 
social interests on behalf of which they work (Weedon 1987: 8).  
 
Subsequently, feminist scholars (Mama 2002; Weedon 1987) suggested FPST as the 
ideal theoretical lens in this regard. It is also a theory with an emphasis on knowledge 
production through an exploration of relations of language, social constructs and 
processes, subjectivities and power, which assists in “understanding, changing and 
transforming social and cultural practices that constitute, reproduce and contest 
gender power relations” (Weedon 1987: vi).  
 
Relevantly, Judith Baxter distinguishes ‘post structuralism’ from the general 
philosophical movement ‘post modernism’ as a branch of the latter, in that it is not, 
  
…specific to a single school of thought or academic discipline, but is constituted by a 
plurality of theoretical positions. However, the specific locus of its interest is in 
language as a ‘site’ for the construction and contestation of social meanings (Baxter 
2003: 6). 
 
Hence it is through language that an analysis of power, social meanings and 
construction of subjectivities is done. By examining sexual agency in the online 
fatwas of mufti Ebrahim Desai, the main research question, which is to identify the 
discursive representation of sexual agency in online fatwas, will be attended to within 
a feminist post structural paradigm, so that the interplay of knowledge, power and 
social practice and their influence on the construction and experience of the sexual 
agency of Muslim women is revealed. Fatwas themselves are also 
 
…considered as discourses between the petitioner and the mufti, or as an interplay 
between legal argument and social and cultural reality. Fatwas can therefore provide 
us with insight into the dynamics of continuity and change in the [discursive] Islamic 
tradition (Larsen 2015: 202). 
 
In their Foucaldian designations, power and forms of knowledge are inextricably 
linked, producing subjects through a series of discursive practices. Relatedly, “post 
structuralism proposes a subjectivity which is precarious, contradictory and in 
process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak” 
(Weedon 1987: 32), thereby accommodating subjectivities which are multiple and 
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dynamic, continuously produced in the course of social relations, and providing for a 
more nuanced data collection and analysis process. For example, in my interrogation 
of the fatwas, FPST allowed for simultaneous and competing subject positions 
amongst all participants, in which power and powerlessness was in a constantly fluid 
and changing system. Post structuralism is therefore appropriate to the feminist 
concerns of this research, 
 
…not as the answer to all feminist questions but as a way of conceptualising the 
relationship between language, social institutions and individual consciousness which 
focuses on how power is exercised and on the possibilities for change (Weedon 1987: 
19). 
 
3.3.1  Feminist Post Structural Theory and Fatwas 
 
In diverse historical settings of restricted literacy and restricted control of the 
essential cultural capital that sharī‘a knowledge represents, the relation between 
mufti and questioner is a relation of power  (Masud, Messick & Powers 1996: 21). 
 
Underpinning the interlocutory space of the fatwas, amongst the questioner (mustafti) 
and the mufti and the question (istiftā ) and answer (iftā) “lies a complex social and 
interpretive relation”. The trust and reliance placed on the fatwa by the mustafti is 
inextricably dependent on their reliance on the mufti’s piety, religious knowledge and 
sense of justice. Of relevance too is an understanding of the social relation between 
knowledge and power, as the “conceptual distinction between the mufti and mustafti, 
involve[es] diametrically opposed statuses with respect to the key activity of sharī‘a 
interpretation” (Masud, Messick & Powers 1996: 20-21). In this social relation only 
the Mufti is regarded as the interpreter and the questioner is the follower, establishing 
a wide hierarchical difference between the two.  
 
But this is not only true for historical settings and fatwas. Contemporary online fatwas 
exhibit a similar relation of power. As a case in point, a question from a petitioner in 
South Africa posed to the Mufti on askimam.org states:  
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I would be very much grateful if you could kindly tell me the definition of fatwa and 
its important . insyaAllah with ur  sharing i will share the knowledge to my friends56  
 
The hierarchical difference between the petitioner and the mufti produces a discourse 
of power in relation to sharī‘a knowledge as seen in the petitioner’s trust and 
dependence on the Mufti’s knowledge. The petitioner has also donned a follower 
status, promising to disseminate the knowledge.  
 
Potentially, imposing a post structural lens onto the online fatwas of Ebrahim Desai in 
this research study, provides us with further “insight into the dynamics of continuity 
and change” (Larsen 2015: 202) with regards to sexual health rights in the discursive 
Islamic tradition, and potentially exposes shifts and displacements in the relation of 
power between male and female members of society, the mufti, his students and his 
doctrinal school. 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a description of my ontological positioning, located my 
motivations and experiences and highlighted particular personal, social and geo-
political influences that had a bearing on my choice of FPST as a research paradigm.  
Against the backdrop of the fraught and vexed relationship between feminism and 
Islam, FPST’s contention that there is no particular truth value, and its ability to 
explain why women accept subordinate subjective positions, rendered it a relevant 
feminist lens for centralising women’s faith-based lived experiences, understandings 
and practices within a non-liberal tradition like Islam. The next chapter provides an 




   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  See Fatwa # 18511 called Fatwa Y in Appendix 2 
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This chapter sketches the analytical methodologies and the research design used in 
this study. A feminist post structural discourse analysis framework (FPDA) in 
conjunction with traditional analytical approaches deployed by classical legal scholars 
is employed in this study, in order to produce the instruments, the data and to generate 
the analysis.  
 
In the first section, a synopsis will be provided of both FPDA and the classical legal 
interpretive frameworks used for fatwas located in adab-al-mufti treatises as outlined 
by Masud, Messick and Powers (1996). Section two follows with a description of the 
research design, the rationale for using askimam.org, sampling and data sourcing and 
production.  
 
4.1  Analytical Approaches 
 
4.1.1  Feminist Post Structural Discourse Analysis (FPDA)  
 
In this study, the interplay of knowledge, power, social practice and their influence on 
the construction and experience of the sexual agency of Muslim women is revealed 
using a qualitative analytical approach of Feminist Post Structural Discourse Analysis 
(FPDA). 
 
Baxter describes FPDA as an analytical framework that is in line with feminist post 
structural theory (FPST), with its roots in post modernism. FPDA has a 
transformative agenda and is well suited to exploring how discourses shape and 
produce competing, and multiple subject positions in which power and powerlessness 
is in a constantly “fluid and changing matrix”. FPDA can be used as a supplementary 
analytical approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or Conversation Analysis 
(CA) and focuses on the complexity of subjects. It challenges polarisation and 
oppositional pairs of thought; and has an anti-materialist tendency where materiality 
is understood through cultural and social discourses (Baxter 2003: 42-57). In this 
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regard, FPDA cannot support any agenda that, in Michel Foucault’s terms, may 
become a ‘will to truth’ and therefore ‘a will to power’. In other words, FPDA cannot 
support a political or indeed, a theoretical mission, which might organise itself into a 
“regime of truth” and one day become its own “grand narrative” (Foucault 1980: 109-
133).  
 
Even though FPDA may be used as a supplementary analytical approach in relation to 
CDA, it is distinctive in that unlike CDA it does not give in to polarities. It does not 
presume that women are consistently disadvantaged or victims, explains the intricate 
patterns of relations of discourses that produce dramatic power shifts, and allows 
space for a multiplicity of subject positions of power and powerlessness, through 
“continuous shifts in the negotiation for power” (Baxter 2003: 48).  
 
Mahmood (2011) illustrated in her Politics of Piety that for women in non-liberal 
traditions like Islam, a secular liberal framework of agency and freedom precludes 
other versions of agency that are based on religious practices towards the attainment 
of piety. In view of Mahmood’s hypothesis and the description of FPDA above, the 
latter appears to be an appropriate methodology for analysing the discursive shifts of 
power exhibited by Muslim women, their husbands and the jurists in the fatwas.  
 
In addition to a FPDA framework, analytical approaches, which were traditionally 
deployed by classical Islamic legal scholars, were also used to analyse the fatwas in 
this study. The use of frameworks for analysing fatwas that stem from classical 
Islamic methodologies locates the work firmly within the traditional legal interpretive 
framework. As noted by Muslim feminist scholars, especially those doing tafsir work, 
locating the work firmly within the traditional methodological lineage while at the 
same time critiquing its androcentric underpinnings renders its feminist endeavour 
more credible than a methodology that ignores the historical analytic approaches of 
the Islamic sciences (Hidayatullah 2014: 33-36, 145).  
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4.1.2  Adab-al–Mufti Treatises 
 
The adab-al-mufti treatises of classical Muslim social and legal theorists, “elaborates 
on the detailed features of the mufti’s position and on the processes of the interpretive 
interchange” (Masud, Messick and Powers 1996: 15). They thus provide an overview 
of the classical legal interpretive framework for fatwa analysis. By paying attention to 
elements within classical treatises like the basic characteristics of a mufti, the 
conditions and requirements for the position, the kind of interpretive relation between 
muftis and questioners and the basic structural elements of the fatwas, Masud, 
Messick and Powers (1996) outline a substantial framework for the exploration of this 
specialized field of Islamic legal interpretation.  
 
In a case-based volume on Islamic legal interpretation dealing with fatwas from the 
pre-modern to the modern era, the above scholars suggest that compared to historical 
fatwas, modern fatwas deal more with broader social relations and issues of family 
law, while the discourses of modern muftis have been consciously revised to 
accommodate their “perceptions of new societal conditions” (Masud, Messick and 
Powers 1996: 29). In addition, new media technologies57 have altered fatwas through 
“basic discursive changes, a shift in authorial voice, new rhetorical forms, and a 
greatly expanded and differently constituted readership”. Finally, the transnational 
nature of modern fatwas tends to “speak to the common experiences of widely 
differing communities” (1996: 31).   
 
The authors’ compilation of the analyses of fatwas by various scholars from different 
disciplines indicates that even as these substantial shifts occur, the analytical 
approaches of classical legal theorists continue to be relevant for the analysis of the 
modern fatwa genre, and that “…the issuance of fatwas in the electronic media age 
retains some of the institution’s former character as a societal barometer, as modern 
muftis respond to the specific concerns and the changing worldly circumstances of 
their questioners” (31).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The authors refer specifically to print and broadcast media, but the same can be said for the online 
space (Masud, Messick and Powers 1996: 31).   
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I draw out their analytic method from the five strategies the editors proposed that 
contributors to their volume use when analysing individual fatwas, namely, to begin 
with the institutional context in which the fatwa arises, note the sources used by the 
mufti, “the language and rhetorical strategies employed, the method of reasoning and 
the intended audience” (1996: x). These five strategies, have been employed in this 
study as an analytical framework for examining sexual agency in online fatwas.  
 
The institutional context and sources used in Desai’s fatwas were outlined in chapter 
one through an overview of the Deoband school of thought and the genealogy of its 
curriculum. I add to it in this chapter through considerations of the mufti and 
muftiship. In terms of the additional strategies of exploring language and rhetorical 
approaches, I used rhetorical and language tools, noting too whether the tone in the 
fatwas resemble a rhetoric characteristic of the Deoband school, which Metcalf 
describes as that of utilising “a straightforward simple language, ideally accessible to 
anyone” (Metcalf 1996: 187). Some of language tools were drawn from a Hallidayan 
approach to linguistic analysis and were used to analyse the verbal text in some of the 
fatwas.58 In addition, Hilary Janks (1997: 335) provides a useful checklist for the 
systematic linguistic analysis of verbal texts, in order to provide for a richer more 
nuanced analysis.59  Some of these linguistic tools were used, and only when they 
were valuable for a textual analysis that complemented the strategy drawn from the 
work of Masud, Messick and Powers as outlined above. 
 
In terms of the last two proposed strategies, the method of reasoning and intended 
audience, I approach these through an analysis of the structure of the fatwa, the form 
of the disclaimer and the deconstruction of the answer as outlined below.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
58 The resources offered by Hallidayan grammar are often used as a heuristic device – a possible entry 
point - for the analysis of verbal texts often in a CDA approach. See Janks (1997: 335) and Wodak 
(2002: 16). I sparingly used some of these grammatical tools in the analysis of the fatwas.  
59 Janks’ checklist includes lexicalisation, patterns of transitivity, the use of active and passive voice, 
the use of passivisations and nominalisation, the choices of mood, the choices of modality or polarity, 
the thematic structure of the text, the information focus, and cohesion devices. Not all of these 
grammatical resources were employed for the text level analysis of the fatwas.  
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4.1.2.1  Considerations on Mufti’s and the Muftiship 
  
The adab-al-mufti treatises of the classical Muslim legal and social theorists explore 
the qualities of a mufti, the different typologies, 60the conditions for mufti candidates, 
and important features for the Muftiship.  
 
A mufti should be a pious person who is an expert in the field of Jurisprudence. …. A 
mufti who makes a fatwa founded on rumours and instincts will become a sinner and 
his action haram. Such a mufti is sinful because of his blatant lie towards Allah 
Ta’ala and Rasullullah (Sallalahu Alaaihi Wasallam) (Fatwa Y in Appendix 2).61 
 
The job of a mufti has a positive and a negative side. In terms of the qualities of piety 
and religious knowledge, the mufti is “identified as the heir of the Prophets” and 
fulfils a farḍ kifāya  (societal obligation) to provide religious guidance (Masud, 
Messick and Powers 1996: 16-17 ). But his errors are so punishable that the mark of a 
well-trained mufti of integrity was reticence and caution in the issuing of fatwas (16).   
i  Typologies of Muftis 
 
Depending on his competence with regard to his employment of ijtihād (independent 
reasoning), Hallaq (1996) and Masud, Messick and Powers describe four different 
types of mufti’s. The highest category and the most learned are the Mustaqill, 
independent mufti’s who used only Quran, hadith, qiyās  (analogical reasoning) and 
”unfettered” ijtihād (independent reasoning). A mark of this category of mufti was 
that he does not engage in taqlīd (the practice of following the opinions of others) or 
even of an established school of law. Opinions were instead innovative, creative and 
original.  
 
Another category, which incorporates the majority of contemporary muftis, is the 
Muqallid (associated mufti). They responded only within the parameters of the 
established legal school (madhab), and consulted opinions of jurists across time and 
space in that school. Opinions had to conform to existing opinions. This level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  For a description of the genealogy of mufti typologies and the categorisations of muftis into formal 
categories, see Hallaq (2001) Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic law, Chapter one. 
61 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 18511, 2010. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/18511>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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emphasises too, “the proper acquisition of the requisite knowledge through the basic 
instructional mechanism of memorisation, with the principal texts being the 
authoritative manuals of the particular schools” (Masud, Messick and Powers 1996: 
17). 
ii  Other Features of the Muftiship 
 
Fatwas mainly provide determinations of law, assuming a set of facts, while 
judgements mainly provide determinations of fact, assuming a set of laws (1996: 17). 
 
Additional features of muftiship emerged in the treatises through technical contrasts 
with judgeship. Women and slaves for example could be muftis, but not qādi (judges). 
The interpretive acts of both muftis and qādi were distinctive in that each had 
different orientations to the “relationship of law and fact” (17).  
 
Muftis are only reliant on what the petitioner says, and textual sources. Fatwas do not 
comprise of testimony and are non-litigious. Facts are accepted at face value, do not 
have to be proven, and the process is non-adversarial, with the mufti’s considered 
opinion regarded as non-binding. 
 
A judgement is a “creative” (insha’i) or performative act, a quality it shares with 
other categories of legal speech acts such as testimony and binding contractual 
utterances. Very different as a discursive act is the informational or communicative 
nature of a fatwa. In this respect, a mufti is comparable to a transmitter of hadith 
(19). 
 
Historically, in the case of judgements, court records were kept, but no precedent 
setting was incorporated within judgement rulings, and therefore no form of 
publishing or referencing occurred. In the case of fatwas though, they were collected 
in book form and cited across space and time, impacting the law considerably; and it 
is “in this light that the burden of the mufti as a human interpreter of God’s law may 
be seen as even greater than that of the judge” (19).  
 
While nowadays too, fatwas are compiled in book form, the online space makes them 
a lot more accessible and egalitarian, ensuring that not just muftis but ordinary 
Muslims can retrieve them at any time.  
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4.1.2.2  On Questions and Answers 
 
The adab-al-mufti treatises also provide a framework for analysing the structure of the 
fatwa through an evaluation of both the question and the answer.  
i The Question 
 
“The interpretive process between mufti and questioner begins with the posing of the 
question”. According to this framework, questions are analysed by variations in their 
construction and framing. Investigations of the question centre on the author, whether 
it was on behalf of someone else, whether intended to be a trick question or posed as a 
series of questions intended to elicit a desired response.  Framing the question also 
includes the one who is speaking, indicating “motivated and selective renderings of 
the facts and issues”. There may also be a reformulation by official scribes of the 
question in preparation of the final fatwa. Because the mufti is not acting as a judge, 
he takes the question at face value, and does not usually ask additional questions. 
Therefore, as the field of the response is determined by the framing of the question, 
the question not only “initiates the mufti’s interpretive activity but also constrains it” 
(Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996: 20-25).  
ii The Answer  
 
The mufti begins the answer by first comprehending the question and requires a 
knowledge of the customs, language and linguistic nuances of the petitioner. Some 
historical fatwas deal with simple legal questions by providing a legal answer free 
from doubt. The adab-al-mufti treatises encouraged mufti’s to refrain from providing 
an answer if uncertain, and to instead respond with an “I don’t know” (1996: 23). But 
despite this caution, many mufti’s both public and private, have responded to “routine 
informational questions”, so that “part of the fatwa-issuing work of many noted 
scholars typically is devoted to the giving of ordinary opinions to private questioners” 
(23).  
 
Of significance for this study of online fatwas in relation to sexual and reproductive 
health concerns would be to note to what extent the answers in the fatwas on sexual 
health concerns are legalistic, falling within the ambit of training of the individual 
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muftis, and to what extent they venture into providing advice, opinions and sexual 
health counselling, in relation to how the questions are posed to them.  
 
Differences in form and content of the answers also occur, depending on who the 
questioner is and for whom the answer is intended. If the mustafti is a layperson, the 
general rule is that the mufti does not have to explain his reasoning; he can be concise 
and more informal. But when he addresses another mufti, his answers are more formal 
and all his reasoning should be provided. In this regard, those muftis who are 
“commonly affiliated with particular schools of law, cite authors and authoritative 
works specific to those schools. “A mufti muqallid should accept the opinion of the 
best jurist of his school and attribute his answer to him” (25). This trend is illustrated 
in some of the fatwas on askimam.org, where students who generate the answer which 
is then further ‘checked and approved’ by the mufti, often cite Arabic sources in their 
reasoning at the end of the fatwa, most likely intending them for Desai’s perusal.  
 
The last step in the interpretive process is the deconstruction of the answer 
characterised sometimes by follow-up questions, which ask for, or provide further 
information to elicit another response if the answer is not adequate. Sometimes a 
second opinion from a different mufti is also sought. This step is valuable in 
providing additional information for a case and provides an opportunity for a 
diachronic analysis of mufti’s opinions. In this study, two of the fatwas in the sample 




The treatises also note that fatwas include disclaimers at the end, usually in the form 
of versions of Allahu-alam (and Allah knows best) (1996: 24).  As a reflection of this 
trend, all the fatwas I inspected on askimam.org contained two disclaimers. The first 
one aligns with historical fatwas and is found immediately after the answer in the 
form of, “And Allah Ta’ala knows best”. The second disclaimer is a little ambiguous 
and found at the end of the entire fatwa. It reads:  
 
Askimam.org issues pertaining to Shariah. Thereafter, these questions and answers 
are placed for public view on www.askimam.org for educational purposes. However, 
	   74	  
many of these answers are unique to a particular scenario and cannot be taken as a 
basis to establish a ruling in another situation or another environment. Askimam.org 
bears no responsibility with regards to these questions being used out of their 
intended context (askimam.org 2011).62  
 
The disclaimer goes on to stress that the answer has to be read only in conjunction 
with the question, that it cannot be used as evidence in a court of law and any links to 
other websites does not mean the mufti necessarily endorses all the content on those 
sites.  
 
In light of, firstly, the emphasis on consulting the opinions of other jurists across time 
and space in the Deoband school, secondly the idea that the fatwa compilations are 
precedent setting works for use in other scenarios and contexts in the field of legal 
interpretation, and thirdly, that there is an emphasis on “public interest in a 
consideration of legal questions” in the Hanafi school of jurisprudence (Weeramantry 
1988:50), the second disclaimer on askimam.org, ventures a move away from 
traditional modes of legal interpretation. 63  This statement in the disclaimer is 
especially relevant in light of the fact that some of Desai’s approved and sanctioned 
fatwas over a range of different categories have been compiled in book form in two 
volumes called Contemporary Fatwas and in another book called Al-Mahmood, 
suggesting a certain reliance on them as references to similar contemporary concerns 
in disparate contexts and situations.64 
 
Having provided a synopsis of both the FPDA framework and legal interpretive 
analytical approaches found in adab-al-mufti treatises of classical scholars, the next 
section sketches the research design used in this study.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 As an example refer to: Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 18511, 2010. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/18511>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
63 The first two points are mentioned in chapter one on the Hanafi Deoband legal school. 
64 See the Daruliftaa website. 
<http://www.daruliftaa.net/index.php/resources/publications/viewcategory/27-publications >. 
[Accessed 30 October 2015]. 
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4.2  Research Design 
 
The information from the fatwas on askimam.org is the primary data in this study.  
Secondary data includes other online content by Desai and his students, and additional 
literature or sources referred to in the fatwas. These sources of data were triangulated 
to provide more rigour to the research process.  
 
4.2.1  Rationale for Using askimam.org 
 
My reasons for choosing askimam.org (2011) stems firstly from Bunt’s (2003: 167) 
and Mohamed Chawki’s (2010: 175) assessments that it is a well-organised, easily 
researchable site, which, like those in Muslim majority contexts, contains a range of 
fatwa, reflecting varying themes dealing with religiosity, piety and health. The distinct 
feature is that answers generated on the website diverge from the ones in Muslim 
majority contexts; instead reflecting the contemporary challenges of Muslim minority 
contexts. In addition, the Deoband school in which Desai is located, is also shared by 
many established religious authority figures and structures in South Africa so that his 
fatwas provide insights into the religious thought and trends within the South African 
Deoband structures.  
 
A further and chief consideration for choosing askimam.org instead of the other 
websites affiliated to the Mufti where he is regarded as a decisive and authoritative 
religious figure, relates to the form, content and researchable potential of these sites. 
The main websites mentioned on askimam.org are daruliftaa.net (2013), the website 
of Desai’s mufti training institute; idealwoman.com, which is administered by and 
directed at women towards the construction of an ideal Muslim womanhood; and 
daralmahmood.org (2015), which has an emphasis on tasawwuf (Sufism). Considering 
that the idealwoman site’s intended audience is Muslim women, and that the site 
claims to be administered by women, it could potentially fill the lacuna in women’s 
online participation. It would subsequently appear credible to select my fatwa samples 
and gather my data from it. But an overview of the content on idealwoman.org 
revealed why this is not the case.  
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There were very few fatwas on sexual agency as compared to the askimam.org site 
where the range of social issues and concerns in relation to sex, sexual health and 
reproduction were substantially more significant. From this I deduced that 
askimam.org appeared to be the repository for the majority of Mufti Ebrahim Desai’s 
fatwas, and that using this site to gather my primary data on notions of women’s 
sexual agency in online fatwas would be the most reliable way forward. 
 
4.2.2  Sampling and Selection  
 
This is a collective case study in which the issue of sexual agency within multiple 
fatwas authorised by one individual were analysed (Creswell 2012). My rationale for 
using this approach as opposed to an instrumental or intrinsic approach, stems from 
my preliminary overview of the data, which demonstrated that one particular case as 
required in an instrumental approach would be unable to provide data on the broad 
range of issues encompassed by the notion of sexual agency as outlined in the 
literature. Secondly, an intrinsic approach, which would have focussed only on the 
Imam’s fatwas to the exclusion of the phenomenon of sexual agency under scrutiny, 
would not have served the purposes of this research (Creswell 2012). Using a 
purposeful sampling method, Desai’s fatwas on the site ask-imam.com were selected 
to gain an understanding of the notions of sexual agency as identified in the literature.  
 
Two main approaches were used in the preliminary selection of fatwas. Firstly, 
because askimam.org is easily searchable, an online keyword search of  
‘contraception’, ‘sex’, ‘abortion’, ‘sexual health’, ‘agency’, ‘sexual consent’, ‘tamkin’ 
and ‘wife obedience’, were done immediately prior to archiving the sites. By way of a 
conceptual analysis, I read and recorded every fatwa that dealt with any aspect of 
sexual agency as defined by me in chapter one. This included themes associated with 
consent, male control, pleasure, desire, sexual satisfaction, force, sexual violation, 
female passivity, sexual availability, choice, consent in both licit and illicit sex in 
relation to questions on contraception, abortion, fertility, sexual positions, and sexual 
health. Secondly, after archiving the website, I then redid the keyword search in 
addition to two readings of all the fatwas in the website’s categories of marriage, 
divorce and miscellaneous fiqh in order to provide additional rigour to the selection 
process. 
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An initial large sample size of 120 fatwas dealing with the broad notion of sexual and 
reproductive agency including both male and female agency, were identified. These 
included fatwas by both men and women, related to sex and contraception both inside 
and outside the context of marriage. Consistent with my research aims of analysing 
the discursive constructions of married women’s sexual agency in the fatwas of 
askimam.org, and assertions that petitioners’ questions are a rich source of “social 
data” which can provide insights into the lived experiences, actual problems and 
concerns of men and women in society (Larsen 2015: 201), the 120 fatwas were 
further investigated through a process of textual analysis for further refinement 
according to the framing of the question by the petitioner.  
 
As established in the introductory chapter, in this study the scope of ‘sexual agency’ 
within a discursive religious tradition like Islam has been expanded from the focus on 
young unmarried women to include married women in a religious community. The 
underlying rationale being that Muslim marriage in its classical and normative 
delineation is a marriage of dominion (Ali 2006; Wadud 2006). Following on a 
reading of the literature on sexual agency in the introduction, I located sexual agency 
in terms of the capacity to choose when and with whom one wants to experience sex, 
to choose how to define oneself sexually, to choose how one wants to engage in and 
negotiate around sexual activity, and to be afforded choices in making health 
decisions in relation to sex and sexuality. 
 
In line with this definition, I chose to focus on those fatwas that only dealt with 
petitions that spoke to these ideals of sexual agency relating to the capacity to choose 
to have sex in marriage. Those that dealt with other aspects of agency in the realm of 
reproduction, contraception, abortion and fertility, as well as questions on what should 
not be divulged before marriage, the afterlife, and reasons for the prohibition of 
polygyny, were excluded. The questions dealing with desire in the afterlife and 
polyandry, by virtue of providing insights into contemporary women’s thoughts on 
equality and justice in marriage, and their resistance to normative beliefs, were kept 
aside as beneficial for a possible supportive analysis, but were not included in the 
main sample. Overall, these fatwas, including the others on contraception, 
reproduction, abortion and fertility, all warrant additional research. This meant that 
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only those questions which divulged firstly what kind of sexual possibilities wives 
wanted and were experiencing in terms of their desires, pleasures and experiences of 
sexual and bodily controls and rights, and secondly what was being divulged in terms 
of what wives didn’t want in terms of sex were included in the final sample of 26 
fatwas.  
 
Selection of Fatwas for Data Production 
 
By virtue of the personality of Ebrahim Desai as the master teacher and creator of the 
website in this case study, the selection process incorporated an overview of the 
authorship of the fatwas. Of the 26 fatwas, most were answered by students of Mufti 
Desai even though he had a final say in approving and sanctioning them. Only four 
fatwas were answered directly by him, two65 of which comprised of enquiries which 
related to purely pietistic concerns eliciting brief, perfunctory and legalistic responses, 
providing very few insights into the Mufti’s thinking.  
 
I selected the remaining two fatwas for analysis. I attribute my decision to the 
potential of both these fatwas to provide deeper insights towards my research goals. 
For instance, in fatwa # 17537, from hereon referred to as fatwa A (seeAppendix 1), 
Desai’s response was explanatory and therapeutic according with Larsen’s (2015: 
201) typology of fatwas. His answer in fatwa # 15085, from hereon referred to as 
fatwa B (seeAppendix 1), although equally perfunctory, diverged from the others in 
that instead of dealing directly with the pietistic concerns of the petitioner, Desai 
mainly dealt with the husband’s biomedical sexual health constraints in the context of 
satisfying his wife. In addition to these two fatwas, another two related ones were 
selected. Fatwa # 18350, from hereon referred to as fatwa C (seeAppendix 1) and # 
16306, from hereon referred to as fatwa D  (seeAppendix 1), both comprised of 
similar enquiries to those answered by Desai, except that his students answered them, 
providing an opportunity to gain insights into the master/ student relationship in the 
context of sexual health concerns.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See fatwa #24644: http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/24644 
 and fatwa # 14954 : http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/14954. 
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In addition, two other fatwas, # 32049, from hereon referred to as fatwa E 
(seeAppendix 1) and # 32362, from hereon referred to as fatwa F (seeAppendix 1), 
generated by the same female petitioner and answered by two different students, were 
also selected for a diachronic analysis, to add further insights to the deconstruction of 
the answers of the fatwas. This process, as earlier outlined, is important though not 
always possible because the anonymity of petitioners makes it impossible to 
determine which fatwas are generated by the same petitioner over a period of time. 
These two fatwas were unique by virtue of being the only ones in the sample that 
were written by the same petitioner with a second petition following upon the 
response to her first, providing a window into the reality of what happens when a 
petitioner acts in accordance with the advice of a jurist, the subsequent experiences 
and concerns that arise, the type of follow up questions provoked, and the attempts by 
the petitioner to elicit a favourable response from the jurist regarding her 
circumstances. The follow-up question in this case dealt particularly with the sexual 
agency concerns of the petitioner and was an attempt by her to elicit a religious 
response from the mufti in line with her psychological, mental and pietistic concerns.  
 
To summarise, the final six selected fatwas, as displayed inAppendix 1 are identified 
as follows:  
# 17537- A 
# 15085 - B 
# 18350 - C 
# 16306 - D  
# 32049 - E 
# 32362 - F  
Other fatwas from the larger sample were also occasionally referred to in the analysis. 
These are displayed inAppendix 2.  
 
4.2.3  Data Sourcing 
 
Archiving of Internet material is imperative in order to maintain, stabilize and 
preserve the object of the study for further documentation and critique (Bunt 2003: 
16; Brugger, 2005). “Micro-archiving” is the best option when working in an amateur 
set-up, with limited computer storage space, time, resources and technical knowledge. 
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I chose one of the four methods as proposed by Niels Brugger (2005: 21), namely 
archiving the entire website or parts of it, at a given moment in time which allows for 
analysis of the content of fatwas without requiring a continuous online presence. One 
of the shortcomings of this approach is that it is not possible to gauge movement 
between the elements that occur when there is a continuous online presence. The 
software I chose to use was Sitesucker66. It saves webpages from URLs, and all linked 
webpages within the original site. It is limited in browsing capabilities but manages to 
archive the entire website. 
 
4.2.4  Data Production Strategy and Analysis 
 
Using FPDA as an analytical approach in data analysis makes allowances for multiple 
and silent voices in the fatwas, where women’s voices are mediated by men and men 
speak about women. As part of the first step in the data production strategy, and in the 
location of discourses, an instrument in the form of an analytic schedule 
(seeAppendix 3) was developed to be applied in a level one analysis to the selected 
fatwas, using a combination of both Masud, Messick and Powers (1996) proposed 
analytical framework, and Baxter’s textual approach for locating discourses as 
outlined in her FPDA management team study (2003: 138).  
 
In addition, I had to be cognizant of the context in which the petitioner was speaking, 
what issues were being discussed, how the issues were addressed, as well as how the 
responses were delivered and by whom. I kept in mind the requirement of the FPDA 
approach for data analysis, that sources of data be taken from a range of different 
voices in order to showcase a plurality of perspectives. Baxter proposes allowing 
space in the production and analysis of data for multiple, different voices and 
accounts (polyphony) as well as competing silenced, minority voices alongside 
official and dominant accounts (heteroglossia). Polyphony and heteroglossia, in 
particular, makes spaces for multiple, silent and marginalised voices, allowing for 
further rigor and reliability in data analysis (Baxter 2003: 67-73). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See Appendix 4 for details.  
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Amongst the means she proposes to generate polyphony in the data, is to deploy 
different analytical frameworks and rhetorical strategies, so that “one author might 
produce multiple and perhaps competing versions of the same act of discourse 
analysis, so in a sense there would be no ‘original’ or authorized version”. (Baxter 
2003: 67-58). In order to generate polyphony in this way, chapter seven herein brings 
in the use of an additional analytic lens provided by critical male studies.  
 
Baxter further advocates both a synchronic and a diachronic textual analysis of data. 
The latter assists in the identifying of discourses with an emphasis on the language 
used by participants, “plotting the discursive relationships of particular social groups 
over a period of time”. These discursive relationships, which are shaped by particular 
versions of social reality, can be plotted and named through a perusal of the fatwas 
dealing with sexual agency. It can assist in identifying the discourses in these fatwas. 
A synchronic analysis entails a “detailed micro-analysis of short stretches of broken 
discourse” and includes a denotative (descriptive) and connotative analysis of data 
(Baxter 2003: 73).  
 
Therefore, in order to provide answers to the research questions of this study, which 
were to firstly identify discourses in the fatwas dealing with women’s sexual agency, 
secondly to explore to what extent and to what effect the fatwas enabled women’s 
negotiation of sexual reproductive health, and thirdly to ascertain the use of 
foundational texts in the construction of these discourse within the fatwas, I adhered 
to Baxter’s suggestion and focussed on language “as the site where the construction 
and contestation of social meanings” in the relationships between the mufti, his 
students and the petitioners, were discursively produced (Baxter 2003: 6).  
 
4.2.5  Additional Considerations 
 
Speaking to issues of trustworthiness and credibility, data from the fatwas of Desai 
were triangulated against other online material produced or sanctioned by him. Noting 
consistencies and dissonances in these comparisons further speak to reliability and 
rigour in data production and analysis.  
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The findings and analyses of this study are potentially transferable to other structures 
and authorities also aligned with Desai’s Deoband legal school, both locally and 
internationally, thereby providing a range of possibilities in dealing with 
contemporary sexual health concerns available to other Deoband muftis and 
established religious structures in Muslim minority contexts.  
  
Even though the Internet is widely used, gender and socio-economic disparities 
confine accessibility to an elite few, creating a “digital divide” (Bunt 2003: 8-9; 
Chawki 2010: 178). Bunt (2003) argues that fatwa sites are accessed mainly by 
middle to upper class Muslims. The scope of this study cannot be generalized to all 
Muslim communities, although it may offer a research model specifically for 
researching the responses of Deoband scholars to contemporary sexual health 
concerns in Muslim minority contexts.  
 
There are also theoretical limitations attendant to being an insider in the South 
African Muslim society. As depicted in chapter three, Muslim women scholars who 
work within a feminist paradigm attest to often having to tread a precarious line 
between being co-opted into projects that promote imperialist tendencies of 
Islamophobia and racism, and maintaining a critical stance within their community by 
revealing and challenging oppressive power dynamics. Therefore, I needed to be 
aware of the geo-political and communal landscapes in which my feminist work is 
undertaken. In this regard, the constant self-reflexivity, which is a central feature of 
my chosen theoretical paradigm proved valuable. 
 
A methodological limitation noted at the beginning of this study was that FPDA has 
mainly been used to analyse conversations and in-depth interviews in small-scale 
ethnographic studies (Baxter, 2008). Using it in a more ossified, albeit interlocutory 
space where mainly men speak about and on behalf of women, like that of online 
fatwas, has not been tested.  
 
A further methodological limitation relates directly to online research. I used “micro-
archiving” as the best approach for an amateur set-up, with limited computer storage 
space, time, resources and technical knowledge. Micro-archiving, however, could not 
mitigate against the continuous and rapid changes to the website content during the 
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actual archiving process, due to the fluidity, complexity and unpredictability of the 
Internet as a “dynamic object” (Brugger 2005: 21). In addition, because the archived 
work is stored offline, I was unable to gauge movement between the elements that 
occurs when there is a continuous online presence. Certain ethical considerations must 
also be noted when archiving the Internet for research purposes. Brugger (2005: 13) 
states that legislation limiting or prohibiting the publication of archived online 
material differs from country to country. To avoid any ethical impasse, the archived 
material for this project was not published, but instead stored on my personal 
computer and a copy stored on a flash-drive was produced for university records. 
 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the analytical methodologies and the research design employed 
to gather and analyse data in order to meet the research aims of analysing the 
discursive representations of Muslim women’s sexual agency in online fatwas.  
Through a purposeful sampling approach, six fatwas were selected for analysis. Two 
were answered by Desai himself and two were similar petitions answered by his 
students. In addition, two petitions, which were the only ones in the sample generated 
by the same petitioner, were included to provide insights into the deconstruction step 
of fatwa analysis.  
 
Data was sourced from the website through a process of micro-archiving and 
produced through a content analysis of the fatwas and a textual analysis of selected 
fatwas. The production and analysis of data utilized both legal interpretive analytical 
frameworks grounded in classical Islamic methodology and an FPDA approach. The 
former strategy locates the work within a traditional methodological lineage, while the 
latter has a transformative agenda, making space for competing, multiple and different 
voices and accounts as well as subordinate ones. The intention was to extract 
discourses, locate knowledge and power, and plot social relationships and multiple 
subject positions in order to add insights to the aims of the research study.   
  
	   84	  
CHAPTER FIVE: SEXUAL RIGHTS: MALE SEXUAL 
NEED AND FEMALE DUTY 
 
 
After applying the analytical tools to the fatwas, and with the first objective of this 
study in mind, namely to identify the discursive construction of sexual agency in the 
fatwas, my analysis began by identifying discourses in the data gathered, for which I 
was to re-read the fatwas and my raw data notes many times. It was through 
subsequent re-readings that categories finally emerged from the data. I remained 
cognizant of the notion of “authorial fictionalizing”, so that I did not impose 
discourses on the data (Baxter 2003).  
 
Bearing in mind that “…discourses are always connected to other discourses which 
were produced earlier, as well as to those that are produced synchronically or 
subsequently”, branded as the “the intertexuality of a text”, four main discourses 
(some with sub-categories) of women’s sexual agency in the context of their sexual 
reproductive health rights were identified, both individually and intertexually 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 276). These were identified as discourses of sexual 
rights (formulated as male sexual need and female sexual satisfaction), a discourse of 
mutuality, and a discourse of health and wellbeing. In the fatwas the discourse of 
sexual rights is gendered, so that for husbands the discourse was constructed as one of 
male sexual need and female sexual responsibility to fulfil that need, and for wives it 
was constructed as female sexual satisfaction and a male obligation to fulfil. Both 
these discourses also intersect with the remaining two discourses of mutuality and 
health and well-being as will be seen.  
 
Though the chapter includes a number of other fatwas, the analysis focuses on a fatwa 
that best portrays the discourse of male sexual need. The remaining discourses are 
addressed in subsequent chapters.  
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5.1  “If a Husband Ask to his Wife for Sex, and if she Refused” 
 
 
The insistence of men’s sexual needs and wives responsibility to fulfil them has 
competed for prominence in modern intra-Muslim discourses on sex, with the 
recognition of female sexual needs (Ali 2006: 9). 
 
The discourse that prioritises male sexual need and its inter-textual links with the 
other discourses identified in this study is best illustrated in fatwa C67 published on 
October 2009 (seeAppendix 1). In this section I will only deal with the first enquiry in 
the petition. The second one will be dealt with in chapter eight.  
 
Questions 
1- “ if a husband ask to his wife for sex, and if she refused oftenly. with reasons that she is not 
in mood, and after this, if husband indulge in some other immoral and sinful activities, then 
what would be position of both in front of ALLAH? 
  
2- if a muslim, dont want to live , due to extra stress ,pain, and unhappines in his life, can he 
commit suicide ? is there any possibility that ALLAH forgive his sin, as he is aksing to ALLAH 
to resolve his problems but ALLAH didnt. 
 
Answer 1 
When a husband and wife make nikaah Allah Ta’ala grants certain rights and privileges to 
one over the other. It is the duty of the man to provide shelter for the woman and to take care 
of her needs. Similarly, it is necessary for the woman to obey her husband at all times and to 
respect his authority over her. 
Rasulullah has mentioned  
“If I had to command anyone to make Sajdah (prostrate) to another person, I would of 
instructed the woman to make Sajdah to her husband” 
Rasulullah also mentioned  
When a man calls his wife to bed and she refuses, he then spends the night upset and angry 
with her, the angels curse her till the morning.” 
  
If a woman has a valid reason for not responding positively to her husband, she should 
discuss this with him. 
If there is no valid reason for not responding to him, she should rather obey him and save 
herself from the curses of the angels. However, if she does not offer herself to her husband, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 18350, 2009. Available from: 
< http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/18350>. [Accessed 15 October 2015] 
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does not give him the right to abuse his chastity and to involve himself in any illicit relations. 
If he commits any evil or immoral act, he will be responsible for his own actions and 
answerable for it on the day of Qiyaamah…. 
            And Allah knows best 
Wassalaamu `alaykum 
Ml. Rayhaan Docrat, 
Student Darul Iftaa 
Checked and Approved by: 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 
Darul Iftaa, Madrassah In'aamiyyah 
 
5.2  Description  
 
 Description of the Petition 
 
The participants in this fatwa are the wife, the husband, Mufti Desai, his student 
Rayhaan Docrat, God and the Prophet. In the petition, a male petitioner from Pakistan 
frames the first question as a religious request.  The husband, who is the petitioner, 
requests sex from his wife and she refuses because she is not in the mood. The 
husband inquires about the effects of her refusal and his consequent “immoral and 
sinful activities” on their individual God-believer relationships.  
 
The effect in the petition is to produce a narrative where a woman’s sexual choice is 
positioned as the potential cause of her husband’s “immoral and sinful activities” and 
secondly, where her choice is constructed as though it impacts the “position of both 
[the wife and the husband] in front of Allah” thereby linking the husband’s ‘immoral 
and sinful activities’ with the wife’s refusal. The question is centred on the subsequent 
God-believer relationship of both the husband and the wife.  
 
Description of the Answer 
 
The answer generated in South Africa provides a rationale for the male sexual needs 
discourse and locates its origins in Prophetic traditions. It is provided by a student of 
the Mufti, Maulana Rayhaan Docrat at the DarulIftaa centre, and it is checked and 
approved by Mufti Desai. The petitioners question is initially outlined by the imam as 
a question of complementary marital obligations of rights and privileges, but then 
focuses particularly on the discourse of male sexual needs and privileges and female 
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sexual responsibility within a Muslim marriage. Docrat comprehends the question as 
it was presented by the husband in terms of his sexual and marital rights. He answers 
prescriptively and within a normative classical framework, citing firstly hadith 
sources to establish male sexual dominance and female obedience, then subsequently 
explaining the dire consequences women invite if they refuse sex through a 
traditionalist discourse of female obedience and male financial responsibility and 
dominance. As a response, male sexual need,  Docrat suggests, is prioritised and 
under the ambit of the wife’s responsibility and duty, while female financial needs, 
maintenance and shelter are a man’s responsibility.  
 
In his response, the scholar takes up the dynamic between the husband’s request for 
sex and the wife’s refusal and re-presents the terms of the marriage contract, 
suggesting this grants the couple “certain rights and privileges to one over the other”. 
Providing shelter and caring for her needs requires that she “obey her husband at all 
times and [to] respect his authority over her”. The dynamic of male need and female 
responsibility is also transformed into female sin; when a wife refuses her husbands 
bed “the angels curse her till the morning”.  
 
The thematic structure of the text moves on to directives. In terms of what should 
happen if the wife is “not responding positively” in the absence of valid reasons, the 
jurist returns once again to the husband’s concern that his wife refuses because “she is 
not in the mood” and attends to the spouses God-believer relationships. Using hadith 
and Quran, Docrat suggests that the wife save herself from ‘cursing angels’ and the 
way to do this is to obey her husband. The import of the directive is that the wife’s 
relationship with God and her standing with the angels, who are God’s messengers, is 
mediated by her obedience to her husband. The husband’s God-believer relationship 
on the other hand, the jurist explains, is not influenced by his wife’s actions. He is 
responsible for his own actions and answerable for them on the last day of judgement 
and by extension, the afterlife. The equation of male need and female responsibility is 
not so easy as to allow the scholar to relieve the petitioner from responsibility for his 
sinful indulgences. The scholar makes clear that the wife’s refusal does not excuse the 
husband from responsibility for “illicit relations”. He is personally responsible for 
“any evil or immoral act” and will be held to account in the hereafter.  
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5.3  Discussion  
 
Islam is viewed as a sex positive religion, with an acknowledgement of the positive 
aspects of female sexuality. Ali contends that this view coexists with, and is 
challenged by, two other narratives (Ali, 2006: 8-13). One of these common 
narratives, that of the importance of male sexual need which is viewed as potent, and 
its connection to the discourse of women’s responsibility to fulfil male desire, finds 
resonance in this fatwa. In this narrative male sexual needs and access to wives is 
prioritized to such an extent that female sexual availability is a central legal aspect to 
a Muslim marriage such that a wife’s non-availability renders her in violation of the 
legal parameters of the marriage contract. The narrative of male sexual need and 
female responsibility to fulfil that need coexists paradoxically with another view of 
“women as sexually insatiable and thus prone to create social chaos” (Ali 2006: 9). In 
this narrative, female sexual desire is regarded as important and has to be satisfied by 
men as their ethical moral obligation to control the potential dangers of an unfulfilled 
female sexual need.  
 
Feminist scholars Mernissi (1991), Sabbah (1984) and more recently Ali (2006) have 
noted the tensions in the discourse of sexual rights and obligations in the Islamic 
classical tradition. This potent and limitless male sexual appetite is constructed 
against a female sexuality that, if unfulfilled, is potentially dangerous, and wanton - a 
potential source of corruption (fitna) to society thereby affording it power and 
requiring controls to keep it in check. I will extrapolate on the potentially sinful 
female sexuality later. For now, I focus on the discourse that reveals itself most 
prominently in the fatwas, namely the male sexual need discourse that views men’s 
sexual appetite as limitless and potent. My reading of the fatwas confirms the 
literature on male sexual need and in this chapter we see how the discourse intersects 
with a number of other discourses while it maintains its dominance. 
 
Significantly, this discourse is not usually described as dangerous to the social order. 
Potent male sexual need is rather managed through the lawful provisions of polygyny, 
unlike women’s sexual potential that can only be managed through her one lawful 
husband. In Sabah’s view, potent male sexuality is also subject to boredom and can be 
managed by repudiation; 
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Since fornication is forbidden, the Muslim man must not only guard against it by 
increasing the number of legitimate wives, but also by changing them through 
repudiation as soon as he feels boredom creeping into his relationships with his 
partners (Sabbah 1984: 116).  
 
A brief analysis of the dynamic of male sexual need and female responsibility tells us 
how the jurists view a wife’s refusal. The petitioner problematizes his wife’s refusal. 
The mufti, in this case Docrat, recognizes it and subsequently also undermines her 
refusal. Linguistically, the wife is present in the text through her husband’s narrative 
of their actions. While the active voice is used for himself, the petitioner uses the 
passive voice and nominalisations to describe his wife’s refusal to have sex with him. 
The husband says she “refused”, while Docrat refers to her action as “not responding 
positively to her husband” or “not responding to him”. While the active voice is used 
for himself, the petitioner uses the passive voice and nominalisations to describe the 
wife’s refusal to have sex with him. Nominalization is the process of turning a verb 
into a noun and passivisation is choosing the passive voice over the active (Billig 
2015), the effects of which are to delete agency, so that “identified agents of action 
[are] turned into agentless statements”. Nominalisations can also reify processes and 
qualities so that they become “things, impersonal and inanimate rather than contingent 
on the result of human action” (Billig 2015). Through nominalisation of the wife’s 
action, the petitioner reifies her action and undermines her agency to refuse.   
 
Another means to reify female agentival capacity as a responsibility to fulfil rather 
than the capacity to refuse male sexual need is reflected in the pattern of transitivity 
(Halliday 1985: 101) 68, where every verb and its associated process is identified. 
Janks describes these processes as material, verbal, mental, relational, behavioural and 
existential (Janks 1997: 335).   
 
The husband constructs himself as having verbal capacity to say what he wants and 
the mufti, by suggesting the wife discuss her valid reasons with her husband’s, also 
constructs her as having the ability and agency to verbally speak her mind. But, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Halliday asserts that language allows individuals to “build a mental picture of reality” and to make 
sense of “goings on”[as well as] of doing, happening feeling and being” (1985: 101). In this respect, 
“transitivity specifies the different types of processes that are recognized in the language and the 
structures by which they are expressed” (101). 
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agency is constructed differently for the man and the woman. The wife’s agency is 
constrained by what the mufti considers her appropriate reason to refuse. Rather than 
refuse, according to the mufti, appropriate agency in a woman is displayed when she 
obeys, when she respects, she prostrates and she discusses what her valid reasons for 
refusal of sex are. In this way a traditional view of male authority over female 
sexuality is buttressed by the discourse on male sexual need and female responsibility 
to fulfil that need. The wife has agency but only within the terms of this traditional 
marital structure where the husband’s authority and sexual needs are prioritised.  
 
This does not detract from the fact that she still refuses him without a seemingly 
“valid” reason, displaying resistance and agency against the male sexual need 
discourse of the text, thereby creating a slippage in power, and moving herself from a 
position of powerlessness to one of power. This reveals that some women are 
choosing to exercise agency to reject this discourse. I will return to this in the 
discussion later on the discourse of mutuality in fatwa A.   
 
The husband also advances the suggestion that in terms of Islamic law, a wife’s 
rejection of sex with her husband, and his consequent immoral actions, has a 
repercussion on her God-believer relationship. In his question, the husband suggests 
the threat to the wife’s God-believer relationship can also become a coercive tool that 
would cause her to engage in sex after having refused to have sex with him. The link 
between a wife’s refusal and her God-believer relationship occurs in another fatwa as 
well. In fatwa A,69 which will be analysed in further detail in chapter seven, the male 
petitioner from the UK is speaking about his wife in relations to his own sexual need. 
The fatwa reads:  
  
My wife got very law  sexual desire. I want to have intimacy every other day or after 
week, she doesn’t let me even touch her. I fill very bad and then I don’t know what to 
do. Is there any sin when wife reject her husband. Can you please explain to me 
about this situation (SeeAppendix 1). 
 
Whereas the first petitioner left open the possibility that his illicit sexuality had 
implications for his wife’s relationship with God, this second petitioner is specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 17537, 2009. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/17537>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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about the link between his wife’s rejection and God’s disapproval. Here too the 
husband says what he wants by subscribing to the discourse of male sexual need and 
female responsibility and also linking it to a woman’s relationship with God.  
 
5.3.1  Internalisations of the Dominant Discourse 
 
Lest we believe that only male petitioners subscribe to the idea that wives are 
compelled to fulfil male sexual need, fatwa F70 shows that women also internalize the 
belief. Here the female petitioner who was sexually molested as a child feels forced 
into consummating her arranged marriage and resorts to the Mufti to argue for an 
annulment. She says: 
 
My ‘husband’ knew about my traumatic childhood experience but forced kissed me 
and touched when I was sleeping…i cried in the bathroom because I felt violated and 
hurt. I really do not like him, and I feel like I can’t full fill (sic) my duty as a wife 
towards him. How can I love someone when I was forced into this? 
  
Her trauma and pain are mediated through what she considers her “duty as a wife 
towards him”. She has internalized the dynamic of male need and female 
responsibility and her responsibility is intensified as duty. She is constrained by this 
responsibility, as she experiences a tension between her refusal, the feelings of 
violation, and her duty. She says further on at the end of the petition:  
 
I know i won't be able to full fill my duty as his wife, it’s not fair to me nor to him…I 
don’t want this marriage. Never did. Isn’t this void?  
 
She moves from ‘feeling’ to ‘knowing’ that she won’t be able to fulfil her duty to 
fulfil his sexual need, appealing to the ethical ideal of fairness to bolster her argument.  
Beyond the idea that women must fulfil male sexual needs, this woman petitioner has 
also internalized the two divergent voices in Islam described by Ahmed (1992: 65-
66),71 namely the pragmatic legal voice, in which marriage is deemed an institution of 
sexual hierarchy, and the ethical voice, “virtually unheard by rulers and lawmakers” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 32362, 2015. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/32362>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
71 Refer to chapter two section 2.1.3.   
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and which “stressed the importance of the spiritual and ethical dimensions of being 
and the equality of all individuals” (65-66).   
 
Drawing on Ahmed’s thesis, I argue that the petitioner’s argument can be understood 
in two ways. Firstly, she could be arguing that what is not fair to her is to be in a 
situation where she cannot fulfil her duty, and given her admitted failure to meet this 
duty on the basis of her diminished emotional and psychological capacity, she should 
also be released from the marriage. Secondly, she could be arguing that what’s fair to 
her is her right to refuse consummation and force, and to not want the marriage. 
Viewed both ways, she appeals to the ethical voice as described by Ahmed, through a 
discourse of ethics of fairness.  
 
I argue that there is a slippage occurring here as she simultaneously accepts and 
resists the dominant discourse of male need and female responsibility in favour of a 
subordinate discourse of an ethics of fairness in this context. This synchronic 
movement, once again puts her in a subjective position of power in relation to the 
discourse of male sexual need. For this discussion, the above fatwas demonstrate that 
the dominant male sexual need and female responsibility discourse and its links to a 
woman’s relationship with God, has been internalized by ordinary men and women in 
the fatwas under discussion, and is often offset by another discourse, that of fairness.  
 
Muftis too who mediate theological and moral concepts into society through sermons, 
popular literature and fatwas, have understood the prioritizing of male sexual need 
and female responsibility as the dominant discourse. For example, in fatwa # 15104, 
hereon referred to as fatwa G72, a newly-wed female petitioner asks whether she can 
avoid washing her hair during the ritual purification required after sex, because the 
frequent sexual intercourse and subsequent ritual washing has created sinus problems 
and headaches for her. Citing a Hanafi textual source, the student mufti grants her a 
concession but still prioritises male sexual need even in the face of her pietistic ritual 
and biomedical concerns. He says in fatwa G (seeAppendix 2):  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 15104, 2007. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/15104>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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It is permissible for you to make masah of your head instead of washing your head in 
ghusl if washing almost everyday is causing you serious headaches and other 
sicknesses Allaamah Shaami states “A woman should not withhold herself from her 
husband, i.e. out of fear of falling ill due to Ghusl (bath) becoming obligatory on her. 
Rather, she has been granted concession regarding washing her hair. (Raddul 
Muhtar, vol 1, pg 153). 
 
In this analysis, fatwas F and G are fringe examples from other petitions on the 
website, and they provide a glimpse into the discourses that support the discourse of 
male sexual need, namely that male sexual need is a priority and female availability is 
a responsibility, according with the literature and further confirming that this a 
dominant discourse within the Muslim mind.  
 
5.3.2  ‘Wives are Meat - Slaves are Fish’ 
 
Returning to the discussion of the main fatwa in this chapter, Fatwa C and the priority 
for male sexual fulfilment underpinning it, Docrat’s reference to a husband’s marital 
duty to provide financial support for the wife and her obligation to obedience 
(including sexual obedience), further stems from classical jurisprudence on marriage, 
which takes its cue from the laws of ownership and slavery. Consequently, marriage 
is described as an exchange of the dower (mahr) for sexual access and continued 
sexual availability for continued financial support (Ali 2003; 2010).  This classical 
legal logic with its “gender- differentiated marital claims beginning with dower and 
carried through to divorce” (Ali 2006:9) also underpins Desai’s stance in two other 
fatwas; the first one on slavery and concubinage by Desai himself and the other on 
consummating a marriage sanctioned by him but generated by a student of his.  
In fatwa # 17032, hereon referred to as fatwa H73, answered in August 2008, Desai 
replies to a query regarding the Islamic ruling concerning slave women and 
concubines.  He refers the petitioner to what he describes as his “standard answer” 
which he then proceeds to outline in three pages. Of significance is his use of the 
classical jurisprudential underpinnings of a Muslim marriage. He states in fatwa H:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Appendix 2, referring to fatwa # 17032, Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/17032>. [Accessed 15 October 2015].  
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…A free woman cannot be 'possessed', bought or sold like other possessions; 
therefore Shariat instituted a 'marriage ceremony' in which affirmation and consent 
takes place, which gives a man the right to copulate with her. On the other hand, a 
slave girl can be possessed and even bought and sold, thus, this right of possession, 
substituting as a marriage ceremony, entitles the owner to copulate with her. A 
similar example can be found in the slaughtering of animals; that after a formal 
slaughtering process, in which the words, "Bismillahi Allahu Akbar" are recited, 
goats, cows, etc.; become "Halaal" and lawful for consumption, whereas fish 
becomes "Halaal" merely through 'possession' which substitutes for the 
slaughtering... 
In other words, just as legal possession of a fish that has been fished out of the water, 
makes it Halaal for human consumption without the initiation of a formal 
slaughtering process; similarly legal possession of a slave woman made her Halaal 
for the purpose of coition with her owner without the initiation of a formal marriage 
ceremony.  
 
The classical jurisprudence differentiates between wives and concubines, but the two 
relationships share a similar legal construct that prioritises male sexual fulfilment. 
Another fatwa # 30630, hereon referred to as fatwa I74, and dated November 2014, in 
response to a question about the appropriate behaviour for consummating a marriage 
prior to the “ruksati” which the scholar jurist defines as the “customary handing over 
of the wife into the custody of the husband”, explains the scope of the husband’s right 
to sexual fulfilment as ‘he pleases’. The answer states:  
 
In principle, once the contract of nikāh has been concluded, the husband is entitled to 
sexual intimacy with his wife. The wife has the right to refuse his sexual advances or 
to travel with him until he submits the mahr mu‘ajjal (the mahr due immediately). 
After submission of the mahr mu‘ajjal, the husband is at liberty to take her where he 
pleases. 
 
These fatwas demonstrate that the discourse that prioritises male sexual need is a 
consequence of the classical legal logic of a Muslim marriage. It is accompanied by 
discourses of obedience and financial support reflected in two concepts of qiwāma  
and wilāya .   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa #  30630, 2014. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/30630>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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Qiwāmah generally denotes a husband’s authority over his wife and his financial 
responsibility towards her, and …wilayah generally denotes the right and duty of 
male family members to exercise guardianship over female members… (Mir-
Hosseini, Al-Sharmani and Rumminger 2015: 1). 
 
The term qiwāma, although not mentioned in the Quran, derives from the term 
qawwamun (meaning protectors and maintainers) in Q 4:34. As noted in chapter two, 
this verse has been used to assert a husband’s right to command and discipline 
wives.75  According to the above scholars, by relying on a notion of femininity that is 
constructed normatively as weak, requiring protection and guidance, and a 
masculinity which is constructed as strong, powerful and dominant, “these two 
concepts play, and continue to play a central role in institutionalizing, justifying and 
sustaining gender inequality in Muslim contexts”(2015: 1). In addition, fatwa C also 
establishes qiwama through well-known hadith.  
 
The discussion of qiwama and wifely obedience adds substantive theoretical form to 
the argument that male sexual need is a prominent discourse, and further to this 
Docrat makes reference to women bowing to husbands, which reflects his Deoband 
gender ideology. This ideology is characterised by male domination and priority and 
female subordination and submissiveness to men, collectively considered as a 
divinely sanctioned social order. In an overview of second generation influential 
scholar Ashraf Ali Thanwi’s writings on women, and their influence on the women of 
the Deoband-led proselytizing movement the tabligh jamaat 76 , Ambreen Agha 
suggests that this ideology constructs women as precious “objects” or “jewels” that 
adorn the house. Women are “exclusively accessible to their husbands” and male 
domination and female submission is rationalized as “an act of God” (2015: 7).  
 
In addition, the idea that the wife`s God-believer relationship is mediated by her 
husband is also underpinned by the body/ spirit dichotomy found in the gender 
ideology of the Deoband legal school. Through an in-depth analysis of Thanwi’s book 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See chapter two, section 2.2.  
76 For an explanation of this movement, see Vahed (2000: 46). He describes the tabligh jamaat as a 
proselytizing, pietistic, grassroots movement which is an offshoot of the Deoband movement, allied to 
it, and concerned with providing religious guidance on all matters. It is always led by Deoband-trained 
or Deoband-affiliated ulama. 
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for women, the Behishti Zewar, which is still in use in South Africa today, Metcalf 
suggests that the Deoband reformers’ goal was to establish a correct hierarchy in all 
areas. This included women’s position, which was determined in terms of a 
hierarchical gender ideology arising out of classical legal specifications.  
 
In a period of alien rule and disruptive change, the reformers were driven to establish 
boundaries for belief and behaviour that would ensure order among humans and 
between humans and God.  Women were to be subordinate to men, children to their 
elders, [and] the humble to the great... (Metcalf 1990: 37). 
 
In this way “proper hierarchy had to extend from earth to heaven” (37). Scholars 
show that women’s subordinate inferior status emphasised the body/ soul dichotomy 
prevalent in classical texts. Women are considered as akin to the body, sensual, 
irrational and physical, while men are akin to the soul, stronger in mind and 
intelligence, rationally and spiritually superior (Anwar 2006; Shaikh 2004). 
   
Similarly Thanwi’s work “portrayed women as having a weaker nafs (self) and aql 
(intelligence)” while his writings, which “favour female submission and 
subordination, are held in high esteem and his teachings adhered to in daily lives” 
(Agha 2105: 6). Desai’s Darul Ifta mufti-training institute includes some of Thanwi’s 
texts in its curriculum, providing evidence that Desai and his students are influenced 
by Thanwi’s work.77    
 
This hierarchical gender ideology appears to be a dominant orthodox perspective in 
various other Muslim discursive spaces. As Izugbara (2004: 16-18) has shown,78 the 
binary of male and female sexuality prioritizes male sexual dominance and privilege. 
He shows how Quran and hadith are also used to encourage androcentric notions of 
male and female sexuality and sanction male control of women’s sexuality. Similarly, 
in fatwa C, Docrat uses two Prophetic traditions (hadith), as a strategy to convincingly 
prop the male sexual need discourse. This accords with assertions in the literature that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Refer to: http://www.daruliftaa.net/index.php/courses-admissions. 
78 Refer to section 2.3 in chapter two. Izugbara argues that the dominant narrative of Q2: 223 combined 
with that of numerous ahadith that “good women do not refuse their husband sex” is internalized by 
women themselves, placing them in a self-coercive position.  
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religious texts are employed in formulating normative discourses around sexual 
health, agency and expression (El Fadl 2001; Mir-Hosseini, Sharmani & Rumminger 
2015; Shaikh 2004; Shaikh, Hoel Kagee 2011).  
 
5.3.3  Supplicating Wives, Angry Husbands and Cursing Angels  
 
We have seen in this chapter, how muftis use hadith texts to render the wife’s God- 
believer relationship contingent on her obedience and subservience to her husband, 
while they leave the husband’s relationship to be contingent only upon his own 
actions. Bennet’s work singles out in particular the ‘cursing angels’ hadith cited by 
Docrat in fatwa C. She says, 
  
The most sexist interpreters of this hadith claim that it establishes a woman’s refusal 
of her husband’s request for sex as a sin, and further that it is acceptable for a 
husband to strike his wife if she does refuse him (Bennet 2007: 376).  
 
Kodir (2007) and Abou Fadl (2001) point to several similar hadith that are also 
usually cited to keep women obedient and to coerce them to be open to sexual 
overtures from their husbands, or else incur the wrath of angels and/or God’s ire. This 
confirms Abou El Fadl’s observations above (2001: 211- 212) on the influence of 
hadith in spousal obedience and the denigration of women. These hadith “place 
women’s sexual duties to husbands under the ambit of divine concern, and divine 
approval as contingent on a husband’s approval” (Ali 2006:11). 
 
The usages of the hadith quotes are in the main body of the fatwa, and quoted in both 
English and Arabic. They are not just in Arabic small print at the end of the fatwa, but 
also in English, the language of the petitioners and of the interlocutors of the website, 
meaning that Docrat has chosen to provide his reasoning not just to other jurists and 
the approving Mufti but to the petitioner, and the English reading public. He is either 
both aware of mainstream knowledge of and familiarity with these hadith, and/or he is 
purposefully creating familiarity with these hadith by prioritizing these over other 
hadith that could support female sexual assertiveness.  
 
He also prioritizes an interpretation of these hadith that does not support absolute 
female submissiveness, but which makes allowance for “valid reasons” for refusal. 
	   98	  
Abdul Kodir (2007) and Bennet (2007) have reviewed the various interpretations and 
versions of the ‘cursing angels’ hadith cited by Docrat in the fatwa. They argue that 
classical and modern scholars all do not subscribe to a wife’s absolute submission in 
terms of her sexual services. Some interpretations state that she will only be sinful and 
therefore cursed by angels dependent on her husband’s emotions, like when he is 
angry at her refusal, while others suggest that she is “entitled to reject her husband’s 
call for sexual activity if it is certain to hurt her, or if she is engaged in fulfilling a 
religious obligation” (Kodir 2007: 73). These alternative interpretations, argues Kodir, 
provide a glimpse into legal scholarly attempts to create “opportunities for the woman 
to enjoy sexual relations or refuse them” (73).  
  
Attesting to the fact that the hadith play a greater role in women’s experience and 
understandings of sexual agency, Hoel and Shaikh (2013) and also Marcotte (2015) 
have shown that women were familiar with, and had internalized the general message 
in many popular hadith like the ones used in this fatwa. In Marcotte’s study, 
Australian women in online forums rejected the discourse of male sexual need, 
particularly the notion of a dangerous female sexuality and passivity, while in Hoel's 
and Shaikh’s study, women displayed ambivalent responses to particularly the 
“cursing angels” hadith, depending on their life experiences. Some women in their 
study carefully negotiated the hadith without outrightly rejecting it, but “in ways that 
reflect a deep resistance to patriarchy”. Others who experienced abusive marital 
encounters, also in the face of HIV and AIDS, challenged its authority by invoking 
other ethical theological concepts of a just, merciful God as a means of resistance. 
Still others dealing with promiscuous husbands chose to reject the hadith and instead 
emphasized ethical-moral discourses of mutuality and consent (2013: 83-85). In light 
of Ahmed’s (1992) idea that Muslim women have internalized a legal pragmatic and 
an ethical spiritual voice, Hoel and Shaikh’s study shows how and when the ethical 
voice trumps the legal one in relation to the ‘cursing angels’ hadith cited by Docrat.   
 
Accordingly, I argue that much like the women in Shaikh's study, the wives in fatwa 
C and A have either negotiated, resisted or rejected the discourse of female 
responsibility to fulfil male sexual need and enacted their capacity to refuse. In 
contrast, the wife in fatwa F has internalized her responsibility as duty. However she’s 
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able to use this same concept of duty to also argue for her release from the marriage, 
given her admitted failure to meet this duty.  
 
I argue that even though only the mufti in fatwa C has used the hadith and the muftis 
in the other fatwas A and F have not, the mufti in F can nevertheless rely on this 
hadith and others like it, which female and male petitioners seem familiar with, to 
reinforce his ruling. Docrat’s reasoning reflects, in the contemporary Deoband 
madressa curriculum, the emphasis of hadith over philosophical reasonings (Moosa 
2015: 120).  
 
To summarise, the discourse that prioritises male sexual need underpins the legal 
logic of a Muslim marriage and is complemented by views of a potent male sexuality, 
male financial obligation, continued female sexual availability, female responsibility, 
sin, and a potentially dangerous, sinful female sexuality that needs to be kept in 
check.  
 
5.3.4  “She Should Discuss this with Him”. 
 
In Fatwa C, Docrat proscribes the wife’s agentival capacity by insisting that her 
refusal must be preceded by a discussion to ascertain whether her refusal is legitimate. 
In making space for sexual communication to be initiated by the wife, another 
temporary power slippage occurs. The wife is given agency by the jurist to verbally 
explain her reasons for refusal. This slippage is mirrored in Kodir's contention that a 
nuanced interpretation of the cursing angels hadith provides opportunities for refusal. 
Docrat states, “If a woman has a valid reason for not responding positively to her 
husband, she should discuss this with him”. The implication is that in the absence of 
valid reasons for refusal, the power slippage reverts and the dominant dynamic is re-
established.  The valid reasons alluded to by Docrat may be gauged from other fatwas 
in my sample79 which also deal with women refusing sex; however in each instance 
the valid reason is decidedly health-related, namely instances of post-natal pain, and 
pregnancy.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Refer to fatwa’s # 18778 hereon referred to as J and # 24644 hereon referred to as K and # 27692, 
hereon referred to as L in Appendix B.  
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In the same fatwas that indicate some reasons Docrat might find valid, we also find 
the petitioner’s, who are all men, are enquiring about the consequent possibilities of 
achieving sexual satisfaction through masturbation or through their wives touching 
them.   
 
The petitioner in fatwa J for example asks:  
 
If wife does not want to have sex (because she feels pain in her private parts and also 
she is tired looking-after her small baby), then is it permissable for the husband to 
masturbate? 
 
The answer in fatwa J, by a student of Mufti Desai, states:  
 
In principle, it is not permissible for a man or woman to masturbate/self stimulate 
themselves. This is substantiated by clear juristic texts cited in various books. 
However, if a husband desires his wife to masturbate him, it will be permissible 
despite it still being regarded as an undesirable act. 
 
The fatwa concludes by citing texts used in the Deoband curriculum. 
 
Notably, even in the face of an undesirable act, i.e. masturbation, the mufti prioritizes 
male satisfaction and female responsibility to fulfil it. In fact he uses a distinctive 
rhetorical persuasive method of citing Deoband sources in this regard. No mention is 
made in the answer about the wife’s agency in regard to masturbation, so that only her 
physical biological health constraints are regarded as valid reasons for refusal to 
engage in intercourse. Her feelings about whether she wants to “masturbate” her 
husband are not considered, neither does Docrat consider her post-partum status. 
Once again the mufti prioritizes male sexual satisfaction. 
 
5.4  Key Observations 
 
The analysis of the main fatwa C in this chapter, demonstrated that male sexual need 
and its link to divine approval, is a prominent societal and institutional discourse, and 
in accordance with the literature, is internalized by ordinary Muslim men and women, 
and muftis. It is entrenched within the legal logic governing a Muslim marriage, to the 
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extent that even in the face of women’s pietistic concerns and instances of weakened 
physical health, it is prioritized.  
 
Husbands are familiar with the discourse of male sexual need, and tend to emphasize 
the link between a wife’s refusal and God’s disapproval so that the perceived threat to 
the wife’s God-believer relationship arising out of her refusal becomes a coercive tool 
to prompt her into having sex.  
 
When dealing with male petitioners’ sexual needs, some jurists like Docrat resort to 
familiar hadith texts to buttress this discourse, allowing women limited and 
inadequate agency, in this instance by advocating for a conditional and restricted 
sexual communication, which in this case depends on the wife’s physical health 
concerns. Kodir argues that the nuanced interpretive approaches in the fiqh to the 
‘cursing angels’ hadith demonstrates that even as jurists use primary sources to 
buttress dominant discourses, they endeavour to allow women space to refuse sex and 
to allow for their sexual fulfilment, albeit minimally.  
 
The analysis also supported evidence in the literature that the internalized 
perspectives of male sexual need presented here in familiar hadith, is not acceptable 
by some women. This is evidenced too by the agentival role played by the wife in her 
refusal to engage in intercourse because “she was not in the mood”, and is sometimes 
offset by a discourse of fairness. Determined by life experiences and their 
internalization of a pragmatic legal Islamic voice and an ethical voice, women evoke 
the ethical voice by negotiating, resisting or rejecting the discourse of female 
responsibility to fulfil male sexual need and instead enact their capacity to refuse.   
 
The analysis also exposed the fact that Mufti Desai himself subscribes to the legal 
logic governing marriage, in line too with the traditional hierarchical Deoband gender 
ideology. But in chapter seven we will see how Desai also disrupts this gender 
ideology. For now, I focus on the paradoxical and challenging sub-discourse of 
female sexual satisfaction where the tension between the legal logic governing a 
Muslim marriage and its ethical moral paradigm is starkly apparent. 
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CHAPTER SIX: FEMALE SEXUAL SATISFACTION 
AND MALE DUTY  
 
 
6.1 “He Wants to Pay her Rights and Save her from any Sin”    
Fatwa B 
 
As in chapter five, the discourses on sexual rights are gendered. In this chapter I focus 
on the discourse of female sexual rights, which is often described as female sexual 
satisfaction and male duty. This discourse has strong intertextual links to the 
discourse of male sexual need, and is further linked to the other discourse of 
mutuality.  
 
Reflecting the discourse of female sexual rights, in an analysis of a fatwa by a Saudi 
Mufti, Kecia Ali brings attention to the tensions, 
 
… between moral exhortations surrounding wives sexual rights in marriage, and the 
legal logic governing sex as part of the structure of gender-differentiated marital 
claims beginning with dower and carried through to divorce (Ali 2006: 9). 
 
These tensions are also evident amongst the fatwas that reflect the discourse of female 
sexual satisfaction in this study. To illustrate, fatwa #15085, referred to as fatwa B80, 
which was answered by Desai himself.  
 
                        Question:  
May Oral Sex be permissible if the husband is suffering from premature ejaculation 
and is unable to give orgasm to her wife through vaginal intercourse alone? 
He wants to pay her rights and save her from any sin? In such conditions may he use 
oral sex in addition to vaginal intercourse for her orgasm. 
 
Answer:  
In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatoh 
The husband should undergo treatment for premature ejaculation. 
And Allah knows best 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 15085, 2007. Available from: 
< http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/15085>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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Wassalam 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai  
Darul Iftaa, Madrassah In'aamiyyah  
 
6.2  Description   
 
The petitioner’s concern centres on the permissibility of oral sex in the context of 
premature ejaculation, and further concern for his wife not attaining sexual 
satisfaction through vaginal intercourse. His questions pertain to two main issues - the 
permissibility of oral sex, which he asks about twice, and the consequences of his 
inability to ‘pay’ his wife’s sexual rights and his duty to save her from “any sin”.  
 
His reasoning links the lack of female sexual satisfaction, which he calls “her right”, 
to her potential for sin. The husband believes that he is responsible for his wife’s 
sexual satisfaction; it is his responsibility to “save her from any sin” arising from this 
unpaid right. In response, using a single sentence, Desai prescribes without any 
elaboration, simply that the husband undergo presumably medical treatment for his 
premature ejaculation.   
 
6.3  Discussion  
 
6.3.1  Discussion of the Petition 
 
An analysis of the dynamic of female sexual satisfaction and a husband’s duty brings 
into question the legitimacy of the wife’s right to sex and who might be responsible 
for fulfilling that right. Once again the wife is present in the text through her 
husband’s narrative in terms of what he understands her rights are. The use of the 
active voice by the husband in terms of his actions gives him agentival capacity and 
control over the situation.  
 
The petitioner’s concern for his inability to pay his wife’s sexual rights and his duty to 
save her from any sin, speaks to female sexual rights in the form of satisfaction, and 
complements the discourse of sexual sin arising out of a dangerous female sexuality. 
Feminist scholarship on sexuality in Islam juxtaposes ideas of positive mutual 
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sexuality with a potent and divinely protected male right to sexuality and a socially 
dangerous and potentially sinful female sexuality (Ali 2006, Sabbah 1986). Ideas on 
the potent male sexual need were captured in chapter five in the discourse on male 
sexual need and female responsibility. Here I focus on the latter discourse. 
 
Sabbah’s (1986: 34-43) ‘omnisexual woman’ reflects the interplay between what she 
calls the erotic and orthodox discourses, is a threat to society, and is kept in check 
through onerous societal controls, which undermine her potentially dangerous sexual 
appetite. Unlike potent male sexuality which has multiple opportunities for 
expression81 within the context of marriage, the ‘omnisexual woman’ only has sexual 
access to her one husband. For Sabbah, the limited options a wife has for fulfilling her 
sexual needs are what render her sexuality socially dangerous and potentially sinful. 
This also exacerbates a husband’s responsibility to fulfil, to manage, and thus to 
control her sexuality. 
 
The petition above supports this idea, and the effect is to produce, firstly, a narrative 
where female sexuality is important and has to be satisfied. Secondly, the sexuality of 
a wife is her husband’s responsibility to satisfy and control, lest she be prompted 
toward sin. Thirdly, the husband’s duty is to also “rescue” her from unfulfilled sexual 
need to avoid sin. Through the discourse of sin, the wife’s God-believer relationship 
is not dependent only on her individual choices, but also dependent on her husband’s 
efficacy in ensuring her sexual satisfaction.  
 
The petitioner links the wife’s rights, to the notion that unsatisfied female sexuality is 
potentially sinful. He makes himself responsible for saving her from sin by satisfying 
her needs. In this regard the husband in the petition intends to “save her”, his wife, 
from creating chaos in society through her potential for illicit sexual actions. Couched 
in these terms, the petitioner appeals to an ethical and “moral exhortation” of female 
sexual rights which in Ali’s view is contrary to the classical “legal logic governing 
sex” (2006: 9) in a Muslim marriage. The legal logic prioritises male sexual needs and 
female sexual availability (12). Ali argues that, “whatever the ethical importance of a 
husband satisfying his wife and thus enabling her to keep chaste”(13) and prevent her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Sabbah contends that for men, extra-marital sex is managed through the legal lawful provisions of 
polygyny and unilateral repudiation of wives. By contrast, the only lawful way to manage female 
sexuality is through sexual satisfaction by her one lawful husband (1986: 34-43).  
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from inflicting “social havoc”, in fiqh texts, “sex is, by and large, a male right and a 
female duty”. In other words, sex is not regarded as a female right, even though 
satisfying a wife is a husband’s duty. The reciprocal right to this male duty is not the 
right of the wife to sex but the right of the society to be protected from the wife’s 
unfulfilled sexual need. This is illustrated by classical scholar Al-Imam Al-Ghazali (d 
505 H/1111 AD) in the book on the etiquette of marriage from his work the Iḥyā; “it 
is true that intimate relations should be more or less frequent in accordance to her 
need to remain chaste, for to satisfy her is his duty” (Ghazali and Farah 2012: 127).  
 
Evidence that Muslim women too, have internalized this classical fiqh view is noted 
in an excerpt from fatwa # 30959, hereon referred to as fatwa M82. A female 
petitioner tells the Chicago jurist Sohail ibn Arif that her husband’s lack of attention 
may lead her to sin: 
 
…my husband doesn't keep marital relations with me I have spoken to him nicely 
argued with him even asked for divorce as from his part he doesn't show any 
intimacy only basic hugs and kisses now n then which just aren't enough…. 
I don't want to fall into haram out with my marriage I have told him this... 
 
Hoel and Shaikh point out that “gender-biased religious traditions… are powerful in 
shaping women’s gendered subjectivity” (2013: 87). Similarly, the woman in this 
fatwa has accepted that it is her husband’s duty to satisfy her. She uses it in an 
agentival way though, as a coercive measure to argue for her husband to provide her 
with ‘intimacy’. In the answer the jurist also relies on the discourse of sin to argue for 
her right to sexual satisfaction, but he focuses on both female and male sin. 
 
In the answer, ibn Arif in fatwa M, tells the female petitioner:  
 
…Preserving one's chastity is one of the noble objectives of nikāh. Since the need to 
preserve one's chastity is common to both husband and wife, the right to intimacy 
also belongs to both husband and wife. As a result, it is necessary for your husband 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  See Appendix 2. Refer to # 30959, 2014. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/30959>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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to fulfil your needs to prevent you from falling into harām. Failure to do so without 
an acceptable reason would make him in a sinner in the sight of Allah. 
 
Ibn Arif initially equalizes both the husband’s and wife’s sexual rights by linking 
them to the preservation of mutual chastity. He then insists that the wife’s “needs” 
must be fulfilled by the husband to prevent her from sinning. He begins with a 
discourse of mutuality, and then undermines this discourse by reverting to a view of a 
husband’s duty to save the wife from a potentially sinful position due to a dangerous 
unfulfilled sexuality. 
 
In her analysis of the Saudi fatwa mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Ali 
points out that “concepts of reciprocity and mutuality permeate even conservative 
Muslim discourses”, even as contemporary Muslim discourse within Western contexts 
continues to incorporate “strongly gendered understandings of male female sexuality” 
(Ali 2006: 9). Similarly, Ibn Arif in fatwa M advocates for mutuality in marital sexual 
relations, while simultaneously grounding his answer within the conservative view of 
a dangerous female sexuality. His answer, in essence, subscribes to both the rights 
discourse as well as the duty discourse of fiqh texts, further aligning with observations 
by feminist scholars that discourses of sexual rights are fraught with internal tensions 
of a simultaneously positive female sexuality and a sinful dangerous one.  
 
Ibn Arif shows the complexity of the dynamic between male duty and female sexual 
need by making the husband’s sin contingent on the wife’s sin. The result is a 
paradoxical shift in power to the wife. He affords the wife some level of control over 
her husband’s God-believer relationship, through her sin. He links the discourse of 
female sexual satisfaction and male duty to a man’s relationship with God. The 
husband’s relationship with God is determined by his actions in how he manages and 
controls his wife’s sexual satisfaction. The jurist doesn’t say if the husband becomes a 
sinner only by virtue of failing to satisfy his wife, thus rendering her sexuality 
dangerous. Neither does he show whether any sinful actions as a result of her 
unsatisfied sexuality will incur sin upon him. Either way, the wife’s sexual 
satisfaction is made to mediate the husband’s relationship with God.  
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This differs substantially from the narrative in chapter five on male sexual need, 
where the wife’s relationship was dependent on her responsibility to make herself 
sexually available and her obedience to her husband who was portrayed as the 
intermediary between wife and God in such a way that his anger and subsequent 
disapproval of her made her sinful. There the husband’s relationship with God is not 
influenced by his wife, and is rather dependent on his personal relationship with God 
and through his individual actions. By contrast, in this narrative, the husband still 
maintains his personal God- believer relationship, but this time it is determined by his 
capacity to fulfil his wife’s sexual needs and his capacity to keep her satisfied. 
 
There are three main slippages to the dominant discourse on male sexual need, noted 
in the above fatwa. First, a shift in power occurs when mutual sexual rights are 
prioritized, female sexual rights are recognized, and when both receive the same 
priority as male sexual needs. Second, by acquiescing to and then relying on the 
normative gendered view of a negative and dangerous female sexuality which is a 
man’s responsibility to control, the wife has at her disposal a coercive measure to 
argue for intimacy with her husband. Third, the jurist, ibn Arif, renders the wife 
powerful in her ability to control her husband’s God-believer relationship by making 
him a sinner should her sexual needs go unfulfilled.  
 
6.3.2  Discussion of the Answer 
 
Returning to the main fatwa under discussion, fatwa B, even though the framing of 
the question focused on the permissibility of oral sex in relation to female sexual 
satisfaction, Desai chose to prioritise male sexual health, strategically answering the 
question in an indirect way. His answer can be described as prescriptively therapeutic, 
partially aligning with Larsen’s (2015: 210) description of a personal petition, which 
elicits answers that take “the moral responsibility of the individual for granted”. She 
states these serve a therapeutic function where the Mufti deals with pietistic concerns 
by providing guidance that is geared towards refining the moral and spiritual growth 
of the individual83. It appears that in this case though, the response to the petition in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 As mentioned in chapter two, Larsen describes two main types of questions in fatwas that elicit 
different responses. She states that in addition to personal petitions, generic petitions elicit informative 
answers where the “mufti’s authority is constructed by virtue of superior knowledge” (2015: 210). 
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fatwa B diverges from the actual question itself, does not provide any clear moral and 
spiritual directives, but it does serve a therapeutic function in the form of advice for 
the petitioner’s physical, in this case, sexual/biological well-being.  
 
Desai could have answered in any number of ways. He could have directly answered 
the actual question by denouncing oral sex and deeming it impermissible, as do 
numerous other askimam.org fatwas on the subject. But that answer would not have 
resolved the issue of the sexual rights of both spouses, the sexually unsatisfied wife 
nor the husband who is not able to sexually perform sexually. Alternatively, Desai 
could have denounced the oral sex, and instead provided the husband with other 
options to sexually satisfy his wife. Instead, he focused only on male physical sexual 
health, prioritising normative sexuality, i.e., restoring the biological ability to 
ejaculate appropriately and to be able to engage in satisfactory vaginal intercourse. It 
appears on the surface as if he completely ignored the two concerns of permissibility 
of oral sex and female sexual satisfaction. But it could also be argued that his 
rhetorical strategy indirectly deals with both questions; i.e. he solves the problem of 
male sexual incapacity so that wife may be sexually satisfied through vaginal 
intercourse. This trend to prioritise male sexual health and not to address female 
satisfaction is also noted in another fatwa answered by Mufti Ibn Arif. Fatwa # 23651 
hereon referred to as N84. The male petitioner’s request is as follows: 
 
I wanted to know if it was permissible to use One hour Per week for some penis 
exercises which helps you solving premature ejakulation. I feel that my wife is not 
fully satisfied with the size and time it takes. I do all my Islamic responsibillities so i 
basically wanted to know whether this is haram. 
 Answer: 
It would be best first of all to consult a physician to undergo proper treatment for 
premature ejaculation. 
 It is also permissible to perform these exercises provided the following conditions 
are met: 
 a.) It must not involve any haram – such as watching any sort of instructional video 
or reading any instructions which contain explicit images. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 23651, 2012. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/23651>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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 b.) If the exercise involves any aid/equipment – or involves any touching of the penis 
– these should all be operated by the wife and not by husband to himself. 
 c.) The aid/equipment that is involved should not cause ejaculation. 
 d.) The exercises should not result in any harm or bodily injury to oneself. 
 
Sohail ibn Arif, the same Chicago jurist who also answered fatwa M, frames his 
answer in relation to both the male petitioner’s premature ejaculation problem and the 
pietistic constraints of penis exercise, ending with a directive to avoid harm or bodily 
injury to oneself.  
 
The response from Desai in Fatwa B and Ibn Arif’s in Fatwa N, indicate that in 
instances of male petitioners’ pre-occupations with their wives’ sexual satisfaction in 
the face of their husbands’ physical sexual health issues, the latter is treated with 
urgency, as are the men’s related pietistic concerns. The silence of the jurists on the 
accompanying concerns over female sexual satisfaction could be viewed in two ways. 
Firstly, by ignoring the husband’s concerns for the wife’s sexual satisfaction, Desai 
may be suggesting that this is not her right aligning with Al-Ghazali’s opinion above. 
Secondly, as Ali (2006: 9) suggests, despite the concerns of the petitioners for female 
sexual satisfaction, because the legal jurisprudential framework supports the discourse 
of male need, the discourse of female satisfaction which is only supported by a ‘moral 
ethical’ framework and not by the legal logic of the law, is rendered a subordinate 
status in Muslim legal spaces. Desai’s answer could be a reflection of Ali’s sentiment: 
  
Despite the scholars’ acknowledgement of the importance of female sexual 
satisfaction in the sexual act, the overwhelming weight of the Muslim legal and 
exegetical tradition is on women’s obligations to make themselves sexually available 
to their husbands, rather than the reverse. This bias in the sources emerges even in 
contemporary discussions that attempt to discuss male and female rights in parallel, 
highlighting the immensity of the task for those who would redefine sex within 
marriage as a fully mutual endeavour (Ali 2006: 9).  
 
Thus, it could be argued that the lack of additional information in Desai’s answer and 
his reliance only on biomedical advice can be viewed as a responsible way to deal 
with the biomedical sexual health of his petitioner. But, it could also be a strategy to 
avoid dealing with the tension between the ‘legal logic’ governing sex in marriage 
which prioritises male sexual need, and the ethical “moral exhortations” (Ali 2006: 9) 
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of female sexual satisfaction. His strategy ensures the sexual needs of both husband 
and wife are fulfilled without having to undermine either paradigm.  
 
When navigating between the difficult legal concept of a marriage of dominion and 
the real life marriage where petitioners suggest a certain amount of mutuality and 
reciprocity in sexual relations, sometimes, as fatwa B demonstrates, the mufti 
supports both the legal logic and the ethical moral paradigms of marriage. He also 
avoids the tension between these two when it comes to female sexual rights by 
prioritising the physical sexual health concerns of the petitioner. In this way Desai 
facilitates both male and female sexual needs allowing for a slight slippage in the 
discourse that prioritises male sexual need. At other times, as will be seen in fatwa A 
in the next section, he leans decidedly towards the moral ethical paradigm. Another 
fatwa, fatwa D, demonstrates how a student of Desai’s does precisely that, within the 
discourse of female sexual satisfaction.  
 
6.4  “She Says I Do Not Satisfy Her Sexually” Fatwa D 
  
In another fatwa which deals with the discourse of female sexual satisfaction and 
male duty, fatwa #16306, referred to as fatwa D, reads as follows 85: 
 
I got married 2 years ago but my wife seems to be unhappy. she says I do not satisfy 
her sexually. what should I do? Also can a man and women masturbate each other 
for pleasure. Also is it haram for a women to reach an orgasm by her husband 
masturbating her? 
 
Assistant Mufti Muhammad Zakariyya Desai answers in fatwa D using bullet points.  
 
1.      At the outset, it is important that you consider the feelings of your wife in this 
regard. If she claims that you are not satisfying her, you should obtain professional 
medical advice on this issue. You are newly married and should avoid any type of 
resentment from your wife. 
2. It is permissible (Shaami Page 355 Vol. 2) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 16306, 2008. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/16306>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
 
	   112	  
3. Refer 2 above. 
 
6.4.1  Description and Discussion 
 
The question is framed as pietistic concern for a male petitioner in relation to both 
male and female sexual satisfaction. A young married woman is able to communicate 
her sexual needs and desires to her spouse who then appeals to the mufti for pietistic 
directives in relation to mutual sexual satisfaction. An analysis of this fatwa also 
reveals as in fatwa B, the presence of the wife in the text through the husbands 
narrative. But here the husband couches the question not in terms of his wife’s right to 
sex, but rather in terms of her needs, desires and pleasures as she has presented them 
to him. The use of the active voice by the husband and the jurist to describe the wife’s 
claims, in effect recognises her agentival capacity in her experience of sexual 
satisfaction.  
 
This petition provides clear possibilities for a both a wife and a husband to be 
satisfied, and also addresses the husband’s pietistic concerns. But the answer differs 
from the others above, in that assistant mufti Zakariyya Desai foregrounds the wife’s 
unhappy feelings and then prioritises the biomedical sexual health concerns of the 
husband. Thereafter, the mufti returns to the wife’s feelings and links it to concern for 
the preservation of the marriage. The protection of the marriage in the face of the 
wife’s possible resentment at her right not being fulfilled is the basis from which 
Zakariyya Desai appears to advocate what might be called a ‘benevolent masculinity’ 
characterised by kindness and concern for a wife’s feelings and needs.  
  
The jurist in this fatwa disrupts the combined discourses of female sexual satisfaction, 
male duty and sin in favour of a subordinate complementary combination of female 
sexual satisfaction with mutuality and wellbeing. The focus here is on the discourse of 
female satisfaction which Zakariyya Desai supports here not as a legal right but as a 
moral ethical concern for the integrity of the marriage. Here it is viewed as a right in 
the interests of marital relations based on mutual intimacy, similar to Ibn Arif in his 
answer on mutual marital rights above in fatwa M. The difference between Zakariyya 
Desai and Ibn Arif, is that the latter continues to rely on the resilient gendered notions 
of sexuality. Zakariyya Desai instead deals with the tensions between the legal and 
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ethical moral paradigms by locating his answer firmly within the ethical moral 
exhortation of female sexual satisfaction, linking it to female psychological and 
emotional well-being and male biomedical health concerns, creating a decided 
slippage in power by validating the wife’s resistance to the discourse of male need 
and recognising her concern for her sexual satisfaction. In doing so, he refers to a 
Deoband textual source to stress this mutuality in sexual relations. 
  
6.5  Key Observations 
 
This chapter outlined the discourse of female sexual rights by describing the female 
right to sexual satisfaction and the underlying discourse of female sin that 
accompanies it. In light of the above, Ali’s thesis that the overwhelming weight of the 
Muslim legal and exegetical tradition is on women’s obligations to make themselves 
sexually available to their husbands and that female sexual satisfaction although 
recognized is downplayed, may be somewhat true. However, the fatwas analysed in 
this section also divulge a certain fluidity in the jurists approaches.  
 
They demonstrated that when faced with concerns by male petitioners about female 
sexual rights in the context of male sexual health concerns, jurists navigated the 
tensions between the legal logic of a prioritised male sexual need and the ethical 
moral paradigms of female sexual need by either remaining silent or making a 
decided shift towards the ethical moral paradigm. The former approach as noted in 
fatwa B concurs with classical guidelines of the qualities required of a well-trained 
Mufti of integrity, one of which was reticence and caution in the issuing of fatwas.86  
 
In fatwa D, the jurist Zakariyya Desai’s answer leaned towards an ethical moral 
paradigm, deviating from the legal logic of male sexual need as well as the classical 
gendered notions of male/ female sexuality. Instead he advocates a consideration of 
the wife’s feelings and her psychological and emotional well-being, in conjunction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 As mentioned in chapter four, the job of a mufti has a positive and a negative side. In terms of the 
qualities of piety and religious knowledge, a mufti is equated with the Prophets, but his errors are so 
punishable that the mark of a well-trained mufti of integrity is reticence and caution in the issuing of 
fatwas (Masud et al 1996: 16). 
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with bio-medical interventions for the husband, bolstering a form of benevolent 
masculinity and promoting marriage as the primary imperative.  
 
When faced with concerns of female sexual rights by a female petitioner, Ibn Arif in 
fatwa M advocates for mutuality in marital sexual relations while simultaneously 
embedding his argument in normative views of a dangerous female sexuality and 
male duty to satisfy it. This aligns with Ali’s earlier two contentions: that mutuality 
and reciprocity permeate the rulings of even conservative jurists, and that “strongly 
gendered understandings of male and female sexuality” is found in even 
contemporary Muslim discourse. Ibn Arif’s manoeuvring is a clear reflection of Ali’s 
thesis in a minority Muslim context. 
 
In response to male petitioners, both Ibn Arif in fatwa N and Mufti Desai in fatwa B, 
located their answers mainly within biomedical parameters, choosing reticence and 
caution and avoiding the direct question of female sexual rights, couched as female 
satisfaction, instead dealing with both male need and female need indirectly. 
Zakariyya Desai’s approach in fatwa D, by foregrounding female psychological and 
emotional wellness and male biomedical health, is indicative of increasingly fluid 
juristic trends within contemporary contexts. It appears that jurists might understand 
that the sexual desires, expectations and experiences of ordinary Muslims within 
modern contexts function within two different discourses - mutuality, and discourses 
of health and wellness - and that a reliance on considered gendered perspectives of 
male female sexuality in their fatwas will prove counterproductive. The societal and 
institutional discourses in this regard will be covered in the next chapter.  
 
This chapter therefore provided a synopsis of first how female petitioners who 
acquiesce to prominent discourses use the same as a coercive measure to fulfil sexual 
desires, as noted in fatwa M. Second it divulges how jurists navigate the fraught space 
between the “legal logic governing sex” in a Muslim marriage and the ethical moral 
exhortation of female sexual rights discourses within contemporary societies where 
marriage is increasingly understood as relations of mutuality and reciprocity, and 
where “gendered understandings of male female sexuality” continue to exist. Third, 
discourses of health and wellbeing are seen to provide a means to navigate between 
the two paradigms of a Muslim marriage - from the legal towards the ethical-moral in 
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terms of women’s sexual rights discourses. For example in the fatwas on male sexual 
inability, the answers prioritised male biological sexual health issues, while in fatwa 
D where biological health concerns were absent in the petition, Zakariyya Desai 
prioritised female emotional and psychological well-being. Desai’s approach in fatwa 
A in the next section further supports this analysis.  
 
Finally, what is especially noteworthy in the sample of online fatwas on sexual 
agency in my study, is that the trend noted by both Marcotte (2015) and Imtoual & 
Hussein (2009) of male forum contributors ignoring Muslim women’s sexuality by 
“interpolating a Muslim male audience for their comments and thus ignoring Muslim 
women or by sexualizing non-Muslim women and by default de-sexualising Muslim 
women”, is not overtly displayed here (Imtoual &Hussein 2009: 35). Instead, petitions 
like some outlined in this section point to male contributors’ anxieties with regard to 
the sexual concerns of their wives, especially in relation to the discourse combination 
of female sexual satisfaction and mutuality. An overview of the larger sample of 
fatwas as mentioned in my section on sampling, indicate that this trend is also 
occurring in the area of contraception and reproduction, inferring that some husbands 
in contemporary Muslim marriages are demonstrating concern and care about their 
wives’ sexual satisfaction and sexual and reproductive health concerns even if these 
concerns continue to be grounded within gender asymmetric discourses. For example, 
it is unclear how many male petitioners’ concerns for their wives sexual satisfaction 
are underpinned by internalized pietistic perspectives of male duty to satisfy and 
control the potentially chaos-producing female sexuality which if left unsatisfied 
negatively impacts the husband’s God-believer relationship.  
 
An important question raised in the analysis in this chapter is that while it is generally 
accepted by mufti’s that the idea of mutuality exists in questions related to female 
sexual rights as a discourse of sexual satisfaction, the question of female sexual rights 
as reciprocal desire, where wives’ rights to sex itself and a say to how sex happens 
and not just to their satisfaction to avoid danger to society within the male dominated 
sexual act, is another matter. The analysis of fatwa C in the previous chapter revealed 
that this idea is not so easily accepted especially within the legal logic of a marriage 
of dominion. In addition, the idea of reciprocal desire is contentious as long as the 
female sexual rights discourse emphasizes sexual satisfaction as a male duty to protect 
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society from the potentially chaotic female sexuality (Ali 2006: 13). As Ali asserts, as 
long as these “gender differentiated rights and duties” which underpin the legal logic 
of a Muslim marriage continue to exist, mutuality in sexual relations cannot be a 
requirement, merely an ideal” (13).    
 
Muftis within contemporary societies do understand that marriage is increasingly 
experienced and understood as relations of mutuality and reciprocity. As established, 
Desai is informed of these expectations through South African societal discourses. 
But he is also informed by other petitions on the askimam.org site that point to female 
petitioners’ expectations of marriage as reciprocal desire too. As a female petitioner in 
fatwa # 17012, hereon referred to as O, expounds:  
 
When I tell my non-believer friends what girls cant practice polyandry while guys 
can practice polygny, I find it hard explaining it to them why Allah has programmed 
women to not be able to have multiple husbands…. 
It should be the girl's prerogative whether or not to have multiple husbands, even if it 
may not necessarily be beneficial for her. But if the right has been given to man, 
women should get it too…The question really is, maybe its hard for some women, 
maybe other women find it not so hard, but why the ruling only for women to not 
marry more than one, or carry additional burden. There are many men who would 
find it hard dealing with mental stress and physical pains too in general life, but why 
did the religion generalize? 
 
Ultimately, the question of whether women have the autonomous right to initiate sex 
for their own pleasure and enjoyment as men do, without the underlying negative 
gendered constructions of a dangerous female sexuality within the fatwas of 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MUTUALITY 
 
 
7.1  “Intimate Relation is a Mutual Issue between the Spouses” 
 
There is a mismatch between views of marriage and sexual intimacy as based in 
mutual consent and reciprocal desire and the entire structure of classical 
jurisprudential doctrines surrounding lawful sexuality (Ali 2006: xxv). 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the discourse of mutuality through an analysis of fatwa A,87 
which is another answered by Desai. Earlier we examined the petition in fatwa A to 
illustrate the dominance of the male sexual needs discourse. Here it serves a further 
function as we examine the Mufti’s response which produces a further discourse, that 
of mutuality. The fatwa also provides a glimpse into how the petitioners and muftis on 
askimam.org remain committed to the legal rules governing Muslim marriage, yet 
articulate views based on mutuality. Through the use of this and other fatwas, this 
chapter   also explores how conflicts and tensions between the moral ethical logic and 
the legal logic of marriage as theorized by Ali, are managed by all participants in the 
fatwas. 
 
Fatwa A is found in the website’s category of marriage, dated Feb 2007 and is 
generated by a male petitioner from the UK. It is answered by Mufti Desai himself 




“ My wife got very law (sic) sexual desire. I want to have intimacy every other day or 
after week, she doesn’t let me even touch her. I fill very bad and then I don’t know 
what to do. Is there any sin when wife reject her husband. Can you please explain to 
me about this situation.”  
 
Answer: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 17537, 2009. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/17537>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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“Intimate relation is a mutual issue between the spouses. Apart from the wife 
fulfilling her marital obligations, it is important that the husband takes the feelings, 
tempo etc. of the wife into consideration before becoming upset. By the husband 
forcing the issue upon the wife, sometimes it could create estrangement in the 
marriage. Instead of the husband worrying about the sin of refusing him his marital 
right, rather talk to her and enquire if she experiences any difficulty in doing so. By 
the husband forcing the issue upon the wife, she will eventually feel used for this 
purpose and become de moralized which could possibly ruin the marriage and 
complicate matters further”. 
 
7.2  Description  
 
The petition is framed as a question about sin and presents the interlocking 
associations of a wife’s low sexual desire and rejection of intimacy and sex with her 
husband. The husband asserts his own sexual need by expressing how many times a 
week he wants “intimacy”. He also expresses feelings of helplessness and 
despondency and appeals to the Mufti for assistance in the form of an explanation 
about the link between her rejection of him and her sin. As already established in 
chapter five, through the mention of her sin in the context of her rejection of him, the 
husband draws attention to the wife’s God- believer relationship to coerce her to make 
herself sexually available to him.   
 
The Mufti’s answer is framed in terms of emotional/psychological health with 
interlocking associations of mutual intimacy, wifely obligations and benevolent 
husbandly consideration. Desai initially locates his argument in a mutual intimacy 
discourse, then recognizes both the wife’s “marital obligations”, and the husband’s 
right to disapprove and to be angered by her rejection of him. He asks that the 
husband weigh the male sexual rights and female responsibility discourse against 
consideration of her “feelings, tempo etc…before becoming upset”. Desai cautions 
against forcing the issue of wifely non-compliance, and advises the husband against 
“worrying” about his wife’s sin in “refusing him his marital right”. He instead 
advocates for both communication about sexual needs initiated by the husband, and 
further consideration of a wife’s feelings, which he describes as “feeling used for sex” 
and becoming “demoralized” which could lead to marital breakdown.  
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7.3  Discussion  
 
7.3.1  Discussion of the Petition 
 
The petition reveals a slippage in the dominant discourse of male sexual needs as a 
right towards one of female sexual assertiveness in the form of the wife’s choice to 
refuse. Even as the husband says what he wants by subscribing to dominant 
discourses of male sexual rights and female sexual availability and sin, as in fatwa C 
in chapter five above, the wife is simultaneously constructed as having agentival 
capacity by her refusal of sexual intimacy. The wife shows a certainty in not wanting 
sex. The husband is uncertain about what to do, about his need for sex, his wife’s sin, 
and what he should do generally. He uses a rhetorical strategy of direct language to 
describe his wife’s rejection and appeals to the legal framework of a marriage to 
regain his agency. She is thus constructed by the petitioner, as a both powerful subject 
with agentival capacity making her own decisions with regard to her agency in the 
sexual arena and a powerless subject of the legal discourse, which portrays her as 
sinful if she does not fulfil her husband’s rights by being sexually available. 
Arguably, the petitioner’s question is framed in terms of the wife’s direct disruption 
of the prominent discourse of husbandly sexual needs and wifely availability, and the 
consequent God-believer relationship of the wife, which is dependent on her 
obedience to her husband.  
 
Through the linguistic patterns of transitivity, the husband constructs the wife as 
having mainly material processes, while he constructs himself as having material, 
mental and behavioural processes. The wife having mainly material processes implies 
a level of autonomy and agency in relation to him. She acts without the husband’s 
permission and is not obedient. And he expresses his despondent feelings that result 
from her agency.   
 
These linguistic patterns suggest a contradiction in the discourse of husbandly sexual 
rights and wifely obligations, where the two accompanying ideas of female sexual 
availability and divine approval (noted in chapter five) are undermined in favour of a 
wife’s choice to refuse. Within these competing discourses, the wife is constructed by 
the petitioner, as a simultaneously powerful subject with agentival capacity making 
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her own decisions with regard to her agency in the sexual arena and a powerless 
subject of the legal discourse, which portrays her as sinful if she does not fulfil her 
husband’s rights by being sexually available. Arguably, the petitioner’s question is 
framed in terms of a direct disruption of the prominent discourse of husbandly sexual 
needs and wifely availability, and the consequent God-believer relationship of the 
wife, which is dependent on her obedience to her husband.  
 
The petition in fatwa A together with others including fatwa C, D and M above, 
provide glimpses into how women are making sexual choices with regard to their 
“desires pleasures and experiences” of sexual intimacy (Lesch & Kruger 2005: 481). 
Many do this by balancing pietistic concerns with sexual desire, while others also 
resist the Deoband gender ideology thereby informing Desai and the other jurists of 
women’s contemporary experiences, expectations and understandings of marriage as 
relations of mutuality and reciprocity. 
  
As an example of the former, the petition in fatwa #31509, hereon referred to as S88, 
reads: 
 
During haiz if wife insist to have sex using condom when there is very little or almost 
no bleeding during the three days wait period of haiz. 
Is it permissible in islam or not? There is no forcing or desire shown from husband 
for sex. It is only wife expectation. 
 
As examples of the latter, the petition in fatwa # 28553 hereon referred to as P 
reads89:  
 
“Have women only been created to satisfy their husbands? Is that the only reason to 
be a wife? So women don’t have any value? 
 
Similarly the petition in fatwa # 14847, hereon referred to as Q reads90:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 31509, 2014. Available from: 
< http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/31509>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
See also fatwa # 28092, (hereon referred to as fatwa R) in this regard. 
89	  Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 28553, 2014. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/28553>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
90	  Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 14847, 2007. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/14847>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
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How can something that has been created for something else be equal to it? I've 
always heard that men and women are equal in Islam depending on their actions, but 
I find it hard to swallow that the very nature of women is to be subservient to men? 
 
Scholarship on fatwas indicates that petitions are valuable sources of research because 
they provide insights into the actual problems and concerns of particular societies 
(Larsen 2015; Masud, Messick & Powers 1996). Whether they point to women 
rejecting the Deoband gender ideology, or provide glimpses into lived experiences 
where women are making choices in the sexual arena with regard to their ‘desires 
pleasures and experiences’, while simultaneously balancing pietistic considerations, 
the petitions above suggest that some wives exercise agency by making choices 
reflecting their preferred sexual experiences. In the discussion of the answer that 
follows we see also that where muftis view women’s choices in terms of mutuality 
they may also recognise that ideas of mutuality and reciprocity are prevalent in 
modern Muslim marriages.  
  
7.3.2  Discussion of the Answer 
 
A study of the answer finds the mufti using at least five strategies to guide the 
petitioner toward a discourse of mutuality. He is aware that modern marriage is under 
social pressure to function on ideas of mutuality, and further that the classical law on 
which he offers his opinion rests on an imperative to preserve rather than dissolve an 
existing marriage. Thirdly, he finds value in spouses communicating sexual concerns 
with each other and next he advocates what may be described as a benevolent 
masculinity. In the midst of these, Desai also brings attention to the issue of force, 
which is the final strategy addressed in this chapter. 
 
Linguistic patterns of transitivity reveal that the Mufti constructs the husband as 
having mainly material and verbal processes, which means he is able to act and speak 
at will. Desai on the other hand constructs the wife as having mental and behavioural 
processes, which in the context, affords greater agency of action to the husband in 
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terms of how the issue should be handled. The language patterns reveal that Desai 
recognises the husband’s dominant role, but at the same time tempers it by suggesting 
a level of compassionate authority from the husband thereby also assigning the 
husband a paternal role. He suggests a benevolent consideration of the wife’s well-
being in the interests of saving the marriage, and also asserts that sexual intimacy is 
mutual between the spouses.   
 
This analysis is reinforced by the direct language used to describe the husband’s 
agentival and actor capacity in contrast to the passive tense used to refer to the wife’s 
feelings. The Mufti says: “rather talk to her and enquire if she experiences any 
difficulty”. In this way the Mufti affords the husband agency, while simultaneously 
shifting away from the coercive sin discourse, which relies on divine approval of male 
sexual right.  
 
In a synchronous move, an additional and significant slippage occurs, when even as 
the husband’s agentival capacity is supported through the use of direct speech on what 
he should do, nominalisations and passivisations to describe the husband’s feelings 
and concerns converts these into “agentless statements” (Billig 2008: 786). 
Nominalization and passivisation “especially when used by official speakers lend 
themselves to ideological uses” (786). This is reflected in the Mufti’s inclination away 
from the discourse of female sexual availability and male sexual right and wifely sin, 
toward mutuality. This passivisation and nominalization of the husband’s feelings, I 
argue, contradicts other linguistic patterns and allows for the downplaying of 
discourses of both coercive sin and male sexual right in terms of the “the wife 
fulfilling her marital obligation”.  The husband’s agentival capacity in terms of his 
sexual right and his wife’s sin is somewhat weakened, revealing a possible shift as 
Desai’s answer does not emphasise the normative hierarchical Deoband gender 
ideology we saw earlier in chapter five. To theorise this shift, I offer an analysis that 
points to Desai’s social context. Desai may be influenced in this regard, by modern 
communal and societal discourses that challenge this ideology which originates in 
classical thought on sexual intimacy.  
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7.3.2.1 Societal Discourses 
 
In addition to being informed by the voices of female petitioners on his website (as 
divulged in section 7.3.1 above), it can be surmised that Desai emphasizes mutuality, 
and discourages male force and anger in fatwa A, because he is moreover aware of 
ideas of equality and mutuality in contemporary societal views of Muslim minority 
contexts. He is conceivably cognizant of nuances in gender relations in minority 
contexts like South Africa, where gender symmetrical discourses on sexual health 
rights exist.  
 
South Africa, as a signatory to CEDAW, has committed to ensuring the sexual 
reproductive health rights of all women (Department of Health 2011). The 
Department of Health draft on sexual reproductive health rights (2011) sketches 
guidelines for the protection of sexual and reproductive health rights of both men and 
women under the South African legal system. It stipulates:  
 
Sexual health requires a positive and respectful approach to a person’s sexuality and 
sexual relationships. To be sexually healthy, people need to be able to have 
pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free of coercion, discrimination and 
violence. …… For people to have and keep their sexual health, their sexual rights 
must be respected, protected and fulfilled…. (Department of Health 2011: 3). 
 
In addition, South African legal discourses are also enmeshed with intra-community 
debates within the minority Muslim community. Potential conflicts arise out of the 
two Constitutional imperatives of freedom of religion and right to equality in such a 
way that the traditional religious practice and understanding of a Muslim marriage 
encompasses discriminatory practices that do not meet Constitutional imperatives of 
equality, with the result that Muslim marriages remain unregulated and Muslim wives 
are severely disadvantaged (Amien 2006; Amien 2010; MacDonald 2010; Rautenbach 
2009; Jeenah 2004).   
 
Recent case law points to Muslim women increasingly turning to the South African 
courts for relief in difficult marriage and divorce situations. Often these court rulings 
are in contravention of the classical Islamic jurisprudential marriage rules, compelling 
ulama intervention. Ulama bodies like the KZN Jamiatul Ulama (The Council Of 
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Muslim Theologians) had, through its inclusion in the United Ulama Council of South 
Africa UUCSA, participated in developing the latest Muslim Marriages Bill as part of 
a process towards the recognition and regulation of Muslim Marriages in South Africa 
(UUCSA 2011; Vahed 2000: 65). According to the darulfiqh website, Desai is an 
executive member of the KZN council of theologians (Jamiat), meaning he is at least 
exposed to the debates and contestations of the South African Muslim Marriages 
process.91 
 
The linguistic patterns in his answer above point to Desai’s shift from prioritising 
classical legal doctrines on sex in marriage, and could mean that the above societal 
and institutional discourses provide jurists like him with an overview of modern 
expectations of sexual intimacy in marriage as infused with notions of mutual consent 
and reciprocity, and clashing with “the entire edifice of classical thought on sex and 
sexuality” (Ali 2006: xxvi).   
  
Desai’s strategy as informed by his context within South Africa and by his 
petitioners’ expectations as outlined herein, is to discourage the husband from 
“forcing” his wife. His rationale is that it will lead to the wife feeling used for sex and 
to feelings of ‘demoralisation’ and finally to marital breakdown. In this way, there is 
also an additional tension between the discourse of male sexual needs rights and that 
of the wife’s feelings and morale in the mufti’s answer so that the wife moves into a 
position of power, in that it is assumed that if she feels used in the sexual act she will 
feel demoralized and exert further choice of non-consent, resulting in marital 
breakdown.  
 
I will extrapolate from Desai’s viewpoints of this in the discourse on health and well-
being in the next chapter. For now, this discernible trend to downplay the dominant 
discourses of male sexual priority and female availability and divine sanction of these, 
particularly in minority Muslim contexts is evidenced in other fatwas located in 
minority contexts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Refer to chapter one section 1.2.4 for more detail. 
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In fatwa # 19494 (hereon referred to as fatwa U92) from South Africa for example, the 
petition focuses on the issue of custody, but mentions a woman’s refusal to 
consummate her marriage. The question and the answer deals only with the Islamic 
legal custody concerns without further mentioning the wife’s refusal to engage in sex. 
Similarly, in fatwa # 28508 originating in the United States (hereon referred to as 
fatwa V93), and found in the website’s category of ‘miscellaneous fiqh’, dated March 
2014, the female petitioner asks for clarity on what constitutes a type of divorce called 
khula 94 . She speaks about both herself, her husband and an imam from her 
community, explaining her reasons for refusing sex. Notably these reasons are not 
valid ones according to the legal logic of marriage  
  
I was upset i had refused to have marital issues w my husband since he would 
introduce me as his friend instead of as his wife to his coworkers. 
 
In his answer the Zambian jurist says 
  
….By you refusing to have conjugal relationship due to personal reasons with your 
husband does not mean the child you are expecting is illegitimate, nor does it mean 
you are divorced from your husband…. 
 
The jurist ignores the traditional idea of a husband’s right to sex and wife’s obligation 
to make herself available. He instead foregrounds her question on what constitutes a 
khula, in addition supporting her refusal, by accepting “personal reasons” as a 
justification.  
 
This adds to the impression that there is a trend in askimam.org fatwas to downplay 
the dominant discourse of male sexual needs rights, and indirectly sanction a 
woman’s right to refuse. It speaks to the notion of reciprocal desire raised in the last 
chapter and surprisingly demonstrates that many muftis, by virtue of their silence in 
the face of overwhelming legal support of male sexual rights, are favouring 
reciprocity and mutuality within marriage.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 19494, 2011. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/19494>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
93 Askimam.org. 2011. Fatwa # 28508, 2014. Available from: 
<http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/28508>. [Accessed 15 October 2015]. 
94 A form of divorce where the wife secures her release from the marriage by financially compensating 
the husband (Mansoori 2009: 133).  
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Having outlined lived experiences as articulated by petitioners in the fatwas, and 
muftis’ responses to normative male sexual rights discourses in the context of modern 
marriages of mutuality, I now focus on marriage as an imperative and the techniques 
Desai proposes for protecting it.  
7.3.2.2 The Marriage Imperative 
 
Desai, stresses the marriage imperative through his attempts to relieve the petitioner’s 
wife from coercion. He asks the husband not to “force the issue upon the wife”, in 
case it creates “estrangement in the marriage”. A few sentences later, he once again 
expresses concerns over the wife’s emotions of being forced into sex and the resulting 
negative morale, which he says, could “ruin the marriage and complicate matters 
further”. 
 
Traditional Muslim thought, also central to the Hanafi Deoband ideology, considers 
marriage as a safeguard for chastity, and vital to the development and stability of the 
family, and by extension, the well-being of society. In this respect, marriage is 
regarded as imperative and incumbent upon every physically and financially able 
adult Muslim man and woman. Numerous hadith in the corpus of Islamic popular 
literature on marriage are cited to encourage its uptake and preservation, while 
Quranic verses like Q 30:21 and Q 2:187, that attest to mutuality and reciprocity are 
also invoked (Doi 1989: 31; Esposito 1982: 14-15).  
 
In both responses by Desai and Zakariyya Desai respectively, 95  this marriage 
imperative is underpinned by the discourse of mutuality. I argue that Desai 
accentuates this marriage imperative by giving precedence to the wife’s feelings and 
morale, enacting a shift away from mainstream juristic praxis in this regard96 (Hoel 
2011: 129). The literature revealed   the more common experience to be that women 
are faced with a “marriage at all costs” approach by the ulama and expected to accept 
unjust and potentially dangerous marital relationships in the “spirit of reconciliation” 
even in instances of abuse and infidelity. They are unable to get assistance in exiting 
marriages, and abusive husbands are ignored by some ulama in the interests of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Refer to Desai’s response in fatwa A in this chapter, and Zakariyya Desai’s response in fatwa D 
which is analysed in chapter six.  
96 As illustrated in chapter two in Hoel’s study on women’s experiences of the ulama during divorce 
proceedings.   
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preserving the marriage, illustrating that the marriage imperative in opposition to 
mutuality and consent is a dominant discourse within the institutional religious 
authority structures. Due to the lack of agency experienced by women in terms of 
divorce, a “marriage at all costs” approach of the marriage imperative can severely 
hamper the sexual reproductive health choices of women in perilous marriage 
situations. (Hoel 2011: 129).  
 
Desai’s form of articulation of the marriage imperative in fatwa A on the other hand, 
moderates the prominent male sexual rights discourse and using both a discourse of 
mutuality, and a discourse related to feelings and morale - the latter two being 
indicators of health and well-being. Whether Desai views the wife’s emotional and 
psychological state as a health issue or purely as a means to an end in terms of the 
marriage imperative will be explored in the next chapter on health and well-being. 
Also explored will be the integral connection between spiritual belief and health and 
well-being, in relation to the notion of ibādah (worship) as an important facet of a 
Muslim marriage.  
 
 For now I note that Desai’s position here is in harmony with Zakariyya Desai’s 
approach in fatwa D already analysed in chapter six, which also favours mutuality and 
advocates for male biomedical intervention and a sensitivity to the psychological and 
emotional well-being of the wife. The distinction is that Zakariyya Desai does this in 
the context of prioritising female sexual satisfaction. He foregrounds the wife’s 
feelings, before dealing with the husband’s biomedical health concern and the 
permissibility of masturbation, particularly for the wife’s fulfilment. The newly 
married status of the couple has a bearing on Zakariyya Desai’s answer, also 
influencing his interests in saving the marriage.  
 
Combining both Desai’s and Zakariyya Desai’s concern for mutuality we find that 
their responses also address the “mismatch” between the legal logic and the modern 
expectations of sex and sexuality in marriage “based on mutual consent and 
reciprocity” (Ali 2006: xxv). By relying on both the discourse of mutuality and the 
discourse of psychological and emotional well-being, either as the biomedical sexual 
health concerns of the husband or the wife’s psychological and emotional well-being 
or both, they locate their answers away from the jurisprudential logic of marriage 
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towards ‘ethical exhortations’ as explained by Ali (2006). As a feature of the 
mutuality in a marriage, they also advocate for effective communication of sexual 
concerns between spouses and a form of ‘benevolent masculinity’. As Desai says,  
 
…Instead of the husband worrying about the sin of refusing him his marital right, 
rather talk to her and enquire if she experiences any difficulty in doing so… 
 
The mufti in this case offers an alteration of the authoritative hegemonic masculinity 
in order to keep the marriage intact. 
7.3.2.3 Sexual Communication: Communicating Sexual Concerns between Spouses 
  
The mufti’s in the fatwas already analysed, particularly Docrat, Desai and Zakariyya 
Desai, all advocate for communication of sexual concerns between spouses. Docrat 
places the responsibility for communicating her reasons for non-consent on the wife. 
He says, “…if a woman has a valid reason for not responding positively to her 
husband, she should discuss this with him...” The mufti’s proposals in this regard are 
in line with a study that pointed to sexual communication as an effective strategy to 
prevent coercive sex and to afford young wives an opportunity to negotiate safe and 
voluntary sex.  One of the key proposals of the study pointed to the provisions by 
policy makers of providing sex education to young women before they marry, in order 
to enhance their sexual communication (Pande et al 2011: 102). 
 
Drawing from these considerations, it can thus be suggested that prospective Muslim 
spouses receive sex education as well as adequate education on the jurisprudential 
rules governing sex and sexuality, so that the clashes between their ideas of mutuality 
and consent and the classical edifice of marriage might be better negotiated and 
managed prior to, and within marriage.  
7.3.2.4 Benevolent Masculinity 
 
Bjorn Krondorfer and Stephen Hunt (2012: 198-200) maintain that attempts to 
reconfigure and alter masculinities so that women are not prejudiced requires 
unsettling the triad of patriarchy, power, hierarchy and privilege. They state, “power 
proclaims and enforces gender disparity, hierarchy maintains it, and privilege denies 
that such disparity exists”.  
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Using their approach, I suggest that Desai, even as he subscribes to and is located in a 
hierarchical model of gender relations, also attempts to undermine the prevailing 
gender disparity towards a form of mutuality. He is cognizant of male privilege within 
the discursive legal space of marriage, and attempts to displace it towards a 
benevolent masculinity that empowers and enables women. He says, “…it is 
important that the husband takes the feelings, tempo etc. of the wife into consideration 
before becoming upset …” Desai is aware of the jurisprudential gendered limitations 
placed on women in the context of sexual intimacy, and expresses the possible health 
and well-being repercussions of such limitations on the wife and ultimately the 
marriage and the family.  
 
He nevertheless remains caught within the male privilege of the jurisprudential 
framework. For example, his promotion of a benevolent masculinity continues to be 
embedded in classical jurisprudential doctrine associated with ideas of the wife’s 
“marital obligations” and “sin” in rejecting her husband in both the petition and the 
answer. The idea that the wife has a mediated God-believer relationship, through her 
obligations to be submissive and obedient to her husband, and the threat of divine 
disapproval at her refusal, which becomes a coercive mechanism diminishing her 
human and spiritual wholeness within the bedroom, prevails.     
 
Halkano Abdi Wario (2012: 253), in a study on the constructions of masculinity 
amongst the peripatetic men of the tablighi movement suggests that by virtue of the 
apolitical stance of Deoband affiliated groups like the tablighi jamat, the hegemonic 
masculinity avoids “some of the most visible forms of masculine power in favour of 
non-political engagement, avoidance of heated debates of all nature, pacifism, and 
temporal delegation of household headship” with the result that an ambivalent mix of 
different facets of  masculine power exists in parallel with a normative subservient 
and subordinate femininity97. These are entrenched in the gender ideology of the 
tabligh movement. In his study, Wario theorises the existence amongst the peripatetic 
Deoband tabligh men, of a fluid, alterable and reconstructable masculinity through a 
“transnational flow of practices of how to be proper Muslim men”. I argue that Desai 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Refer to footnote 76, chapter five for an explanation of this movement. 
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in this fatwa A and Zakariyya Desai in fatwa D provide similar options in the 
transnational online space. Thus a similar mobility and fluidity of ideas of masculinity 
to the peripatetic men of the tablighi movement is enacted in the transnational online 
space of askimam.org, potentially enabling women’s agency.  
7.3.2.5 Force and Coercion 
                             
Desai’s strategies in dealing with male concerns of wifely non-compliance in sexual 
intercourse are to advocate for sexual communication and a benevolent masculinity 
towards keeping the marriage intact. But he precedes these with advice which 
dissuades the husband from “forcing” his wife into sex. Desai’s rationale links the 
discourse of force with the emotional and psychological well-being of the wife.  He 
says: 
  
By the husband forcing the issue upon the wife, she feels used for this purpose and 
becomes demoralized which could possibly ruin the marriage and complicate matters 
further. 
 
Significantly, Desai does not negate the option of using force. He instead discourages 
it, citing her feelings and the resultant marital breakdown as the rationale. No 
jurisprudential logic is used in his answer, warranting an interrogation of this notion 
of force and coercion as it functions against with the discourse of mutuality. We will 
recall earlier in this chapter, a male petitioner in fatwa S refers to the idea of male 
force in a marriage. He declares in the context of sex during menstruation, 
 
Is it permissible in islam or not? There is no forcing or desire shown from husband 
for sex. It is only wife expectation. 
 
In a framework of marriage that ensures male sexual satisfaction through female 
sexual availability and where a wife’s recalcitrance may lead to physical castigation, 
the possibilities for forced compliance are real. The literature points to contestations 
on the recognition of marital rape as a form of violation in Islam (Bennet 2007; Ali 
2006). Wadud (2006: 236) suggests further that, “according to sharī‘a, if a Muslim 
man desires intercourse with his wife she must comply. If she does not she is guilty of 
nushūz (recalcitrance)”, an argument drawn from various interpretations of Quranic 
4:34 that the husband may beat his wife if he deems her guilty of nushūz. 
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Relevant excerpts from two fatwas in my sample find that ordinary Muslims and 
jurists who are committed to the relevance of the classical jurisprudential tradition as 
a pietistic requisite, experience a tension when the discourse of force intersects with 
discourse of mutuality. These two fatwas initiated by the same female petitioner, who 
had been sexually molested as a child, were generated within a few weeks of each 
other. They lend themselves to a diachronic analysis of the competing discourses of 
force and mutual consent as it relates to lawful sex before and within marriage. One 
petition was written before the female petitioner’s marriage and the other after. 
Excerpt of Fatwa # 32049, hereon referred to as fatwa E: 
 
I am to be wed to this guy who is religious and my mom loves him. I on the other 
hand do not….. 
..I do not agree to this marriage, at the start I was ok with it because I told him and 
my parents I wated to get married a year later after m studies (my mom didn't 
care..she said I wont find another guy like him)……. 
 
…One week ago, I told the guy I feel sad that no one values my opinion, that I wished 
I could have gotten married a year later then now…..My parents yells at me, threaten 
to kill me and my mom was about to jump out the window to sucided…..I got a few 
minor kicks and bruises from them. They said it was my fault for not strongly saying 
no earlier and now its too late...if they stop the wedding they will lose their respect 
and won't be able to show their face anymore in the mosque. They also said it'd my 
fault if no one will marry my other siblings. 
…… My mom expects me to connsumate the marriage, but I am scared. I HATE the 
idea of him touching me, i feel grossed and throwing up (my mom thought about him, 
how he maybe he has hope -- she doesn't really care what I feel)…Please help me. I 
do not feel at peace, I feel like im going crazy.  
 
The petitioner initially remains silent on the issue of marriage, then agrees in principle 
to the idea, and then finally decides, and clearly articulates that she doesn’t want to 
marry this person. She expresses conflicting feelings in terms of being compelled into 
a marriage she does not want, of managing parental expectations, of feelings of anger 
and betrayal at her parents, of her anger at the ‘guy’ for colluding with her mother, 
and of feelings revulsion at being touched and the fear of sex with her future husband.  
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The UK jurist, Saleem Khan, interprets her question as to whether she should go 
ahead with the nikāḥ (marriage) or not. After stating he understands her predicament, 
Khan completely ignores all the emotional and psychological concerns, the abusive 
displays of coercion and force, and downplays her agentival capacity in terms of her 
right to consent to the marriage in Islamic law, and instead emphasises the ‘marriage 
imperative’ and a trust in her parents and God: 
 
In principle, you are an adult and you have an independent right in Shariah to 
withdraw from this marriage arrangement. However, in the context of the 
circumstances you are facing, you seek our help, probably our advice. Often in life 
we have to distinguish permissibility from practicality. What may be permissible may 
not necessarily be practical or ideal. 
 
Later on he says: 
 
Our advice is you change your mind-set and proceed with the marriage. Living 
together will give both of you the opportunity to win over each other’s hearts, which 
will dominate all negativities. If you trust your parent’s love for you then change 
your attitude and look forward to making the marriage a success. After adopting all 
possible means for a successful marriage, place your trust in Allah. 
  
Khan advises the petitioner to get married and to trust in her parent’s choices for her, 
imposing a normative gendered subjectivity on her, that “girls are supposed to be 
apprehensive, and to give the boy the benefit of the doubt”. Bearing in mind that the 
legal framework of a Muslim marriage strongly supports female agency in terms of 
consent before marriage, but severely restricts it within the marriage, it is significant 
in this instance that Khan advises the unmarried petitioner to disregard her legal right 
to withhold consent to the marriage. Abdur Rahman Doi (1989) in his book Women in 
Sharī‘a, presents numerous ahadith and Quranic sources that attest to the importance 
of free consent before marriage (1989: 35). He argues that even the great hadith 
scholar Bukhari (194-256 H810-880 AD) stressed this aspect of consent to the effect 
that one of the chapters of his hadith compilation is called: When a man gives his 
daughter in marriage and she dislikes it, the marriage shall be annulled.  
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In addition, a foundational Hanafi text, which is used in Desai’s curriculum in his 
mufti training institute, Mukhtasar al Qudūrī, relates in the book of marriage:  
 
The marriage of a free, major, sane woman is concluded with her consent, even 
though a guardian does not conclude it [for her], according to Abu Hanifa…be she a 
virgin (bikr) or a previously married woman who had consummated her marriage... it 
is not permitted for the guardian to compel a sane, major virgin [to marry] ( Al- 
Qudūrī n.d: 379-380). 
 
Arising from these theoretical viewpoints, it can be concluded that the idea of consent 
to marriage is stressed as an important Islamic legal requirement, and a woman’s 
agency in her decision is strongly upheld and respected within the traditional Hanafi 
legal framework. But after a nikāḥ, and particularly after consummation, her capacity 
or the requirement that she consent to further sex is not a matter of consensus amongst 
scholars. Many render her consent subordinate to her wifely obedience and 
subservience to her husband, to the extent that she should make herself sexually 
available in order to fulfil her husband’s sexual right, as is reflected in the fatwa 
below.  
 
In fatwa # 32362, hereon referred to as F that follows a few weeks later, the idea of 
force is played out once again, this time in relation to the same petitioner refusing to 
engage in intercourse or intimacy with her new husband. She mentions that she went 
ahead with the marriage with the intention of building trust and love before sex. But 
she is being coerced by both her mother and her husband to consummate the 
marriage. A section of the petition in fatwa F reads: 
 
Petition 2:” …They both knew I had my monthly cycle and I wasn’t ready. I told 
them it was in the quran that you shouldn’t force a woman or touch her when she’s in 
her monthly cycle but they didn’t seem to care...  
 
…My ‘husband’ knew about my traumatic childhood experience but forced kissed me 
and touched when I was sleeping…i cried in the bathroom because I felt violated and 
hurt. I really do not like him, and I feel like I can’t full fill my duty as a wife towards 
him. How can I love someone when I was forced into this? Forced marriage is 
against islam…. 
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…“I know i won't be able to full fill my duty as his wife, it’s not fair to me nor to 
him” 
I don’t want this marriage. Never did. Isn’t this void? 
 
I observed in chapter five that the theoretical dialectic and the rhetorical patterns this 
petitioner displays suggest an internalization of the two divergent voices that Ahmed 
describes, leaning towards the ethical voice through her appeals to fairness within her 
marriage. Now we can tell that the petitioner also displays a religious commitment to 
the classical Islamic legal tradition. The first is obvious in terms of petitioning a legal 
scholar twice, for assistance, and the second is evident in accepting her “duty” to fulfil 
her husband’s sexual needs in her second petition despite her views of what’s fair and 
what’s lawful.  
 
I noted in chapter five that a slippage occurs as she resists the discourse of male 
sexual need. Now this synchronic movement puts her temporarily in a subjective 
position of power in relation to the discourse of male sexual need and accompanying 
ideas of force.  
The above fatwas demonstrate how a petitioner attempts to balance concerns of 
religiosity which are located for her in normative legal understandings of marriage 
(her understanding of wifely duty) with contemporary personal desires and 
expectations of mutual consent in marriage and arising out of the ethical voice of 
fairness.  
 
Fatwa E further exemplifies the manner in which a mufti can go beyond 
psychological and emotional appeals of abuse and force of a petitioner, and her 
concern about the dominant discourse of consent before marriage, to what he believes 
is an important issue of the practicality of marriage regardless of the circumstances. In 
this case he uses a rhetorical strategy of foregrounding his own concern and opinion 
on the importance of the marriage imperative. The idea of force and the dominant 
discourse of mutual consent before marriage are both linked to the legal logic of a 
Muslim marriage. The psychological and emotional concerns of the petitioner and the 
notions of fairness are embedded in the ethical exhortations of marriage. The analysis 
suggests that Khan uses his position as a religious authority figure to advise in such a 
way that he removes the petitioner from a position of relative power as an unhappy 
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unmarried woman, where she has a legal choice to consent, to one of powerlessness as 
a married unhappy woman where her lawful choices to mutual consent to sex are 
diminished and where the idea of force continues to be present. This demonstrates 
how a jurist attempts to balance his own concerns for the marriage imperative, by 
shifting away even from the legal rules of mutuality before marriage.  
 
Judging from the excerpts of these fatwas, and the experiences of women undergoing 
divorce procedures in Hoel’s and Shaikh’s (2013) study as noted in the literature, the 
ultimate demonstrator of the tenacity of the marriage imperative in modern juristic 
discourses is divulged through firstly, a glimpse into how the legal rules of mutual 
consent before marriage and consummation can be undermined by a jurist, and 
secondly, how a “marriage at all costs” articulation can also severely hamper the 
sexual reproductive health choices of women in perilous marriage situations. In both 
scenarios conditions are created that jeopardise female sexual agency.  
 
As noted though in this chapter, Desai’s approach diverges from the juristic praxis in 
Hoel’s and Shaikh’s study and to that noted in fatwa E. He also stresses the marriage 
imperative, but gives precedence to the wife’s psychological and emotional health 
relayed as her “feelings of demoralization” and her potential feeling of being ‘used for 
sex’, through an encouragement of sexual communication and a benevolent 
masculinity.  
 
7.4  Key Observations 
 
The main fatwa analysed in this chapter provided a useful glimpse into how 
petitioners and different jurists who are committed to the “relevance of the classical 
tradition” deal with the mismatch between the jurisprudential rules of a Muslim 
marriage and modern expectations of reciprocity and mutuality in marriage. Through 
the internalization of both a pragmatic legal Islamic voice on marriage, and an ethical 
voice, some women evoke the ethical voice by negotiating, resisting or rejecting the 
discourse of female responsibility to fulfil male sexual need and instead enact their 
capacity to refuse as theorized by Ahmed (1992: 65-66). The chapter further divulged 
how female petitioners on askimam.org are challenging the normative hierarchical 
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Deoband gender ideology, suggesting ideas of mutuality in modern Muslim marriages 
particularly those in minority Muslim contexts. 
 
Women’s experiences, understandings, and expectations of sexual intimacy in 
marriage, added to South African gender symmetrical discourses within the legislative 
arena, conjoined with intra-Muslim debates and contestations on the recognition of 
Muslim marriages, may influence Desai’s emphasis on mutuality and restrainment of 
male coercion in fatwa A. Desai’s answer in this fatwa differs from Docrat’s in fatwa 
C in its endeavour to provide space for women’s refusal within this moral ethical 
framework.  
 
In chapter six, when faced with concerns about female sexual rights in the context of 
male sexual health concerns, I argued that jurists deviated from the legal logic of a 
Muslim marriage towards the ethical moral logic while simultaneously remaining 
loyal to classical gendered notions of male female sexuality. They accepted that the 
idea of mutuality exists in ideas of female sexual rights as satisfaction. They also 
located their arguments at the convergence of discourses of mutuality and health and 
well-being. In this chapter jurists responded similarly, except that here the 
“mismatch” between modern expectations and classical jurisprudential rules led to a 
modulation of the prominent male sexual needs discourse towards ethical moral 
exhortations. There appears to be a trend on askimam.org to downplay male sexual 
rights discourses. Through their silence on a women’s refusal of sex as demonstrated 
in fatwas C, U and V, muftis stressed mutuality and attended to the question of female 
sexual rights as reciprocal desire, where wives’ rights to sex and to say how sex 
happens, and not just to their satisfaction within the male dominated sexual act, is 
tacitly tolerated. Five possible strategies were revealed to guide petitioners towards 
this discourse of mutuality.  
 
The pervasive discourse of force and coercion and the tension between a discourse of 
force and the discourse of mutuality, especially within a marriage was elaborated on. 
Petitioners and muftis resisted the discourse of force, creating a disruption of power 
by using health and well-being discourses to argue for legal or ethical strategies to 
alleviate psychological and emotional suffering. For petitioners, their rationale was 
undergirded by modern expectations of mutuality in marriage. For muftis, their 
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rationale was underpinned by the marriage imperative. The tenacity of the marriage 
imperative in contemporary juristic reasoning and how it can either facilitate or 
impede women’s sexual agency was also recognised. In the former effect, when this 
imperative is reliant on the discourses of mutuality and health and well-being, it 
moderates the prominent male sexual rights discourse. In the latter effect, in cases 
where women are in perilous and tenuous marriage circumstances, it can prove 
harmful.  
 
Two ethical strategies, sexual communication and an alteration of the hegemonic 
masculinity to a benevolent but enduring paternalistic masculinity were observed as 
tools used in the interests of preserving the marriage. It showed that sexual 
communication as an effective route for protecting young women’s sexual agency in a 
non-liberal tradition like Islam, requires adequate pre-marital sex education as well as 
knowledge of the jurisprudential rules governing sex and sexuality in a Muslim 
marriage. Finally, the benevolent masculinity advocated by Desai points to a mobility 
and fluidity in the transnational online space, of ideas of masculinity which can 
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Religiosity and spirituality integrate into the way people come to make sense of their 
health and well-being. Despite being two separate constructs, religiosity and 
spirituality are connected with overlapping dimensions that relate to beliefs and 
practices (Yehya and Dutta 2010: 846-847). 
 
In this study an intertexual discourse of health and well-being extends over all the 
fatwas referred to in distinctive ways by both petitioners and muftis. The links 
between health and well-being and to piety through expressions of both religiosity and 
spirituality are implicit in both the petitions and the answers. Moving from the 
premise that health includes physical, emotional and psychological well-being, I 
notice that the discourse of health and well-being is sometimes articulated by 
petitioners as a pietistic, by which is meant a religious and spiritual, concern related to 
suffering and affliction broadly conceptualized as physical, emotional and 
psychological. Muftis deal with these articulations through a variety of legal, pietistic 
and therapeutic responses.  
 
The first section of this chapter looks at conceptual approaches to, and theological 
positions on, health and well-being. In the second section I examine the fatwas to 
demonstrate the mufti’s responses to health concerns. An overview of how physical 
health is conceptualized is demonstrated by fatwas B, D, G and K, L, and M. In terms 
of social, emotional and psychological health concerns, three responses were 
identified in the fatwa sample: the first response is spiritual counselling demonstrated 
by fatwas C and E. The second response is a legal response demonstrated by fatwa F 
and the third is a preventative therapeutic response demonstrated by fatwas A and D.  
 
Further to the analysis, an investigation into the website indicates an additional 
potential response which is characterized by the inclusion of someone who is not a 
mufti. In this scenario, the mufti brings in a professional allied health professional, 
from the perspective of a sociologist with a background in psychology. I reflect on 
this briefly here and draw conclusions on it in the following chapter 
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8.2  Conceptual Positions and Theoretical Approaches 
 
8.2.1  Health and Spirituality 
 
Scholars suggest that spiritual beliefs are integral to physical as well as other 
dimensions of health and well-being (Ochieng 2010: 104; Ashy 1999: 256.) 
Participants in Bertha Ochieng’s study, for example, argue for the connection between 
spiritual beliefs, relationships with family and everything else they do. 
 
Spiritual beliefs promoted a broadly holistic view of the individual, which 
encompassed the physical as well as the psychological, and social dimensions of 
health and well-being (2010: 104).  
 
Subsequently, any policies or strategies directed at improving peoples’ health and 
well-being are to be coupled with their belief system because,  
 
… the salutatory effects of the spiritual beliefs and practices that result from 
participating in worship and prayer…[are]… associated with psychological health 
and well-being (Ochieng 2010: 105). 
 
As an example in Islam, Majed Ashy states:  
 
…praying five times a day helps to reduce psychological stress and to keep the 
structure and discipline in the life of an individual. It also gives one a chance to 
express feelings, hopes, needs… (Ashy 1999: 256). 
 
Representative of these views, fatwas in this study show that spiritual and religious 
beliefs are integral to an individual’s physical, social, psychological and emotional 
health and well-being. In this chapter, petitioners articulate and jurists advocate a 
reliance on spiritual and religious beliefs and practices when dealing with health 
concerns. This chapter highlights individuals’ varying health needs in the sexual arena 
to examine the degree to which these needs receive attention and the sorts of attention 
they receive. Are the physical and emotional and psychological dimensions of sexual 
health receiving similar attention and are all deemed to be facets of health in the 
fatwas?  
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8.2.2  Two Theological Positions 
 
Deterministic and free will theodicy offer two views of health and suffering 
(Sachedina 1990: 24-25). The “determinist theodicy” describes suffering and 
affliction as God’s plan to improve humanity. It is either a form of punishment; an 
expiation of a previous sin or it is a trial, or test of faith from God. This theological 
positioning prompts a passive response of patience and endurance through suffering, 
accompanied by dubious attitudes to medical treatment. By contrast, “free will 
theodicy” features human misconduct through disbelief as a means that leads to 
suffering. It triggers an “active response” so that the human being who is the cause of 
his/her own suffering has a responsibility to enact good deeds in the world in negation 
of suffering. The implication is that “health is preferable to sickness, a strong believer 
is better liked than a weak one, and seeking a cure does not contradict submission to 
God’s decisions about humanity”, effecting affirmative attitudes to medical treatment. 
In his description of the two theological positions, Abdul Aziz Sachedina concludes, 
 
…in contemporary Muslim biomedical ethics, the free will theodicy – founded upon 
divine justice and human moral agency - has gradually become the dominant 
approach in dealing with human suffering through illness (25). 
 
It is unclear if in Sachedina’s mind, “illness” appears to be referring to only physical 
afflictions or not. But, as Ashy explains, Islamic tradition recognises at least four 
types of disease which attest to the inclusion of other facets too as described by Khan 
(1986) quoted in Ashy (1999: 256):    
 
Diseases in the Islamic tradition are of four types: spiritual, functional, structural, and 
superficial…. Spiritual diseases are the most severe, such as schizophrenia. 
Functional diseases are the disturbances that are manifested in imbalances of 
temperament. Structural diseases affect size, number, or form of organs. Superficial 
diseases are those of the skin or hair…  
 
Given that a holistic view of health and well-being includes not just physical but also 
psychological and emotional dimensions, and that the latter dimensions are within the 
ambit of “spiritual” and functional” afflictions also recognized as a form of illness or 
disease requiring treatment, I now intend to ascertain to what extent and how these 
approaches to human suffering and affliction have been extended to include various 
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facets of health in relation to sex and sexuality in the fatwas. Petitioners expressed 
health concerns in multiple dimensions all relating to pietistic concerns and muftis 
dealt with health concerns in varying ways.  
 
8.3  Muftis Responses 
 
8.3.1  Responses to Physical Health  
 
We saw above that Desai in fatwa B and Zakariyya Desai in fatwa D dealt with the 
male petitioners’ mention of physical sexual affliction - premature ejaculation - by 
advocating for outside intervention. They applied the “free will” theodicy of 
contemporary Muslim biomedical ethics when dealing with the physical health 
concerns of their male petitioners.   
 
Jurists also locate themselves within a biomedical ethical space when it comes to the 
physical health concerns of female petitioners. In chapter five, a female petitioner in 
fatwa G enquires about the permissibility of not washing her hair during the ritual 
purification required after sex, because the frequent sexual intercourse and subsequent 
ritual washing had created sinus problems and headaches for her. Student jurisconsult 
Ya’qoob Dadabhai responded with a legal ruling granting her a pietistic concession on 
the basis of her physical health concerns. Fatwa G showed that female physical health 
in the face of male sexual need and concerns of piety are also addressed, as legitimate 
biomedical concerns, which can be alleviated through jurisprudential mechanisms in 
the context of pietistic concerns. This trend is further exemplified in the mufti’s 
response to the first enquiry in fatwa C in chapter five, where Docrat prioritises male 
sexual need, yet advocates legal mechanisms to validate the wife’s refusal to engage 
in sexual intercourse. The “valid reasons” which sanction her refusal were illustrated 
through fatwas K, L and M, as physical health reasons associated with pain and 
pregnancy.  
 
Clearly when it comes to the physical sexual health concerns of both male and female 
petitioners, Muftis are attuned with the trends of contemporary Muslim biomedical 
ethics, enacting and advocating a “free will” theodicy resulting in affirmative attitudes 
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to either legal manoeuvres or outside interventions. I now ascertain how social, 
psychological and emotional facets of health are dealt with in general in the fatwas 
through an overview of the second petition in fatwa C, and then in the context of 
sexual agency in the other fatwas in the main sample - A, D, E and F.  
 
8.3.2  Responses to Other Dimensions of Health 
 
8.3.2.1 “Place your Trust in Allah” 
 
Earlier, in chapter five, I addressed the first of the two enquiries presented in Fatwa C. 
In order to further survey how emotional and psychological health and well-being is 
managed by jurists, I now turn to an analysis of the second enquiry in fatwa C. The 
petition stated: 
 
1- if a husband ask to his wife for sex, and if she refused oftenly. with reasons that 
she is not in mood, and after this, if husband indulge in some other immoral and 
sinful activities, then what would be position of both in front of ALLAH? 
  
2- if a muslim, dont want to live , due to extra stress ,pain, and unhappines in his life, 
can he commit suicide ? is there any possibility that ALLAH forgive his sin, as he is 
aksing to ALLAH to resolve his problems but ALLAH didn’t (sic).  
 
The second enquiry in the petition centres on pietistic concerns in relation to suicide 
which is conceptualized as sin. The male petitioner expresses that his appeals to an 
Omnipotent God to resolve his problems and challenges have not rendered 
satisfactory results, and asks the mufti if God will forgive the sin of suicide. The 
petitioner blames the omnipotent God’s failure to resolve his various social, emotional 
and psychological challenges for his suicidal inclinations. In his answer Docrat states: 
 
2) In actual fact, suicide does not put a stop to all problems and worries, rather it 
puts a start to much more distress and problems (in the Qabr98 and in the hereafter). 
As believers in the Kalimah, we believe in Taqdeer and that all good and bad is from 
Allah. Many a times Allah Ta’ala afflicts a person with certain problems and 
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calamities, this is only a test from Allah and he wants to see how we respond to these 
adverse conditions. Whether we are patient and put our reliance on Allah, or do we 
turn our backs and have an evil perception regarding Allah. Accordingly Allah 
Ta’ala will reward the person, whether it is appearent in this world or the hereafter. 
Rasulullah has mentioned:  
“Whoever kills himself in this world using some kind of object, He will be punished 
with the same item on the day of Qiyaamah” 
If a person makes dua and asks Allah to help and assist him, then he should not lose 
hope and continue asking Allah. If his duas are not answered immediately, then too, 
he will not leave empty handed. He will see the fruits of his sacrifice later. 
 
Docrat’s argument is located in an eschatological and pietistic framework. He 
denounces suicide as a way out of “problems and worries”, implies that it creates new 
“stress and problems” in the afterlife, and appeals to the God-believer relationship. He 
advises dealing with the psychological, pietistic and emotional concerns of the 
petitioner, through patience, prayer and reliance on God. 
 
Docrat’s answer can be viewed in a number of ways. Firstly, reflecting Ochieng 
(2010) and Ashy’s (2009) analysis, the mufti places prominence on the petitioner’s 
spiritual beliefs as part of health and well-being. Docrat foregrounds the link between 
the spiritual and the emotional and psychological concerns of his petitioner, firstly by 
re-establishing faith and belief in Gods omnipotence, and secondly through a 
description of the theological aetiology of his affliction. Recognising the belief system 
of the individual allows the mufti to advocate prayer, trust and reliance in God as 
means through which emotional and psychological health and wellbeing are achieved. 
Yehya and Dutta (2010: 846) state:  
 
Religion informs the cosmologies within which individuals come to develop 
understandings of who they are, what health means to them, and the ways in which 
health choices ought to be developed…It offers an alternative entry point beyond the 
biomedical model for understanding the ways in which alternative rationalities are 
constituted in articulating meanings of health, understanding healing practices, and 
actively participating in health-related choices. 
 
In line with this deliberation, I note that Docrat emphasises the trials of the afterlife, 
and attempts to dissuade the petitioner from suicide by providing a pietistic alternative 
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to the biomedical model for health and well-being choices, fully congruent with 
traditional Muslim thought on the aspect of spiritual disease (as noted by Ashy 1999) 
which is here expressed as suicidal tendencies. 
  
Alternatively, it can be argued that the holistic view of the individual is undermined 
when a serious question on suicide is dealt with solely as a crisis of pietistic belief. 
Docrat, whose training as a jurist does not incorporate psychological or psychiatric 
expertise, does not refer the suicidal petitioner to a trained medical or allied 
professional. Instead, the jurist rather adds an additional stress to the petitioner’s 
existing psychological, emotional and mental unease in the form of an eschatological 
apprehension. Both enquiries are now attached to sin and the sin of suicide in the 
second enquiry becomes a matter of further pietistic concern when it is also linked to 
torment in the afterlife. 
 
In this way Docrat services the psychological and emotional health and well-being 
concerns of his petitioner purely through spiritual leadership. He overlooks the 
possible positive contributions of health workers and social workers. He also 
overlooks the potential impact of the male petitioner’s mental state on his wife, whom 
the petitioner complains about in the first question with regard to her refusal to engage 
in sexual intercourse, which he implies is the cause of his subsequent “immoral” 
activities in society. In this way the mufti deviates from traditional Muslim values and 
objectives with regard to counselling which considers both the welfare of the 
individual and others in society. Docrat’s response seems at odds with Mumtaz 
Jafari’s analysis that Islamic counselling considers both the individual and the 
collective well-being of society (1993: 330-331). 
 
More disquieting and clearly not aligning with Jafari’s assessments is mufti Khan’s 
approach to the female petitioner who had been sexually molested as a child and does 
not want to get married in fatwa E.99 This fatwa is important because it deals with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The petitioner in fatwa E says: “…Two weeks ago, I expressed my concern with my parents. I told 
my mom i was assulated when I was a child and was kind of scared of marriage and consummating. 
She didn't care as much expect the fact I was ok and called me stupid because I shared it also with the 
guy. They won't stop the marriage……I feel very depressed. And I really hate talking to the guy now, I 
have bad thoughts like how he would die. I want to run away. My mom expects me to connsumate the 
marriage, but I am scared. I HATE the idea of him touching me, i feel grossed and throwing up (my 
mom thought about him, how he maybe he has hope -- she doesn't really care what I feel)”. 
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social, psychological and emotional health concerns of a petitioner in the context of 
sexual agency. Her question is framed as an appeal for help in terms of her emotional 
and psychological state and arises out of her trepidation and fear of an arranged 
marriage.  
 
In response to her acute feelings of suffering and affliction, when Khan prioritises the 
“practicality” of marriage over the “permissibility” of her not consenting to the 
marriage,100 he ignores her psychological and emotional trauma and instead he 
advocates a pietistic trust in God. He advises her to change her mind-set, proceed with 
the marriage and place her trust in her parent’s good intentions and Allah.101 
 
To summarise, in contrast to Sachedina’s analysis, Docrat and Khan appear to digress 
from a free-will theodicy of contemporary Muslim biomedical ethics. They adopt the 
“passive response” based on “determinist theodicy” to their petitioners’ psychological 
and emotional suffering, resulting in absolutely no reliance on outside interventions 
by medical or allied professionals and in Khan’s case no spiritual counselling either 
for the petitioners’ emotional psychological suffering.  
  
I argue that even if the above two jurists do recognize other facets of health and 
consider that spiritual beliefs and practices contribute to physical, emotional and 
psychological health and well-being, they are not trained to deal with severe 
emotional and psychological health concerns, which they relegate solely to pietistic 
interventions, thereby controverting even the objectives and values of Islamic 
counselling to consider the combined individual and the collective well-being of 
society.  
 
Other Muftis in this study, however, approach the social, psychological and emotional 
facets of health and well-being differently. They initiate a “free will theodicy”, not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Khan in fatwa E responds:  In principle, you are an adult and you have an independent right in 
Shariah to withdraw from this marriage arrangement. However, in the context of the circumstances you 
are facing, you seek our help, probably our advice. Often in life we have to distinguish permissibility 
from practicality. What may be permissible may not necessarily be practical or ideal. 
101 Khan further says: Our advice is you change your mind-set and proceed with the marriage. Living 
togeter will give both of you the opportunity to win over each other’s hearts, which will dominate all 
negativities. If you trust your parent’s love for you then change your attitude and look forward to 
making the marriage a success. After adopting all possible means for a successful marriage, place your 
trust in Allah. 
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necessarily located within modern Muslim biomedical ethics, but which nevertheless 
triggers an active response in varying ways illustrated in the section below.  
8.3.2.2  “We Advise you to Seek the Intervention” 
 
A few weeks after her first petition (Fatwa E), the same female petitioner has gotten 
married and, again appeals for assistance, in Fatwa F.  She concludes by asking if 
what she now considers now a “forced marriage” is possibly “void”, and the rest of 
the petition points to obvious abuse, and social, emotional and psychological trauma.  
 
1.Mom threatens me (kick me out of the house) to consummate marriage when  I felt 
uncomfortable and didn't want to. She wanted to save face in front of his family. 
2.He emotionally blackmails here and there to consummate the marriage. 
3.He tells my mother everything, whenever she asked him if we consummated he says 
no, and then my mom emotionally blackmails me and hurts me.  
4.I ended up in a psych ward because I felt trapped and really betrayed by 
everything. 
…My ‘husband’ knew about my traumatic childhood experience but forced kissed me 
and touched when I was sleeping…i cried in the bathroom because I felt violated and 
hurt. I really do not like him, and I feel like I can’t full fill my duty as a wife towards 
him. How can I love someone when I was forced into this? Forced marriage is 
against islam. 
 
Everyday I come home - I feel sadness. I feel depressed and trapped in my own home. 
I tried to give it a chance, but right now, I really can’t. I don’t find him sexually, 
emotionally and physically attractive. We also have culture differences and I just 
can’t make sacrifices for someone I don’t love. 
  
My parents told me to accept it because allah made me get married for a reason, they 
said im acting out..but I am depressed and hurting inside. If everything happens for a 
reason..than why is there such thing as - forced marriages is against islam? Why 
can’t they see that?  
My parents expect me to consummate in summer when i’m suppose to go visit him…I 
just want to run away. I know i won't be able to full fill my duty as his wife, its not 
fair to me nor to him.  
I don’t want this marriage. Never did. Isn’t this void?(sic).  
 
The Australian Jurist Haris Siddiqui assists by suggesting legal mechanisms for 
terminating the marriage.  
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We take note of your negative feelings in the marriage even after giving it a chance. 
We advise you to seek the intervention of some senior person in the family and some 
senior ‘aalim in whom your parents have confidence and confide in them. Explain to 
them how you feel and the negative consequences of moving ahead. Request them to 
assist you to amicably terminate the marriage through a talaaq. Make them explain 
to your parents that the negative consequences of moving forward in the marriage 
are probably more than terminating the marriage and it is in their interest to be part 
of amicably resolving the problem. 
 
Siddiqui’s rhetorical strategy does not prioritise the feelings of abuse or trauma. He 
refers to these only as “negative feelings” and as a rationale for ending the marriage. 
The psychological and emotional health issues, and the prospects of ending up “in a 
psych ward”, only serve as logical reasons to end the marriage. These issues are not 
taken up by Siddiqui as health concerns requiring appropriate interventions. 
 
Firstly, Siddiqui’s response while it completely bypasses the obvious health concerns, 
is an active response through legal mechanisms. It is facilitative in that it affords the 
woman agentival capacity to exit the marriage on the grounds that staying could result 
in “negative consequence”. Rhetorical mechanisms to this effect include the jurist’s 
use of active directives. He tells her to “explain”, to “request”, to “make them 
explain”, further constructing the woman as having verbal processes, capable of 
articulating what she wants and convincing others of what is best in the 
circumstances, placing her in a subjective position of power.  
 
On the other hand, the jurist also constructs the petitioner as powerless because, while 
he locates power in her, he simultaneously locates power in other male members and 
also relocates power to her parents. Her agency to exit her marriage must be mediated 
by a male scholar, and he ignores ethical accountability for her parents’ abuse. 
Instead, she is told to continue to trust in her parents and their involvement in her 
marriage is accepted. In this way there has not been an interrogation of the ethics of 
parental involvement, the issues of force and abuse, nor an adequate intervention for 
her emotional and psychological well-being.  
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While the way forward proposed by this jurist may at first glance appear facilitative, it 
is arguably also more onerous and time consuming, possibly jeopardizing her fragile 
mental and emotional state. To illustrate, the jurist advises that she obtain a ṭalāq 
through a process mediated by a senior family member and a religious scholar. In 
suggesting she needs assistance he is advocating for the “aalim” to convince the 
husband to release her through the pronouncement of a ṭalāq. In the practice of 
Muslim marriage and divorce law, a husband is not compelled to issue a ṭalāq, in 
which case a wife may apply for a judicial separation (faskh). The different schools of 
law differ on what constitutes a faskh, some stipulating stringent requirements, 
placing undue burdens on women (Mansoori 2009: 155). Relatedly, the literature 
reveals that Muslim women find it very difficult to exit even long term abusive 
marriages when they request a faskh though a religious scholar. Hoel’s study of 
women’s experiences with the ulama during divorce proceedings underscores the 
hierarchical authority of the ulama, noting how their gendered ontological 
assumptions entrench male privilege, hamper women’s attempts for a faskh, and 
impacts on their sexual reproductive health rights (Hoel 2011: 129).  
 
In contrast to Docrat and Khan who used a passive response to psychological and 
emotional afflictions, Siddiqui’s approach even as it aligns with the “free will 
theodicy” in triggering an active response to suffering, provides no indication that the 
wife’s psychological and emotional afflictions are viewed as a facet of health. The 
mufti’s response to emotional and psychological affliction is not located in a 
biomedical ethical framework, but purely within the legal framework of marriage. He 
also fails to fulfil the holistic requirements of counselling within Islam as described 
by Jafari and does not view the petitioner in a holistic manner as suggested by 
Ocheing and Ashy.  
 
Others like Desai and Zakariyya Desai in fatwas A and D appear to be more sensitive 
to the emotional and psychological well-being of wives and have chosen to promote 
preventative provisions to avoid suffering in this facet of well-being.  
8.3.2.3 “Don’t Ruin the Marriage” 
 
In chapter seven, when dealing with male sexual needs, Desai asks his male petitioner 
in fatwa A to consider his wife’s feelings and not to force the issue of her “marital 
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obligation”, advocating for sexual communication and a benevolent masculinity. 
Similarly, Zakariyya Desai in fatwa D in chapter six, when dealing with female sexual 
satisfaction in the context of premature ejaculation, also advocates consideration of 
the wife’s feelings even as he prescribes medical interventions for the husband. Both 
jurists appear to be sensitive to the emotional and psychological well-being of wives 
and have promoted preventative measures that avoid suffering in the interests of 
keeping the marriage intact.  
 
Here the marriage imperative is linked to a wife’s emotional wellbeing, the premise 
being that a healthy emotional and psychological state promotes the chances of a 
marriage remaining intact. This could stem from the idea that a Muslim marriage 
comprises both of a spiritual (ibāda) and relational (muāmala) component (Mansoori 
2009: vii). 
 
In line with Ochieng’s and Ashy’s opinions, the ibāda component of Desai’s fatwa is 
twofold. In the first, the mufti considers providing sound legal advice a form of 
worship or a pietistic duty which is enhanced by encouraging the couple to remain 
married. Second the couple that remains married is also performing a pietistic duty 
when they persevere through their challenges to make the marriage succeed. 
Maintaining the integrity of Muslim marriage is a pietistic practice for both the mufti 
and the petitioner; through the fatwa both are “participating in worship and prayer” 
(Ochieng 2010: 105). Saving the marriage is a form of worshiping and pleasing God, 
and contributes to the petitioner’s psychological and emotional wellbeing. So in 
Desai’s answer in fatwa A in the previous chapter, even though he does not advise 
marriage counselling with a suitably qualified professional, the mufti takes on the role 
of cyber-counsellor and religio-legal advisor and accordingly advocates for a 
consideration of the wife’s emotional and psychological state to keep the marriage 
intact. This analysis suggests that responses which consider the emotional and 
psychological well-being of a wife are triggered by a marriage imperative which is 
regarded as a form of participating in worship. 
 
In addition, it could be argued that Desai has internalized the Islamic traditional views 
on disease as described by Ashy earlier, and therefore sees emotional and 
psychological illness or affliction as a spiritual or functional facet of health and illness 
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(Ashy 1999: 256). In this regard he adopts the “free will theodicy” approach, and 
offers what Sachedina describes as an “active response” to his male petitioner’s 
emotional suffering in the form of cyber-counselling. Through the encouragement of a 
benevolent masculinity and adequate sexual communication, Desai also aligns with 
the goals and values of Islamic counselling, which in this case is to firstly develop the 
male petitioner’s Islamic self (nafs) which “needs to be healthy, balanced and well 
integrated” where the self is “directed towards a pursuit for the pleasure of God”, and 
ultimately towards its own contentment (1993: 330-331). Secondly, by advocating a 
consideration for the wife’s feelings of demoralization and being “used” for sex 
towards the goal of keeping the marriage and by extension the family and society 
intact, Desai aligns with the additional objective that counselling in Islam “...is not 
concerned with the welfare of the individual only; it seeks to achieve the wider social 
well-being” (Ashy 1999: 336). 
 
This speaks to the competencies of the mufti’s, who are not trained in the biomedical 
or allied socio-psychological therapeutic field, but rather in the jurisprudential and 
spiritual traditions of their Deoband jurist training.102 This is reflected in the above 
rulings on physical health in which muftis refer petitioners to outside interventions, 
but not so for other facets of health. Desai’s approach is a clear example of this. He 
advocates interventions for premature ejaculation as seen in fatwa B in chapter six, 
but does not advocate interventions by a marriage counsellor or other allied 
professionals in fatwa A in chapter seven. 
 
In this regard, because emotional and psychological afflictions are also regarded as 
“spiritual” or “functional” afflictions, they are dealt with by muftis in a therapeutic 
way and solely within the juristic space, as seen in fatwas C and E and F. But the 
question arises on whether the muftis’ training in the spiritual and jurisprudential 
space is sufficient to provide a remedy for emotional and psychological sexual health 
afflictions.  This is especially significant when the muftis’ concern for the wife’s 
emotions are undergirded by the classical philosophical underpinnings of gender 
difference, ideas of male-female duality and chaotic female emotions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 For an overview of this Sufi inclination in the Deoband school see chapter one section 1.2.2 . 
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Philosophical thought demarcates the duality of the male and the female and this 
philosophical imprint was incorporated into the Islamic intellectual tradition. Etin 
Anwar traces it back to 
  
…  Plato and Aristotle and later to modern philosophers such as Descartes and 
Kant…[and encompasses] a dualistic understanding of humanity in which male is 
associated with reason, spirit, and mind, while female is associated with nature, 
matter and body (Anwar 2006: 11). 
 
The gendered divide between mind and body meant that women were associated with 
matter and a chaotic assemblage of emotions and feelings, while men were associated 
with reason and control. Desai’s answer, in fatwa A, even as he proposes a benevolent 
masculinity, points to this philosophical preference, as husbands are asked to consider 
the emotional state of their wives in a paternalistic way.  
 
Calling for the rejection of this “gendered split between mind and body”, Shaikh 
suggests that the construction of the human being in classical Islamic thought was 
based on the presumption that the  
  
…normative being at the centre of religious thought was male… [so that] …the 
female human becomes the Other, thereby diminishing a human wholeness and 
spiritual potential. This conclusion is one that runs contrary to the very essence of 
qur’anic ethics and has enormous repercussions in the lives of Muslim women in 
various ways (2004: 107).  
 
Representative of Shaikh’s analysis, the accepted normativity of a wife’s “sin” of 
rejecting her husband in both the petition and the answer in fatwa A resonates with 
similar stances in the other fatwas in this study. The mediated God-believer 
relationship of a wife through her obligations to be submissive and obedient to her 
husband, and the danger of divine disapproval of her refusal, becomes a coercive 
mechanism within the bedroom, diminishing her human and spiritual wholeness. This 
challenges the assertions that spirituality is “particularly beneficial for the health of 
individuals”, and further, the argument that “the positive aspects of a spiritual 
dimension need to be introduced and valued in strategies to promote health and well-
being” (Ochieng 2010: 107). 
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Drawing from Shaikh’s theory, the primacy of the wife’s feelings in Desai’s answer 
could denote that his goal is not so much to protect her psychological and emotional 
health in order to ensure her wholeness and spiritual potential, but rather a means to 
achieve the marriage imperative. For as long as the philosophical ideal of the female 
associated with the body remains, the muftis’ role as cyber-counsellors will continue 
to diminish women’s wholeness and spiritual potential, limiting the subject positions 
available to women, and their ability to be positioned as powerful within the discourse 
of health and well-being.   
 
In summation, the above fatwas indicate when it comes to the physical sexual health 
concerns of both male and female petitioners, muftis, including Desai, are attuned 
with the trends of contemporary Muslim biomedical ethics, and advocate a “free will” 
theodicy resulting in either legal manoeuvres or outside biomedical interventions. By 
contrast, psychological and emotional afflictions, even if they are viewed as facets of 
health, are not viewed as requiring professional interventions. They are either dealt 
with through spiritual pietistic counselling or by using legal or in-house therapeutic 
mechanisms. Notably, these approaches do not encourage of outside interventions by 
medical or allied professionals. The question arises on whether Desai as author and 
head mufti of askimam.org recognizes that muftis’ training which is largely within the 
spiritual and jurisprudential space, might be insufficient as a remedy for emotional 
and psychological sexual health afflictions.  
8.3.2.4 “Seek Professional Help” 
  
After perusing the fatwas on askimam.org, it is not possible to suggest that Desai as 
the chief mufti and principal authority on the website does not recognize the need for 
allied professional input when dealing with social, mental and emotional health. The 
presence of what appears to be an in-house female counsellor and social worker on 
askimam.org reveals a more holistic intention in petitions relating to emotional and 
psychological facets of health.  
 
Sister Fadila has a B.A. in Sociology & Psychology from Unisa (University of South 
Africa), and is regarded as a qualified social worker. A quick website search with the 
keyword “fadila” reveals numerous petitions by men and women, which are answered 
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by her, dating back to 2007. Like the other scholar jurists, these are also “approved 
and sanctioned” by Desai, with the only distinctions being that sometimes Fadila also 
provides her contact numbers for petitioners to contact her directly and that the 
petitions answered by her require psychological and therapeutic input.  
 
I argue that the inclusion of her expertise on his website and the manner in which he 
trusts and sanctions her answers, reveals Desai’s inclination to recognize general 
emotional and mental discontent as a health concern that warrants professional input, 
outside the ambit of a jurists expertise. But an inconsistency amongst the fatwas on 
the website as noted in discrepancies between Desai’s position in Fatwa A, Docrat’s 
in C, and Khan’s in E, demonstrates the tensions between the traditional approach by 
muftis to psychological and emotional health which is viewed as spiritual health 
requiring pietistic interventions only, and an approach to these dimensions of health 
which are informed by ethical concerns arising out of petitioners’ lived experiences 
and expectations of mutuality in modern marriages. This inconsistency is also 
apparent in the variations between Desai’s personal approach and the fatwas of his 
student muftis which he nevertheless approves and sanctions. It is unclear too, about 
what criteria are in place on askimam.org for petitions to be answered by Fadila, 
leading to a further inconsistency in the fatwas. 
 
These inconsistencies may be due to one, or a combination of three possible reasons: 
firstly, to the difference between the interpretive abilities of, and restrictions on the 
teacher Desai as compared to his students (more on this in the concluding chapter), 
secondly, to the fluidity of the constantly changing online space, or thirdly, because of 
possible administrative constraints in terms of how petitions are allocated to the 
different jurists. As a latter case in point, the two questions in fatwa C of a wife’s 
rejection of her husband and his suicidal tendencies which are managed entirely by 
Docrat in 2009, contrasts with another petition answered by Fadila in 2007.103 She 
receives two questions, one legalistic and the other therapeutic from a male petitioner. 
The first centres around the legal rules of the time of post-coital ghusl (obligatory 
bath), and the second question deals with the petitioner’s emotional and psychological 
trauma as a result of witnessing his father’s violent attacks on his mother, and his own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Refer to fatwa # 15840 referred to as fatwa T in Appendix 2. 
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childhood experience of abuse. In her lengthy answer Fadila answers the first question 
like a jurist would, using traditional fiqh legal sources. The second answer is purely 
therapeutic, and at one point states: 
 
“…it is also important that you, your brothers and your sister, seek professional help 
immediately”. 
 
This is exceptional, because apart from instances of physical health concerns, such as 
premature ejaculation, none of the jurists in my sample refer petitioners to health care 
professionals, or to any other medically aligned intervention when faced with the 
psychological or emotional facets of health. This aspect is managed purely through 
spiritual or legalistic religious interventions.  
 
Overall, although Desai’s inclusion on his website of a female health professional 
schooled in both sociology and psychology warrants additional investigation, it can be 
inferred from her inclusion that he views psychological and emotional afflictions as 
dimensions of health and well-being, which cannot be resolved solely within juristic 
jurisdiction. In this scenario, even though the philosophical underpinnings of chaotic 
female emotions as based on gender differentiated notions of difference may still 
prevail, Fadila’s presence suggests that facets of health which are not physical may be 
situated not only in a biomedical ethical space, but perhaps also in a context of 
therapeutic social, psychological and emotional ethics.  
 
A point of contemplation is that apart from Fadila, no other sociologist, psychologist 
or allied professional is referred to in any of the fatwas in the larger sample, pointing 
to Desai’s control over the extent of inclusion of allied health consultants on his 
website. Bunt has observed that as a “means of projecting Muslim authority”, the 
Internet offers options for “a long-term and technologically adept integration of 
religious symbolism and traditional notions of power” (2003: 2). But through the 
incorporation of sister Fadila’s expertise and opinions into the legal interpretive space 
of the online fatwas of askimam.org, Desai’s approach aligns with Bunt’s additional 
assertion that the internet also “breaks the monopoly of traditional Islamic scholarship 
and leadership”, partly due to non-traditional centres of scholarship, authority, 
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organisations and individuals entering into the information marketplace and 
“influencing traditional regions of Islamic learning” (2). 
 
In this way, as scholars suggest, even though established religious entities use the 
Internet to further entrench conformity and compliance with authority, the Internet has 
also engendered “new usages and practices, which could significantly shape the 
production and consumption of knowledge”, particularly in decision making and 
activism - two principle zones in cyberspace (Anderson 2003; Bunt 2013; Chawki 
2010; Kutscher 2009; Sisler 2011: 69).  
 
By answering some online fatwas as a mufti would, Fadila, a female sociologist, 
disrupts the traditional interpretive legal framework of the adab al-mufti treatises, 
potentially creating new “usages and practices”. No mention is made of her having 
received mufti training either and this results in a reformulation of traditional notions 
of ulama. Her presence significantly alters the normative attitude of the fatwas above, 
so that emotional and psychological afflictions are not just deemed pietistic concerns. 
They have a significant dimension of health, requiring expertise outside the ambit of 
the jurists and affiliated possibly with “contemporary Muslim biomedical ethics” 
(Sachedina 1990). The clear distinction between Desai’s approach as compared to his 
students indicates that this view has not filtered through sufficiently. As mentioned, 
Fadila’s inclusion and her contributions on askimam.org certainly warrants further 
research. 
  
8.4  Key Observations 
 
This chapter explored the discourse of health and well-being across all the selected 
fatwas in the sample. In the first section, conceptual and pietistic considerations were 
outlined. Drawing on Ochieng’s, Ashy’s and Jafar’s research, it was established that 
spiritual belief and practice is important for the physical emotional and psychological 
health and well-being of an individual, that in Islamic tradition illness or disease 
incorporates all dimensions, and that counselling in Islam is concerned with the 
welfare of both the individual and society through submission to God.  
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Varying articulations of suffering and affliction are linked to theological positions 
which in some articulations advocate a “passive response” in relation to the 
“determinist theodicy”, resulting in sceptical approaches to treatment options, and in 
other articulations advocate an “active response” in line with “free will theodicy”, 
resulting in the promotion of treatment interventions.  
  
The second section looked back over all the fatwas in the sample and noted the main 
trends that inform an analysis of the dynamic of the health and well-being discourse. 
Overall, petitioners expressed health as encompassing various dimensions, and all 
relating to a pietistic dimension. Some expressed physical constraints as seen in 
fatwas B, D and G, others in the main sample, expressed a host of emotional and 
psychological challenges such as sadness, hopelessness, depression, suicidal 
tendencies, and despondency. Petitioners positioned themselves strongly within the 
discourse of health and well-being and the complementary discourse of mutuality in 
their appeals to muftis for alleviation of their suffering.   
 
Mufti’s respond to articulations of suffering and affliction in varying ways linked to 
theological positions as described by Sachedina. Some advocate a “passive response” 
in relation to the “determinist theodicy”, and others advocate an “active response” in 
line with “free will theodicy”. Questions were raised about whether varying health 
needs in the sexual arena receive holistic attention. In particular, I explored the way in 
which the physical dimension of sexual health and the social, emotional and 
psychological dimensions were conceptualized in the mufti’s answers and what 
treatment solutions were specified.  
 
When faced with male and female physical health concerns, muftis generally offer a 
solution in line with a biomedical ethical framework confirming Sachedina’s thesis 
that in the face of “illness”, which is conceptualized as a physical health affliction, the 
‘free will theodicy’ has become the dominant approach in Muslim biomedical ethics. 
Even when prioritising male right to sexual fulfilment, muftis downplay this right in 
favour of the wife’s “valid “ reasons for refusal based on physical health and 
wellbeing, and offer legal mechanisms or outside interventions, as noted in the 
analysis of fatwa C and the accompanying K, L, and M.  
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By virtue of traditional Islamic views on disease and illness, which consider non-
physical facets of health as spiritual and pietistic concerns, even when the “freewill 
theodicy” and the subsequent “active response” is enacted by jurists in these cases, 
solutions are not located in biomedical ethics, but rather in accordance with a pietistic, 
jurisprudential and therapeutic agenda. When faced with various facets in the context 
of sexual health, such as social, emotional and psychological concerns, muftis 
responded in three ways. First, as noted in fatwas C and E, Docrat and Khan enact a 
“determinist theodicy” and locate their answers in line with spiritual pietistic 
frameworks only. Second, Siddiqui in fatwa F enacts a legal response in the form of a 
legal tool, in this instance a ṭalāq mediated by a male third party. He completely 
ignores the petitioner’s obvious psychological and emotional health afflictions, and 
does not advocate any spiritual or additional allied professional interventions. Third, 
Desai and Zakariyya Desai in fatwas A and D are sensitive to the emotional and 
psychological well-being of wives and choose preventative therapeutic measures to 
avoid suffering in this facet of well-being. Both latter responses also align with the 
‘free will theodicy’. 
  
The two muftis, Desai and Zakariyya Desai, do not deal with non-physical facets of 
health within the ‘biomedical ethical space’ (as is done for physical health concerns), 
but their reasoning is rather situated within an ethical space of marriage. They are 
distinct from the other muftis in the sample though, in that they also deal with 
emotional and psychological facets of health in accordance with the holistic 
objectives of Islamic counselling through the therapeutic strategies of sexual 
communication and benevolent masculinity to maintain the stability of the marriage 
and the family in society. Other muftis appear more concerned with the welfare of the 
individual in relation to God, and the emphasis on the individual in relation to both 
society and God is minimal.   
 
Of significance too, even though Desai, the chief mufti of the site, responds to 
physical health issues within both the ethical moral paradigm of marriage and the 
biomedical ethical space by advocating for outside interventions, he does not similarly 
advocate interventions by a marriage counsellor or other allied professionals in fatwa 
A; neither does he provide compelling legal rationales for his ethical moral positions. 
The implication is that in the mind of the jurists, treatment for physical health is 
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considered primarily in terms of a biomedical model. Whether this is the case for all 
physical health constraints appearing on the website cannot be established and 
requires further research. On the whole, mufti’s competencies are highlighted in that 
they are clearly not trained in the biomedical or any allied field, but rather only in 
jurisprudence and spirituality. And while physical health concerns are mainly 
preferred for biomedical or other interventions, no mufti refers to an allied health 
professional when emotional and psychological sexual health concerns come to the 
fore.   
 
A further potential response to other dimensions of health on askimam.org was 
provided by the presence of Fadila. The style and number of fatwas answered by her 
attests to Desai’s inclination to recognize emotional and psychological discontent as a 
sexual health concern that warrants professional input outside the ambit of a jurist’s 
expertise, not located necessarily in a biomedical ethical space, but perhaps in a 
therapeutic ethical space. Her presence and input also substantiates scholars’ claims of 
the Internet’s potential to create new “usages and practice” (Sisler 2009: 59) so that 
the traditional legal interpretative space incorporates juristic expertise along with the 
expertise of health and allied professionals.  
 
The fact that her expertise is sought also potentially disrupts the muftis’ role as the 
only cyber counsellors on askimam.org and allows for professionals with different 
ideologies that are not underpinned necessarily by philosophical imprints of gender. 
In this way, drawing from Shaikh’s theory, women’s wholeness and spiritual potential 
might not be diminished and they might be afforded more powerful subject positions 
within the discourse of health and well-being. 
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CHAPTER NINE: COMPETING AND 
COMPLEMENTARY AGENCY IN THE DISCOURSES 
OF WOMEN’S SEXUAL AGENCY 
 
 
The fatwas analysed in this study revealed competing and complementary webs of 
discourses in relation to women’s sexual agency. Using feminist post structural 
discourse analysis and the analytical frameworks drawn from the adab-al-mufti 
treatises as described by Masud, Messick and Powers (1996), four main discourses 
were identified. These were male sexual rights, female sexual satisfaction, mutuality, 
and health and wellbeing.   
 
In response to the first research question on the discourses on sexual agency in the 
fatwas, sections one and two of this chapter present a brief methodological 
commentary and key findings, noting how both petitioners and muftis engage with the 
identified discourses. Complementarity, tensions, and disruptions in the interplay 
between these discourses are exposed. Section three addresses the second research 
objective, namely to gauge the extent to which the fatwas enabled the negotiations of 
women’s sexual health, revealing varying approaches to the different health 
dimensions by both petitioners and muftis. Finally, section four details additional 
prominent discourses which were identified in the fatwas and which played a 
significant role, pointing to the need for further research.  
 
9.1  Petitioners Approaches to Sexual Agency Discourses 
 
The analysis shows that sexuality in the fatwas is gendered in terms of a discourse of 
male sexual need and female sexual availability. In situations where wives refuse to 
engage in intercourse, male petitioners position themselves strongly within these 
discourses104 and position their wives as relatively powerless. A complementary 
discourse of divine approval and wifely sin supports this position so that the perceived 
threat to the wife’s God-believer relationship arising out of her refusal becomes a 
coercive tool to prompt her into having sex. This additional discourse is further 
examined below.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 This tendency was seen in petition one in fatwa C in chapter five and in fatwa A in chapter seven. 
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It is further evident that the discourses of male need and female availability do not 
operate independently. They interact with other discourses, which may in some 
situations allow a woman 105 to locate herself in a strong position in the discourse of 
male sexual rights using ideas of fairness, which she may also apply to both herself 
and her husband. In doing so a wife may disrupt her ordinary position of 
powerlessness and prioritise her personal desires and expectations of mutual consent, 
values characteristic of contemporary understandings of marriage.   
 
Importantly for this study, women also use the health and well-being discourse as a 
means to acquire agency within the sexual realm. A woman may use the discourse of 
male sexual rights to argue for an annulment to release her from a marriage where she 
cannot fulfil a husband’s rights because of her emotional and mental state, in this way 
positioning herself strongly within the discourse of health and well-being.106 In yet 
another situation where a woman’s physical health is affected due to excessive sexual 
demands as a newly-wed, a female petitioner positions herself as powerless within the 
male sexual rights discourse,107 but simultaneously also positions herself as powerful 
using a discourse of health and well-being. This suggests that a powerful position 
within the discourse of male sexual rights does not necessarily guarantee that male 
sexual need is always prioritised by both wives and muftis in the fatwas in this study. 
In some fatwas,108 wives were themselves powerful in their refusal to engage in 
sexual intimacy while in others, as in chapter six, both men and women positioned 
wives strongly within competing discourses of male and female sexual rights 
discourse to which was added the complementary discourses of mutuality and of 
health and well-being.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Refer to the analysis of fatwa E and F in chapter five and seven. 
106 In the face of severe physical, emotional, and psychological suffering, the female petitioner in 
fatwas E and F locates herself both as powerless and powerful within the health and well-being 
discourse. In fatwa F she assumes power within this discourse when she uses her emotional and 
psychological state to argue for a legal mechanism to exit the marriage.  
107 See fatwa G in appendix 2. 
108 Referring to fatwas A and C in chapters five and seven respectively. 
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In some situations a link is forged between the male and female sexual rights 
discourses and the portrayal of female sexuality as negative and dangerous.109 In these 
cases, both male and female petitioners position the wife as simultaneously powerful 
and powerless by relying on the normative gendered view of a dangerous female 
sexuality that is a man’s responsibility to control. In fatwa M for instance, where the 
couple are having marital problems and the husband chooses not to have sex with his 
wife, she uses the potential danger of her unmet sexual need as a coercive measure to 
argue for her right to sexual intimacy and his duty to fulfil that right. 
 
Lastly, the analysis in chapter eight revealed that petitioners also link suffering and 
affliction in all facets of health and well-being to pietistic considerations.110 Thus, 
petitioners position themselves strongly within the discourse of health and well-being 
and the complementary discourse of mutuality in their appeals to muftis to alleviate 
their suffering and facilitate agency within the sexual realm.  
 
9.1.1  Key Findings – Petitioners  
 
Askimam.org petitioners demonstrate how contemporary women and men are making 
choices in the sexual arena with regard to their “desires pleasures and experiences“ 
(Lesch & Kruger 2005: 481), exploring possibilities for sexual satisfaction and 
intimacy and how these are weighed against pietistic concerns.  
 
Determined by life experiences and an internalized ethical voice, and consistent with 
observations in the scholarship,111 women in the fatwas negotiate the pragmatic legal 
aspects of sexuality by negotiating, resisting or rejecting the discourse of female 
responsibility to fulfil male sexual need and instead enact their agency in a variety of 
ways, amongst these the capacity to refuse.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Referring to fatwas B and M. Also refer to section 9.4 for further extrapolation on the discourse of 
sin in relation to the view of a dangerous female sexuality.   
110 Chapter eight included an analysis of all the fatwas in the study. This tendency was demonstrated 
particularly in the analysis of the second enquiry in fatwa C and the petition in fatwa E.  
111 As already noted, Ahmed (1992: 66) refers to women’s negotiations of the ethical and pragmatic 
voices. Building on Ahmed’s thesis, Hoel and Shaikh’s (2013) study on negotiations of sex amongst 
South African women demonstrate this trend too.  See chapter two section 2.2  
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Male and female arguments in the fatwas prioritise female sexual need and resist 
hierarchical and normative gender constructs, which integrate male desire with female 
subservience and obedience. Some women in the fatwas shape powerful subjective 
positions for themselves, by locating themselves boldly within discourses that 
otherwise render them powerless. Women also identify positions of power within 
discourses of mutuality and health and well-being, and prioritise ideas of mutuality 
and reciprocity in modern Muslim marriages particularly those in minority Muslim 
contexts.  
 
But they simultaneously display a pietistic commitment to the classical Islamic 
tradition. This aligns with Ali’s thesis that many Muslims remain thus committed, but 
experience a tension between traditional marital norms which prioritise male need and 
female availability and the stress on “consent and mutuality in contemporary Muslim 
discourses on marriage and gender relations” (2006: xxiii). In this regard, the 
petitioners in the online fatwas on askimam.org are much like Muslim petitioners in 
Europe who  
 
…seek fatwas as authoritative legal and religious opinions that can help them 
navigate the tensions and conflicts arising from the new realities of their marriages 
and family lives. They are aware of the traditional norms regulating gender relations, 
but their daily experiences of their marital roles diverges from these norms” (Larsen 
2015: 215).  
 
9.2  Muftis Approaches to Sexual Agency Discourses 
 
This study revealed that muftis are not uniform in their approach to the sexuality 
discourses presented by the petitioners. In the face of male petitioners’ complaints 
about their wives’ refusal to engage in intercourse, a mufti like Docrat located his 
answer within the legal space of a Muslim marriage entirely, placing a heavy reliance 
on foundational textual sources. He positions the male petitioner as powerful within 
the male sexual right discourse and the wife as powerless, subservient and obedient to 
the husband.112 Docrat nevertheless allows a temporary slippage in power when he 
makes space for sexual communication to be initiated by the wife. The wife is given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See the analysis of fatwa C in chapter five. 
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agency by the jurist to verbally explain her “valid” reasons for refusal which other 
fatwas established as biomedical reasons.113 The wife is located in a position of power 
in this regard within the discourse of health and well-being, because her physical 
biological health constraints are regarded as valid reasons for refusal to engage in 
intercourse. This slippage in power aligns with Kodir's (2007: 67-90) thesis114 that 
even through a reliance on foundational texts which position women as powerless 
within the male sexual right discourse, some jurists simultaneously employ nuanced 
interpretive approaches and endeavour to position women as powerful. 
 
Also in an instance of a male petitioner’s concerns of a wife’s refusal to engage in 
intercourse, Desai 115 responds differently from Docrat. As illustrated in chapter 
seven, he inclines towards the ethical space of a Muslim marriage, and emphasises 
mutuality and restraint of male coercion, force and anger. Desai is possibly influenced 
in his answer by the lived realities of Muslim women who find themselves in 
marriages of mutuality and reciprocity. As a prominent mufti within the South 
African Deoband landscape, he is also potentially informed by both South African 
gender symmetrical discourses within the legislative arena, and intra-Muslim debates 
and contestations on the recognition of Muslim marriages. He positions wives within 
discourses of mutuality and health, rendering them powerful within these. 
 
When faced with petitions about a male duty to fulfil female sexual need, mufti’s 
approaches are also varied.116 Here Desai chooses reticence and caution in avoiding 
the direct question of female sexual rights, which petitioners couched as female 
satisfaction. Instead, he grants a powerful position to the husband in the discourse of 
health and well-being by prioritising male physical health, in this way dealing with 
both male sexual need and female sexual satisfaction indirectly. For the wife, Desai’s 
approach functions to simultaneously position her powerfully within the discourse of 
female sexual satisfaction and powerlessly within the competing male right to sexual 
fulfilment. Zakariyya Desai in fatwa D on the other hand, positions both the husband 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 As seen in chapter five, these reasons are articulated variously in fatwa’s K, L and M in biomedical 
terms. 
114 Refer to section 2.1.2 in chapter two. 
115 See analysis of fatwa A in chapter seven.  
116 See the analysis of fatwa B answered by mufti Desai, and fatwa D by student mufti Zakariyya Desai, 
in chapter six. 
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and wife in powerful positions within the discourse of health and well-being, by 
advocating for a consideration of the wife’s feelings and her psychological and 
emotional well-being, in conjunction with bio-medical interventions for the husband.  
 
The discourse of health also complements both female sexual satisfaction and male 
sexual rights discourses. Where muftis are faced with physical health afflictions, they 
frequently offer a response in line with contemporary biomedical ethics. In some 
instances legal concessions are offered to support a husband’s sexual right and a 
wife’s related physical health concerns.117 Where a wife refuses to have sex because 
of a physical health affliction, legal concessions are granted to support a wife’s refusal 
of sex,118 and where concerns hinge on female sexual satisfaction, male petitioners are 
told to access medical and allied interventions.119  
 
When faced with non-physical facets of health, muftis demonstrated varying 
responses. Desai and Zakariyya Desai in particular position both husbands and wives 
across the fatwas as powerful within both the discourse of mutuality and the discourse 
of health and well-being. For husbands this positioning is mediated through the 
physical facet of health, and for wives, through the emotional and psychological 
dimension.120 
 
There is also a tension between the health discourse and the discourse of male sexual 
rights when Desai modulates the latter discourse in favour of his ethical exhortations 
to mutuality, remaining cognisant of contemporary social norms, discouraging the 
pervasive force discourse, and preserving the existing marriage through devices such 
as effective sexual communication and a benevolent masculinity. The latter devices 
are not seamless however, relying on the goodwill of the husband. In some instances 
they facilitate women’s agency in the sexual arena and in other scenarios hamper it. 
Also when the marriage imperative relies on the discourses of mutuality and 
wellbeing, it moderates the prominent male sexual rights discourse but in cases where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Refer to fatwa G in chapter five. 
118 See the analysis of fatwa C in chapter five where Docrat indicates that a wife can refuse to engage in 
sexual intimacy with her husband if she has valid reasons. These valid reasons as established in fatwas 
K, L and M are biomedical physical ones. 
119 In the context of premature ejaculation. Refer to fatwas B and D in chapter six.    
120 As seen in their responses in fatwas A, B and D. 
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women are in perilous and tenuous marriage circumstances, the marriage imperative 
can prove harmful.121 
 
I also argued in chapter seven,122 that sexual communication as a strategy for 
protecting young women’s sexual agency in a non-liberal tradition like Islam requires 
both adequate pre-marital sex education as well as knowledge of the jurisprudential 
rules governing sex and sexuality in a Muslim marriage. In this way women in 
contexts where marriage is viewed as incorporating ideas of mutuality, are in a better 
position to enact agency and negotiate their sexual needs and desires.  
 
9.2.1  Key Findings – Muftis 
 
Fatwas are excellent examples of how Muftis are engaging with social and cultural 
realities, using Islamic arguments. By analysing the fatwas and what Muftis are 
saying and not saying, by deconstructing their ijtihad and how they define and 
consider the different elements of the topic involved, it is possible to use fatwas to 
help dismantle and rebuild religious discourse on gender norms and rights (Larsen 
2015: 216). 
 
The varying responses in the fatwas reveal how muftis negotiate the complex 
networks of power in the discourses of male and female sexuality, modulating these 
with discourses of health and well-being, and discourses of mutuality. The analysis 
revealed that muftis’ responses mirrored two interconnected observations made by Ali 
(2006). The first is that even conservative muftis include concepts of reciprocity and 
mutuality in their responses. Second, “a strongly gendered understanding of male-
female sexuality… [continues to permeate]…much contemporary Muslim discourse, 
including that produced in Western contexts” (2006:9). 
 
It could be argued that like some petitioners, muftis on askimam.org, too, remain true 
to the classical Islamic legal tradition, but might understand that the sexual ‘desires, 
expectations and experiences’ of ordinary Muslims within modern contexts function 
within the discourses of mutuality, and of health and well-being. Some realise that an 
undue reliance in their answers on distinctive gendered perspectives of male-female 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 As seen in fatwa E and F. See chapter seven.  
122 See chapter seven section 7.3.2.3. 
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sexuality found in foundational sources will prove counterproductive to keeping the 
marriage intact and subsequently maintaining the stability of the family. This explains 
the trend to downplay male sexual rights and female sexual availability and the trend 
to rely instead on discourses of mutuality and health and well-being. In doing so they 
meet the lived realities of petitioners and provide a means to navigate between the two 
paradigms of a Muslim marriage, moving from the legal, where ideas of dominion 
produce undue systems of control in Muslim marriage, towards the ethical, where 
ideas of mutuality and reciprocity preside.   
 
Muftis’ employment of the discourse of health and well-being however appears 
inhibited. Depending on varying theological positions, they displayed a clear 
delineation in their responses to physical health as compared to other facets of health; 
they locate physical health within a biomedical ethical space, and non-physical health 
within the spiritual and jurisprudential space.   
 
9.3  Negotiating Health  
 
To what extent and effect do the fatwas enable the negotiation of women’s sexual 
health? It appears that in the minds of the petitioners, in addition to physical health, 
non-physical facets are relevant in their petitions. They require muftis to enact 
mechanisms to alleviate psychological and emotional suffering and affliction.  
 
In their responses, and based on where they were situated theologically, muftis 
considered health in a different ways. Physical health is considered within a 
biomedical ethical space, and social, emotional and psychological facets of health are 
only dealt with within the ambit of the pietistic, jurisprudential space, so that 
contemporary biomedical ethics dictate muftis’ responses to physical health concerns. 
As a result, muftis encourage outside interventions or they enact legal mechanisms 
that prioritise biomedical concerns. Muftis are thus situated within the ethical logic of 
marriage and the biomedical ethical paradigm when physical health concerns are 
raised. The latter provides more leeway in terms of granting women concessions 
within the jurisprudential framework of marriage. By contrast, the non-physical facets 
of health, although located within the ethical space of marriage, is managed entirely 
by pietistic and legal interpretive mechanisms. 
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Further to this analysis and the argument in chapter eight that muftis exhibited three 
responses to non-physical health, an investigation into the website indicates a fourth 
potential response characterized by the inclusion of someone who is not a mufti. In 
this scenario, the mufti brings in a professional allied health professional, namely a 
sociologist with a background in psychology. The presence of Sister Fadila on the 
website indicates Desai’s inclination as the head mufti to diverge from the normative 
position and to recognize to some extent emotional and mental discontent as a 
therapeutic health concern that warrants professional input outside the ambit of a 
jurist’s expertise. It implies an epistemic shift in relation to traditional 
conceptualisations of emotional and psychological health and illness and opens up the 
possibilities of treatment based not only on a biomedical ethic that prioritises physical 
health concerns in the sexual realm, but perhaps also on a therapeutic ethic that 
prioritises mental and emotional health too.  
 
Human rights activists working in the area of sexual rights have suggested that the 
best way to “positivise” sexual rights and give them legal muscle is to link them 
strategically to health imperatives (Mattar 2008). The trend toward positivising sexual 
rights is also evident in the 2011 South African Department of Health draft on sexual 
reproductive health rights (Department of Health 2011). I have argued above that 
when it comes to physical health concerns, muftis consider both the ethical logic of 
marriage and the biomedical ethics of health. When muftis use these two ethical 
paradigms to innovate legal rulings that divert from normative rulings based on the 
legal logic of marriage, they transform the ethics of marriage into legal concessions. 
This has the potential to ‘positivise’ women’s sexual health rights thereby expanding 
what is permissible in terms of sexual agency. Aware of fatwa mechanisms, Frank 
Vogel (1996: 269) has observed how the “fatwa method” can “lend flexibility even to 
compulsory legal determinations” so that multiple legal outcomes on any single issue 
can be extracted. This points to the potential for a fiqh that is responsive to changing 
circumstance as others have suggested (Ai 2003; 2006; Mir-Hosseini 2009).123 In this 
instance, the change pursues an ethical paradigm which is located in therapeutic terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Refer to chapter two, section 2.1.3 for the discussion pertaining to this suggestion. 
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of other medical and allied professionals, particularly psychologists and social 
workers.    
 
From the above theoretical positions it can be extrapolated that if muftis on 
askimam.org afford credence to the female sexual emotional and psychological well-
being as a health imperative that requires external allied therapeutic health 
interventions as a matter of routine, then social, psychological and emotional sexual 
health complaints of wives might prompt muftis to locate their answers both within 
the ethical logic of marriage as well as an ethical paradigm allied within the 
therapeutic terms of allied health professionals. This proclivity is evident in Sister 
Fadila’s approach as noted in chapter eight.124 For muftis, hypothetically, this would 
mean that in the instance of the suicidal petitioner in fatwa C, Docrat might have 
referred him for external professional interventions. In another hypothetical scenario 
where severe emotional and psychological afflictions arising out of experiences of 
sexual molestation is articulated by the female petitioner in fatwa E and F, the first 
mufti Khan might have referred her to a psychologist or other allied health 
professional instead of advising her to continue with the arranged marriage. If she did 
continue with the marriage, as in fatwa F, the second mufti Siddiqui might have done 
the same in terms of protecting her health. Instead he offered legal mechanisms to 
alleviate her suffering.   
 
As with the biomedical ethical space, this therapeutic ethical space might provide 
further leeway for muftis who are faced with couples whose lived experiences of 
marriage prioritize mutuality and reciprocity, to offer further concessions, and in 
addition to therapeutic mechanisms to offer legal mechanisms which enable women’s 
sexual agency while remaining true to the jurisprudential marriage framework.  
To illustrate, Siddiqui above might have referred his petitioner for both allied health 
interventions based on her health state, and further suggested more rigorous legal 
concessions to terminate the marriage. As the fatwa currently stands, he does enact a 
legal mechanism based on her “feelings”, but these are mediated by a third party 
requiring the husband’s cooperation. Siddiqui might suggest too that she be granted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Refer chapter eight section 8.3.2.4, in which Sister Fadila’s response in fatwa T is to refer the 
petitioner and his family for external counselling.  
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either a faskh or that she use a khula mechanism to exit the marriage.125 In another 
hypothetical scenario, Desai in fatwa A, instead of just discouraging force in spousal 
sexual relations as he does, might outrightly prohibit it in mitigation of the 
psychological and emotional health implications which he alludes to.  
 
As with physical health, which muftis employ in an ethical paradigm located in 
biomedical terms, this opens up the possibilities for muftis to also positivise sexual 
rights by creating links with other dimensions of health, which may be employed in 
an ethical paradigm located in therapeutic terms. In this way Muslim women’s lived 
marriage experiences of sexual agency in modern contexts might be transformed so 
that their ‘desires, experiences and expectations’ within the sexual realm are given 
weight by virtue of the complementarity of the discourse of health and well-being 
with the discourse of mutuality, and the productive tension of these two discourses 
with the prominent male sexual rights discourses.  
 
9.4  Additional Prominent Discourses 
 
In addition to the four main discourses above, another key finding in this research, 
and a feature of intertexuality, is the presence of related discourses. Concepts of sin 
and force produce additional discourses which effect how people speak about and 
conceptualise sexual health within Muslim marriage. These discourses were not 
substantially investigated in this study, but feature prominently, and are areas for 
further research. The following section exposes the minimal findings evidenced in the 
fatwas.     
 
Some male petitioners construct a wife’s God-believer relationship so as to link God’s 
approval with that of a husband’s; the link functions as a coercive mechanism to 
address a wife’s refusal for sex, which is further constructed as sin.126 Even though 
women have generally internalised these perspectives, female petitioners clearly 
ignore this discourse127 and instead enact autonomy and independence of choice with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 For a full description of these divorce options refer to Mansoori (2009: 133,155).  
126 The male petitioners in fatwa C (analysed in chapter five) and fatwa A (analysed in chapter seven) 
display this trend. 
127 Refer to the mention of fatwas A, C, U and V in chapter seven, section 7.3.2.1. 
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regard to sexual intimacy, correlating with evidence in the literature on South African 
women’s perspectives on sexuality (Hoel and Shaikh 2013: 85). In an alternative 
approach where a husband’s God-believer relationship is threatened if he does not 
fulfil his duty to sexually satisfy his wife, male petitioners forward arguments in 
favour of women’s sexual satisfaction,128 and female petitioners argue for the right to 
sexual intimacy thereby positioning themselves as powerful within a gendered 
discourse which ordinarily renders them as powerless.129  
 
Apart from Docrat, most muftis downplay male sexual rights discourses and do not 
censure women who exercise choice and autonomy in terms of sexual availability.130 
However, because they continue to subscribe to the gendered understandings of male 
and female sexuality, muftis do not outright censure the male sexual rights dimension 
of the divine disapproval and sin discourse. Without relinquishing these gender 
differentiated understandings, in another response, a mufti also uses the sin discourse 
as a coercive measure for the husband to fulfil his wife’s sexual rights.131  
 
 
Likely because of the prominence of the male sexual rights and female sexual 
availability discourse, evidence in the literature and fatwas132 denotes a discourse of 
force. In addition, both petitioners and muftis recognise the pervasive presence of this 
discourse, which they also experience in tension with discourses of mutuality, and 
health and well-being.  
 
The study showed that petitioners created a disruption of force by using health and 
well-being discourses to argue for legal mechanisms to alleviate psychological and 
emotional suffering. Muftis do not censure this discourse but downplay it using ideas 
of mutuality and health. As a further point of analysis, the fatwas clearly demonstrate, 
too, the tension between force and consent. A distinction was noted in a comparison 
of the discourse of consent before contracting a marriage and after. In the former 
circumstance, consent and mutuality discourses existed in a complementary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Refer to the analysis of fatwas B and D in chapter six. 
129 Refer to the analysis of fatwa M in chapter six. 
130 Refer to chapter seven, section 7.3.2.1. 
131 Refer to fatwa M in chapter six. 
132 See particularly fatwas E, F and S in this regard in chapter seven. 
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relationship, while the reverse was true for the latter circumstance.133 
  
9.5  Summary 
 
This chapter offered a synthesis of the interplay of all the discourses on women’s 
sexual agency in the fatwas, as identified in the previous four chapters. Through a 
synthesis of both petitioners’ queries and muftis’ responses, it revealed competing and 
complementary agency within the four main discourses of sexual rights, female sexual 
satisfaction, mutuality, and health and well-being, by noting contestations, disruptions 
and slippages of power. Additional discourses which featured prominently within the 
fatwas were also identified for further research.  
 
This chapter further explored the second research objective to gauge the extent to 
which the fatwas enabled the negotiations of women’s sexual health, revealing 
varying approaches to the different health dimensions by both petitioners and muftis. 
It pointed out the potential for muftis to link sexual rights of Muslim women to 
varying dimensions of health within the context of sexual intimacy. In the next 
chapter, to answer the third research objective, I focus on the extent to which 
foundational texts such as Qur’an and hadith are used in the representations of 
women’s sexual agency, with an emphasis on the role of the Internet in a discursive 
Islamic tradition.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See the analysis of the dynamic between force and consent in fatwas E and F in chapter seven, 
section 7.3.2.5 
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Islamic thought initially divided the world into two spheres - dar al-Islam, and dar 
al-harb (the territory of Islam and the territory of war) [and]…there is [now] a 
growing acceptance of the notion of the ‘territory of treaty’ or dar al-ahd, and the 
‘territory of preaching’ or dar al-da’wah. (Kort 2005: 368)  
 
To the territories dar al-Islam, and dar al-harb, Kort adds the cyber Islamic 
environment which she calls dar al-cyber Islam. Entering Dar al-cyber Islam, I 
provide reflections on how the petitioners in the online fatwas in this study are 
experiencing sexual relations within contemporary marriages. I also identify ways in 
which muftis, through their various jurisprudential approaches, may provide for 
ordinary Muslims to continue to be loyal to the classical legal tradition and at the 
same time create spaces within this tradition which support ideas of sexual relations in 
marriage based on mutuality and reciprocity and supportive of health and well-being. 
 
My intention in this chapter is related to the third research question, which is to 
examine the extent to which foundational texts are used in representations of women’s 
sexual agency in the fatwas. Finally, in line with assertions in the literature that the 
Internet is able to provide a portal into the contemporary discursive Islamic landscape 
of which fatwas “constitute an important aspect”, by virtue of providing us with 
“insight into the dynamics of continuity and change in the Islamic tradition” (Larsen 
2015: 202), a further intention in this chapter is to expose the effect of the online 
space for petitioners and mufti’s alike and points to the role of the Internet in the 
discursive Islamic landscape.  
 
10.1  Foundational Sources 
 
The study above showed that classical traditional thought on rights, roles and 
responsibilities in a Muslim marriage, the underlying Deoband gender ideology134 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Refer to chapter five section 5.3.2. 
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the normative view of wifely obedience and subservience as arising out of 
foundational textual sources 135  underpins all mufti responses and petitioners’ 
perspectives and understandings. While none of the petitioners in the fatwas refer to 
foundational sources, only one mufti refers to familiar hadith sources.136 Significantly, 
even when muftis’ answers are framed entirely within the legal parameters of such a 
marriage, the fatwas generally do not use foundational textual sources to reinforce 
juristic opinions.   
 
But the Quran is used in the context of sexual agency within Desai’s purview. While 
the three Quranic verses, which commonly underpin notions of sexual agency in 
Muslim marriage, as mentioned in chapter two,137 are not mentioned in any of the 
fatwa’s under scrutiny, Q2: 222-223 is mentioned in other fatwas on the site in the 
context of detailing permissible sexual positions and proscribing anal sex.138 The 
preference Desai and his student hold for this interpretation over two other 
interpretations, which pertain to contraception and undisputed female sexual 
availability, is further corroborated in a publication on the Darul iftaa website, entitled 
Etiquettes of Marital Relations (nd: 14):  
 
 Intercourse is permissible in any position, from front or rear, so long as anal sex does 
not take place, for that is haram. The example of the Quran for women is that of a 
farm; which can be approached from any direction, provided the seeds are planted 
only in the farm and not elsewhere! Similarly any method of approach is permissible, 
whether husband is on the wife or vice-versa, or whether they are on their sides or 
from the rear, whether sleeping flat or whether squatting, all positions are 
permissible, so long as his "seeds" are planted in the "farm" and not elsewhere.  
 
Further to the lack of Quranic references in the fatwas studied, Docrat buttresses the 
male sexual needs discourse when dealing with a male petitioners’ concerns of wifely 
refusal of sex in fatwa C, by using familiar hadith sources.139 His approach accords 
with Abou Al-Fadl’s assessment that hadith traditions play a greater primary role than 
the Quran in determinations of spousal obedience. Hadith contribute more to “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Refer to introductory chapter and chapter two section 2.2. 
136 Referring to fatwa C analysed in chapter five. 
137 Refer to chapter 2, section 2.1 
138 See fatwas # 19786 (fatwa W) and # 28610 (fatwa X).  
139 Docrat uses familiar authentic hadith. These are explained in chapter five section 5.3.3 and refer to 
supplicating wives, angry husbands and cursing angels.  
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general denigration of the moral status of women” and have drastic normative 
“theological, moral and social consequences”, requiring a “conscientious pause” 140 
for further theorizing and reflection in order to accord better with the Quranic ethos of 
marriage, which Al-Fadl argues is mutuality, reciprocity and harmony (2001: 94).  
  
Therefore in answering the third research question, no Quranic texts are used in any 
of the sample fatwas, but other fatwas on the site mention Q2: 222-223 in the context 
of (im)permissible sexual positions, which does not necessarily overtly prioritise male 
sexual rights discourses. The only time foundational sources were used in the study 
was in the form of two familiar hadith, one depicting ‘supplicating wives’ and the 
other depicting ‘angry husbands’ and ‘cursing angels’. Both are used to buttress the 
male sexual rights discourse. In instances where muftis chose to instead modulate this 
discourse with ethical exhortations in an attempt to manage the mismatch between 
modern marriage expectations and its jurisprudential rules, no similar usage of 
foundational texts were accessed.141 
 
This omission is significant in light of another study mentioned in chapter two that 
points to ‘revolutionary reforming trends’ in Desai’s perspectives of domestic abuse, 
on his site. The fatwa analysed in Kort’s study also precludes foundational sources 
(2006: 378). Kort argued that Desai promotes “self-accountability, reform and a no-
harm approach”, affecting a strong move away from traditional conservative 
perspectives on domestic abuse. Similarly, and consonant with Kort’s study, it can be 
argued from this study that reforming trends are also present on askimam.org in 
relation to sexual agency, through namely the presence of a boisterous discourse on 
female sexual rights in the form of satisfaction, a modulation of the discourse on male 
sexual rights, including a tacit tolerance of reciprocal desire,142 and the recognition of 
non-physical facets of health requiring outside expertise, suggested by the inclusion of 
sister Fadila. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Abou El Fadl (2001: 94) proposes a “faith-based objection” as an option for dealing with a crisis of 
conscience which arises out of a conflict between one’s personal faith conviction and the 
determinations of the text (both Quran and Hadith). He proposes a “conscientious pause”, not as a 
“whimsical” dismissing of the text, but instead affording a “responsible and reflective” person the 
opportunity for further reflection and intense investigation of the text, “suspending judgement until 
such a study is complete”. If the impasse is intractable then, “Islamic theology requires that a person 
abide by the dictates of his or her conscience”.  
141 Desai in fatwa A and Zakariyya Desai in fatwa D. 
142 As noted in the analysis in chapter seven of main fatwas A and D and supporting fatwas U and V. 
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It could also be argued that Desai’s silence when dealing with wives who refuse sex 
with no “valid” reason, not just in terms of their health or sexual satisfaction, may be 
regarded too as a revolutionary move. Muftis, in their silence, are perhaps not 
championing women’s agency, but tacitly tolerating their resistance to one of the most 
essential dictums of a Muslim marriage - that of male sexual access and female sexual 
availability.  
 
But I stop short of describing these reforming trends as ‘revolutionary’ for two 
reasons. First, the persistence of the philosophical underpinnings of the legal logic of 
marriage characterised by a male-female duality continues to inform muftis in their 
role as cyber-counsellors, in ways that risk diminishing women’s wholeness and 
spiritual potential (Shaikh 2004).143 Second, the absence of foundational textual 
rationales in the fatwas tends to lend less support to reforming trends within them. 
Gregory Kozlowski (1996: 247) argues, “fatwas are often significant for what they 
cannot or will not say, as well as for what they actually communicate”. Thus, I 
maintain that the oversight in Kort’s analysis is that by ignoring the absence of textual 
rationales and foundational sources in Desai’s fatwas, she fails to note that 
hermeneutical trends and philosophical views which permit abuse, continue to persist 
in his legal logic. This is further salient in light of what the literature earlier 
revealed, 144  that the internalisation of dominant androcentric interpretations of 
foundational texts often leads to constrained presentations of female Muslim 
personhood, which in hierarchical, asymmetrical gender relationships could 
potentially hamper sexual reproductive health rights. Docrat’s response in fatwa C 
where he supports the male sexual rights discourse using hadith sources is analogous 
of this inclination. Hence I argue that, in addition to his strong personal 
denouncement, a judgment of the ‘revolutionary’ potential for reform in a mufti’s 
fatwa perhaps should also require that the denouncement be strengthened by 
evidentiary motivations arising out of foundational texts. As an illustration, alternative 
hadith and Quranic texts which support a modulation of male rights discourses and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 An example of how this philosophy plays out is illustrated in chapter six, where the idea of 
reciprocal desire is fraught with contradictions because of tendency of the female sexual rights 
discourse to emphasise sexual satisfaction as a male duty to protect society from the potentially 
negative and chaotic female sexuality (Ali 2006: 12).  
144 See chapter two sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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prioritises discourses of female sexual satisfaction, mutuality and health and well-
being exist in the authentic corpus of foundational sources and might be used by 
muftis to buttress reformist trends in fatwas.  
 
10.2  Imam.org in ‘Dar-al cyber’ 
 
 
The physical and theological concept of the ummah … is changing in part due to 
globalization and the Internet. One can see the altering of the tangible space or 
territory of Islam as a condition for change in Islamic thought. Changing concepts of 
the ummah have been integral for Muslims in the West, helping to reconstitute both 
the notion of ulama and ijtihad (Kort 2006: 368).  
 
Challenges faced by ordinary Muslims in the changing social realities of 
contemporary society are revealed in the enquiry of the fatwas in this study in as 
much they did in historical fatwas. The difference in the online space is that a vast 
number of generated fatwas such as those on askimam.org are maintained on the site 
over a period of at least ten years, providing a diachronic overview of multiple 
petitions by multiple petitioners and muftis, from varying geographical contexts. In 
addition, the dynamic between scholar and petitioner and how the religious orthodoxy 
meets the modern concerns of society is exposed, as is the ability of the online space 
to allow for the mediation of the muftis’ ideas to policy makers and the public as 
postulated by Sisler (2009: 51). 
 
Numerous scholars have also noted the Internet’s potential to provide an instant portal 
into the discursive contemporary Islamic landscape (Alwi 2009; Anderson 2003; Bunt 
2003: 2-6; Chawki 2010; Kutscher 2009; Marcotte 2015; Piela 2010). Further to 
which, in light of Campbell’s (2012: 3-5) thesis that online trends are a reflection of 
the changes happening offline in contemporary society and not necessarily the cause, 
it can be extrapolated that any reforming trends or disruptions of the dominant 
discourses within the online fatwa space has the potential to facilitate the production 
of diverse Muslim discourses and expressions, understandings and praxis.  
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More specifically, Kort (2006: 367) theorises that the Internet blurs “traditional 
notions of physical space, and by extension, challenges theoretical space”, eventually 
changing and reformulating traditional notions of ummah, ulama and ijtihād, 
contributing towards a gradual process of reforming trends in gender relations. This 
alteration and reformulation occurs not by the inclusion of “radical or overly liberal 
views” but in a gradual process of “re-intellectualization of Islamic discourse”. In 
considering Kort's theory I now turn to Desai’s online fatwas on sexual agency in this 
study in order to gauge to what extent the online character of his fatwas effect 
reformulation of the traditional concepts of ummah, ulama and ijtihād, in terms of 
potential reform in gender relations. 
  
10.2.1  Reformulation of Traditional Concepts 
10.2.1.1 Ummah 
 
Wario’s (2012: 253) research on peripatetic tablighi men pointed to the presence of a 
fluid, alterable and reconstructable masculinity produced through a “transnational 
flow of practices of how to be proper Muslim men”. Drawing from this theoretical 
reflection, I propose that some fatwas on askimam.org, particularly those in this study 
that moderate male sexual rights discourses and point to the promotion of a 
benevolent masculinity instead, provide similar options in the transnational virtual 
space of the Internet. A similar effect might occur as formulations of reconstructable 
and alterable masculinities, exhibited by peripatetic tablighi men, potentially ensue in 
cyberspace too, offering the possibilities of unsettling hierarchy and patriarchy, and 
accommodating women’s sexual concerns. This accrues with Mazrui’s thesis that 
“new technology will give Islam a chance to realise its original aim of transnational 
universalism” (Mazrui quoted by Kort: 2006: 367) and reflects a new formulation of 
the concept of ummah which some scholars have dubbed the “cyber –ummah” 
(Imoutal & Hussein 2009). The noted tendency of muftis to be aware of contemporary 
expectations of marriage and to subsequently downplay the normative male sexual 
rights discourse and emphasise female sexual satisfaction as well as mutuality and 
health and well-being, potentially also aligns with Sislers contention that the amount 
and type of petitions websites aggregate allows for a “bottom-up approach”, 
permitting ordinary Muslims, the petitioners, to “set the agenda for the issues to be 
discussed on most …websites”, thus constituting “a new manifestation of a Muslim 
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umma where there is independence from traditional religious authority and 
institutional hegemony…” (2011: 1152-1153).  
10.2.1.2 Ulama 
 
The sample of fatwas in this study exposed inconsistencies in the answers of the 
different muftis. Firstly, head mufti Desai’s recognition of other facets of health as 
requiring outside interventions is not followed consistently on the website as noted in 
chapter eight. Secondly, his trend towards mutuality is not clearly articulated and 
consistently applied across all the fatwas sanctioned and approved by him, indicating 
his synchronic hold on the legal jurisprudential framework in terms of how his 
students answer questions. Particularly, Desai’s response in fatwa A was situated 
entirely within the ethical space of marriage, and was mirrored only by Zakariyya 
Desai, revealing some variance from the overall tenor of the entire website.  
 
This speaks to two facets of muftiship on askimam.org. First, it calls into question the 
competencies and training of muftis for petitions requiring either counselling for 
social, emotional and psychological sexual health afflictions or those requiring 
therapeutic strategies to maintain the integrity of the marriage. While her credentials 
in terms of her allied health professional expertise is mentioned, no indication is 
afforded as to sister Fadila’s religious training. An overview of the numerous fatwas 
answered by her reveal that she answers petitions related to legal, religious and 
therapeutic concerns and answers as both a counsellor and a mufti would. Her 
presence and input on the website affords a glimpse into the kind of answers Mufti’s 
would be able to provide if they were adequately trained or if they partnered with an 
allied professional when dealing with petitions requiring additional counselling or 
therapeutic strategies; it also points to the necessity for additional research in this 
regard.  
 
Second, it also speaks to the mufti scholar-teacher relationship and the ability of 
senior muftis to be more flexible when dealing with women’s sexual agency concerns 
as compared to younger muftis who tend to be bound by the constraints of the legal 
logic and its philosophical underpinnings. To illustrate, Desai in fatwa A does not 
refer to any primary sources or Deoband Hanafi sources in privileging the subordinate 
discourse of mutuality and consent and promoting a benevolent masculinity. When 
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weighed against a similar fatwa like C, where student jurist Docrat uses hadith texts to 
buttress his obvious partiality to the dominant male sexual rights discourse, a potential 
shift of power may have occurred within the master-teacher space, so that the 
student’s rhetorical strategy of referring to foundational sources may render his 
argument more persuasive.  
 
At a textual level I could also argue that when the mufti uses the passive voice to 
describe the husbands actions, he weakens his agentival capacity as a religious 
authority figure. A more direct wording like “don’t force the issue” or “don’t worry 
about her sin”, might give the Imam more agency as an authority figure, and his 
directive would perhaps have more impetus to transform how husbands treat wives, 
thereby affording wives more power, further strengthening the discourse of mutual 
consent while still maintaining juristic authority.   
 
Alternatively, this argument may be offset by the institutional discourses of the 
Deoband system of master and teacher within the madressa seminaries. Desai as the 
master-teacher, author of this website, and acting in conformity with the adab-al mufti 
works, does not need to justify his legal opinion to a layperson. Retaining his power 
and authority, his fatwa is credible by virtue of the perceived reliability of the Mufti 
himself in terms of his knowledge and piety. As the master-teacher of both imam.org 
and the mufti training institute Darul Fiqh, Desai’s position within the Deoband 
structures in South Africa also cannot be ignored. Trends of mutuality and reciprocity 
within his fatwas, which are easily open to scrutiny by his students due to the fatwas’ 
long-term online presence, might have the potential to influence their juristic 
approaches. In addition, other community members with similar concerns are also 
informed by his answers. To illustrate, the fringe fatwas dealing with wives’ refusal of 
sex in chapter seven pointed to a general trend amongst the muftis to downplay the 
dominant discourses of male sexual priority and female availability, particularly in 
minority Muslim contexts.  
 
By contrast though, a diachronic analysis of both Docrat's and Desai’s fatwas reveals 
that Docrat's fatwa, which deviates from Desai’s approach and instead prioritises male 
sexual need and female sexual availability, was generated two years after Desai’s. 
This could mean that the above argument regarding the influence of the master-
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teacher on his student jurists is not always relevant. But when we consider that the 
petitioner in Docrat's fatwa originated from Pakistan, a Muslim majority country, 
where the traditional Islamic legal rules governing a marriage forms part of the 
legislative system, it could be further argued that Docrat may have been influenced by 
the social realities of a Muslim majority context. Desai and Zakariyya Desai, by 
contrast, were aware of the challenges of a minority context. This demonstrates that 
Docrat did not answer as his master-teacher might have, but instead chose to situate 
his response within the legal logic of marriage based on the Muslim majority context 
of out of which the petition is generated. The trend amongst the muftis on 
askimam.org may be to read the petitioners’ concerns and then answer according to 
norms of the specific geographical contexts. 
 
To summarise, a reformulation of the traditional concept of ulama occurs in one 
instance when sister Fadila traverses both the juristic and the allied health 
professional’s ambit in her responses to petitions on askimam.org. In addition, by 
virtue of the operations of the educated Deoband religious elite, the nature of the 
master-teacher relationship within the madressa seminaries, and the perceived 
reliability of Desai in terms of his knowledge and piety, it seems that the scholar 
jurists who can access Desai’s online answers would be thus influenced by him, 
especially in relation to fatwas originating in minority contexts. We may speculate 
that the result of this shift would be to effect a change in how future questions directly 
dealing with a wife’s refusal to engage in sexual intercourse is dealt with by other 
muftis on the site. According with Kort, it is possible that a “gradual process of re-
intellectualizing discourse” could occur amongst the Deoband Hanafi ulama on 
askimam.org so that their answers may incline more towards the ethical logic of a 
Muslim marriage as opposed to the legal logic. This argument points to a possible 
reformulation of the relationship between the master and teacher and a reformulation 
in the ways in which ijtihād occurs. 
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10.2.1.3 Ijtihād, 
 
Another important question raised in this analysis is whether Desai as head mufti 
effected a shift away from a strict adherence to taqlīd in relation to the dominant 
Deoband positions in the discourse of male sexual rights and female sexual 
availability, especially when his response is compared to Docrat’s in fatwa C.  
 
Taqlid can be loosely translated as ‘uncritical adherence’, and concerns the level of 
fidelity that one might demonstrate to historical juridical opinions formulated by 
jurists engaging in qiyas or independent legal reasoning (Ijtihad)…  
 
The extent to which a mujtahid is bound by legal precedent or the positions of 
eminent legal personalities corresponds to his freedom to formulate novel legal 
injunctions. Encouraging a mujtahid to engage in taqlid is to promote a view of 
Islamic law as more static, in that once a juridical injunction has been promoted by 
an eminent legal personality, that ruling achieves a normative status for all 
succeeding generations. Restricting taqlid, by contrast, affords the mujtahid greater 
latitude in formulating legal injunctions, and suggests that Islamic law may look 
different depending on the context in which it is applied (Rumee 2012:  129-130). 
 
In light of Rumee’s deliberations and in accordance with Hallaq’s (1996: 43) 
assessment that muqallid muftis in later eras also practiced ijtihād and behaved like 
mujtahids, Desai functions ordinarily as a muqallid mufti, but it is evident in these 
fatwas that he also performs, though without announcement, a form of ijtihād, evident 
when he locates his arguments within the ethical paradigm of marriage. By remaining 
within the traditional legal logic of a Muslim marriage, Desai appears to restrict taqlīd 
to followship, yet he also shifts his reasoning so that his fatwa illustrates a move away 
from a legal approach and towards a more ethical approach. This is salient in light of 
the mismatch between modern expectations of mutuality and the “classical 
jurisprudential doctrines” on sex, which Ali highlights (2006: xxv). Desai deals with 
this mismatch and formulates an opinion in line with his assessment of the 
contemporary concerns of Muslim men and women in minority Muslim contexts. This 
illustrates how scholars propose a remediatory solution to the dissonance between the 
classical legal rules of a marriage and modern expectations. The proposals centre on 
the conceptual difference between the inimitable, immutable sharī‘a and an alterable 
fiqh, so that social practices and experiences have the potential to mould a new fiqh 
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(Ali 2003: 2006; Mir-Hosseini 2009). Desai’s tendency to conform with societal 
trends of mutual consent points to the activity of ijtihād; he considers social practices 
in a manner that allows him to enact a fiqh partial to the ethics of marriage and health. 
 
10.3  Summary 
 
Drawing from the above analyses, the discursive representations of sexual agency on 
the online fatwas of askimam.org therefore accords with Kort's thesis on a gradual 
“re-intellectualisation of Islamic discourse” at the site of the Internet, and points to the 
reformulation of traditional Islamic concepts like of ummah, ijtihād and ulama. Thus, 
the site of the interlocutory space of the fatwas, in dar al-cyber, points to the 
Internet’s potential to showcase and be representative of the discursive Islamic 
landscape, illustrating new usages, and a gradual process of reforming trends in 
gender relations (Kort 2009: 367).   
 
Overall, no Quranic texts were used in the fatwas in this study. Although other fatwas 
on the site mention Q2: 222-223 in the context of  (im)permissible sexual positions, 
they do not overtly prioritise the male sexual rights discourse. Instead two hadith texts 
which are used in fatwa C prioritise the dominant discourse. However, in instances 
where this discourse is modulated by ethical concerns, no similar usage of 
foundational texts was found. The study thus revealed that evidentiary motivations 
arising out of foundational texts are sometimes used by muftis, but mainly to buttress 
normative gender-asymmetrical discourses. The study further suggests that the ethics-
based reformulations found in muftis’ answers would be better served if particular 
Quran and Hadith excerpts that support an ethical paradigm were used.  
  





Since the fatwa and the mufti are situated at the interface between worldly dealings 
and the process of theorising about them, women, drawing on both their life 
experiences and their knowledge of Islamic arguments, are in a position to contest 
fatwas and formulate new questions to promote gender equality and rights (Larsen 
2015: 216-17).  
 
Through petitioners’ queries and muftis’ answers, modern online fatwas are at the 
frontier of where legal interpretation meets cultural and social realities. It is here that 
pietistic concerns attached to worldly happenings encounter the pietistic legal and 
therapeutic devices used to theorise about them.   
 
But women’s contestations and the reform trends as outlined in the last chapter, 
cannot be deemed to be simplistic by virtue of the conflict between modern 
expectations and   classical legal thought on sex and sexuality amongst Muslim men, 
women and muftis who continue to be loyal to the classical tradition. The petitions 
demonstrated that women are making choices in the sexual arena with regard to their 
‘desires, pleasures and experiences’ that they are exploring possibilities for personal 
sexual satisfaction and intimacy, and they have expectations of meaningful sexual 
relationships. But these are weighed against pietistic concerns so that, as the literature 
also revealed,145 women continue to remain committed to the classical legal tradition 
of Muslim marriage which functions in a dynamic of male sexual need and female 
sexual availability, even while they grapple with the dissonance it introduces with 
their expectations of mutuality within marriage (Ali 2006; Hoel and Shaikh 2013; 
Imtoual & Hussein 2009; Larsen 2015; Marcotte 2010; Piela 2010). In dealing with 
this dissonance, the fatwas revealed that petitioners also relied on ideas of fairness, 
mutuality and the various facets of health (physical, psychological and emotional) as 
well as their knowledge of religious rules to argue for choices and possibilities in the 
sexual arena. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Refer to chapter two. 
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Called upon to provide solutions to problems arising out of this dissonance, muftis 
use religious, therapeutic and legal interpretive reasoning. Some relied mainly on an 
ethics of marriage as mutuality, and a biomedical ethic that prioritised physical health 
concerns within the sexual realm. With the stipulated aim of keeping the marriage 
intact and maintaining the stability of the family, some muftis, and in particular Desai, 
enact a move towards the ethical moral logic of marriage where ideas of mutuality 
and reciprocity reside. But they continue to remain within the parameters of the legal 
logic of marriage so that even when Desai appeals to the ethics of marriage in the 
fatwa he answers, he also approves of his students’ responses which may not. Instead, 
these remain entirely within the legal logic of marriage and traditional norms, which 
negate reform and do not consider the ethical dimensions of the lived experiences of 
modern Muslims in marriages of mutuality and reciprocity. The analyses in chapters 
five, six and seven explicated the deeply ingrained nature of this legal logic. But in 
spite of this, in Ali’s assessment, paying attention to muftis’ jurisprudential methods 
can offer much to Muslim feminists.   
 
The ways in which jurists have related source texts to social contexts demonstrates 
that the law they constructed has ‘always already’ been subjected to acts of human 
interpretation. Their practice both authorizes by example human interpretive 
reasoning and provides a useful model for constructive dialogue between textual 
sources and social custom, something that has always mattered a great deal where sex 
and intimacy were concerned (Ali 2006: 154).  
 
In line with the agenda of feminist post structural theory, this study reveals how 
Deoband muftis can remain committed to the non-liberal classical legal tradition of a 
Muslim marriage and yet afford women agency within the sexual realm. First, some 
occasionally locate arguments which are supportive of women within the ethical logic 
of marriage where ideas of mutuality, consent and reciprocity prevail. The study also 
shows that they could do this better by using appropriate Quranic and hadith sources 
to buttress their arguments. In downplaying male sexual rights, these muftis tacitly 
tolerate women’s defiance in one of the most essential dictums of a Muslim marriage 
- that of male sexual access and female sexual availability. Second, some are able to 
recognise non-physical health concerns and allow for external therapeutic expertise 
and interventions by health and allied professionals. Third, muftis positivise sexual 
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rights through links with physical facets of health, which they reason in terms of an 
ethical paradigm located in biomedical terms. The study indicates there is further 
room for muftis to link sexual rights to other facets of health through an ethical 
paradigm located in therapeutic terms of other medical and allied professionals, 
particularly psychologists and social workers.  These rights would then also fall 
within the legal paradigm of marriage. In line with observations on the flexibility of 
the ‘fatwa method’ which ordinarily produces multiple outcomes on a single legal 
issue (Vogel 1996: 269), muftis may bypass existing legal restrictions and offer 
alternative legal outcomes which support women’s ‘desires, pleasures and 
experiences’ in the sexual health realm of marriage.  
 
Thus through a reliance on the biomedical and therapeutic ethical paradigms, muftis 
may be positioned to enact a fiqh partial to women’s concerns at the intersection of 
the ethics of marriage and health. In a contemporary discursive Islamic landscape 
where notions of mutuality, reciprocity, consent and health permeate discourses on 
male-female relations in marriage, Desai’s vision of a mufti’s role as described by 
him below may yet be realized.  
 
The practice of analysing contemporary issues and deducing the relevant rulings of 
Shariah has been the hallmark of the illustrious fuqaha. From advances in the 
medical field to the financial world, the fuqaha left no stone unturned in resolving the 
contemporary issues of their time. As the wheel of time spins us into the 21st century, 
the present day ulama attempt to walk in the shadows of their illustrious predecessors 
by analysing contemporary issues and deducing the rulings of Shariah (Desai n.d).  
 
Larsen (2015: 202) has used Asad’s (1986) anthropology of Islam to show how 
fatwas as discourses between petitioners and muftis constitute an aspect of the 
discursive Islamic tradition. Reflective of these observations, this study demonstrated 
that muftis maintain a continuity with past legal and therapeutic pedagogies and 
practices which determine Muslim marriage as dominion, but are engaged in attempts 
to enact provisions in a present, where ordinary Muslim men and women’s lived 
experiences of marriage are infused with ideas of mutuality, reciprocity and well-
being, potentially leading to reformulations of future practices based on an ethics of 
both marriage and health. The fatwas in this study therefore form an important 
component of a discursive Islamic tradition and suggest how traditional pedagogies 
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and practices are being reformulated to meet contemporary needs. Contrary to Kort 
(2005) who argues that formulations which disapprove of domestic abuse are 
‘revolutionary’, I conclude that the formulations of fatwas in this study remain within 
the traditional pedagogies and philosophies, and while they may promote change, 
muftis do not intend them to be revolutionary.  
 
The Internet, by virtue of altering the tangible territory of Islam into a virtual and fluid 
transnational space, i.e. Dar al-cyber, may feed into a new sense of  “public space that 
is discursive, performative, and participative” (Eickelman & Anderson 2003: 2) yet 
the potential for revolutionary change has yet to be proven. Nonetheless the online 
space not only provides a glimpse into the discursive Islamic landscape, it is also a 
site of the Muslim discursive tradition which is demonstrated by its production of 
diverse Muslim discourses which engender new usages and practices, and allow for 
reformulations of traditional notions and norms, thus facilitating new prospects for a 
gradual reconfiguring of gender relations. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Overall, there were a number of areas identified in this thesis, which hold the potential 
for further research. Chapter six revealed that the question of wives’ right to initiate 
sex for their own pleasure and enjoyment as men do, and not just to their satisfaction 
within the male dominated sexual act, warrants further exploration within the fatwas 
of askimam.org. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the fatwas of sister Fadila on 
askimam.org might deliver deeper reflections on the way in which sexual health is 
conceptualised by her in relation to the muftis on the site. As the only female 
functioning within the legal interpretive space of online fatwa, further insights might 
also be gauged and added to the dearth of research on how women are applying the 
Internet and the degree to which they are “content originators” and not just simply 
content (Bunt 2003: 210).  
 
The additional discourses of sin, force and consent in the context of women’s sexual 
agency that featured prominently in the study require further investigation, as do the 
large number of fatwas I came across in my initial search that dealt with women’s 
pietistic concerns in relation to reproduction, contraception, fertility and abortion. It 
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could be claimed that these areas traverse ethical paradigms located in various spaces 
- biomedical, therapeutic, pietistic and legal - holding the promise to shed further light 
on the devices used by muftis to theorise about them. 
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# 17537- Fatwa A146 
# 15085- Fatwa B147 
# 18350- Fatwa C148 
# 16306- Fatwa D149  
# 32049- Fatwa E150 
# 32362- Fatwa F 151 
 





Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Feb 18,2009 
Title: Is there any sin when wife reject her husband. Can you please explain to me 




My wife got very law sexual desire. I want to have intimacy evry other day or after 
week, she doesn't let me even touch her. I fill very bad and then I don't know what to 





In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatuh 
Intimate relation is a mutual issue between the spouses. Apart from the wife fulfilling 
her marital obligations, it is important that the husband takes the feelings, tempo etc. 
of the wife into consideration before becoming upset. By the husband forcing the 
issue upon the wife, sometimes it could create estrangement in the marriage. Instead 
of the husband worrying about the sin of refusing him his marital right, rather talk to 
her and enquire if she experiences any difficulty in doing so. By the husband forcing 
the issue upon the wife, she will eventually feel used for this purpose and become de 
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moralized which could possibly ruin the marriage and complicate matters further. 
And Allah Ta'ala Knows Best 
Wassalamu Alaykum] 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai  




Category: Character & Morals 
Fatwa#: 15085 
Asked Country: Pakistan 
Answered Date: Apr 23,2007 




May Oral Sex be permissible if the husband is suffering from premature ejaculation 
and is unable to give orgasm to her wife through vaginal intercourse alone? He wants 
to pay her rights and save her from any sin? In such conditions may he use oral sex in 
addition to vaginal intercourse for her orgasm. 
Answer 
 
In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatoh 
The husband should undergo treatment for premature ejaculation. 
And Allah knows best 
Wassalam 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai  




FATWA C  
Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 18350 
Asked Country: Pakistan 
Answered Date: Oct 29,2009 
Title: Q 1- if a husband ask to his wife for sex, and if she refused oftenly.with reasons 
that she is not in mood, and after this, if husband indulge in some other immoral ....Q-
2 if a muslim, dont want to live , due to extra stress ,pain, and unhappines in his life, 
can he commit suicide ? is there any possibility that ALLAH forgive his sin, as he is 






Q 1- if a husband ask to his wife for sex, and if she refused oftenly.with reasons that 
she is not in mood, and after this, if husband indulge in some other immoral and sinful 
activities, then what would be position of both in front of ALLAH?. 
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Q-2 if a muslim, dont want to  live , due to extra stress ,pain, and unhappines in his 
life, can he commit suicide ? is there any possibility that ALLAH forgive his sin, as 





In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatuh 
1) When a husband and wife make nikaah Allah Ta’ala grants certain rights and 
privileges to one over the other. It is the duty of the man to provide shelter for the 
woman and to take care of her needs. Similarly, it is necessary for the woman to obey 
her husband at all times and to respect his authority over her. 
Rasulullah has mentioned: [Arabic text] 
 “If I had to command anyone to make Sajdah (prostrate) to another person, I would 
of instructed the woman to make Sajdah to her husband” 
Rasulullah also mentioned:  
When a man calls his wife to bed and she refuses, he then spends the night upset and 
angry with her, the angels curse her till the morning. 
  
If a woman has a valid reason for not responding positively to her husband, she 
should discuss this with him. 
If there is no valid reason for not responding to him, she should rather obey him and 
save herself from the curses of the angels. However, if she does not offer herself to 
her husband, it does not give him the right to abuse his chastity and to involve himself 
in any illicit relations. If he commits any evil or immoral act, he will be responsible 
for his own actions and answerable for it on the day of Qiyaamah. 
2) In actual fact, suicide does not put a stop to all problems and worries, rather it puts 
a start to much more distress and problems (in the Qabr and in the hereafter). As 
believers in the Kalimah, we believe in Taqdeer and that all good and bad is from 
Allah. Many a times Allah Ta’ala afflicts a person with certain problems and 
calamities, this is only a test from Allah and he wants to see how we respond to these 
adverse conditions. Whether we are patient and put our reliance on Allah, or do we 
turn our backs and have an evil perception regarding Allah. Accordingly Allah Ta’ala 
will reward the person, whether it is appearent in this world or the hereafter. 
Rasulullah has mentioned: [Arabic Text] 
“Whoever kills himself in this world using some kind of object, He will be punished 
with the same item on the day of Qiyaamah” 
 
If a person makes dua and asks Allah to help and assist him, then he should not lose 
hope and continue asking Allah. If his duas are not answered immediately, then too, 
he will not leave empty handed. He will see the fruits of his sacrifice later. 
  
And Allah knows best 
Wassalaamu `alaykum 
Ml. Rayhaan Docrat, 
Student Darul Iftaa 
Checked and Approved by: 
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Mufti Ebrahim Desai 




Category: Character & Morals 
Fatwa#: 16306 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Feb 24,2008 
Title: I got married 2 years ago but my wife seems to be unhappy. she says I do not 




I got married 2 years ago but my wife seems to be unhappy. she says I do not satisfy 
her sexually. what should I do? Also can a man and women masturbate each other for 
pleasure. Also is it haram for a women to reach an orgasm by her husband 
masturbating her?  
Answer 
 
In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatuh 
[if !supportLists]1.      [endif] At the outset, it is important that you consider the 
feelings of your wife in this regard. If she claims that you are not satisfying her, you 
should obtain professional medical advice on this issue. You are newly married and 
should avoid any type of resentment from your wife. 
 It is permissible (Shaami Page 355 Vol. 2) 
3. Refer 2 above. 
And Allah knows best 
Wassalam 
Muhammed Zakariyya Desai, 
Assistant Mufti 
Checked and Approved by: 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 




Category: Marriage (Nikah) 
Fatwa#: 32049 
Asked Country: United States 
Answered Date: Mar 03,2015 






I am getting married next week, this is very urgent. 
I am to be wed to this guy who is religious and my mom loves him. I on the other 
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hand do not. My father talked with me to ask my opinion of him at the start but I did 
not give any because I didnt know what to say. The guy lives in another state, and we 
talked over the phone for a month. He said he loves so much, and wish I can do the 
same..I really tried to, but I can't. I don't find him attractive, and it annoys me when he 
says he loves me. 
I do not agree to this marriage, at the start I was ok with it because I told him and my 
parents I wated to get married a year later after m studies (my mom didn't care..she 
said I wont find another guy like him). 
Two weeks ago, I expressed my concern with my parents. I told my mom i was 
assulated when I was a child and was kind of scared of marriage and consummating. 
She didn't care as much expect the fact I was ok and called me stupid because I shared 
it also with the guy. They won't stop the marriage. 
One week ago, I told the guy I feel sad that no one values my opinion, that I wished I 
could have gotten married a year later then now. He was sad and cried. I hanged up 
the phone, and he calls my mom right after saying I said these things. My parents 
yells at me, threaten to kill me and my mom was about to jump out the window to 
sucided. They said they were really dissappointed in me. I got a few minor kicks and 
bruises from them. They said it was my fault for not strongly saying no earlier and 
now its too late since there's a week left, they brought everything for the marriage and 
they told the community about my marriage...if they stop the wedding they will lose 
their respect and won't be able to show their face anymore in the mosque. They also 
said it'd my fault if no one will marry my other siblings. 
I don't know how to cope but to stay out side or stay in college al day long. I am hurt. 
My parents blame me for hurting them but I feel they do not see me or care. I feel 
very depressed. And I really hate talking to the guy now, I have bad thoughts like how 
he would die. I want to run away. My mom expects me to connsumate the marriage, 
but I am scared. I HATE the idea of him touching me, i feel grossed and throwing up 
(my mom thought about him, how he maybe he has hope -- she doesn't really care 
what I feel). 
Also another note: we did do istikhara namaz, my parents saw good things but him 
and I didn't see anything. But I hate him already...I feel really bad.  




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
  
Sister in islam, 
We understand your mind-set and predicament. 
In principle, you are an adult and you have an independent right in Shariah to 
withdraw from this marriage arrangement. However, in the context of the 
circumstances you are facing, you seek our help, probably our advice. Often in life we 
have to distinguish permissibility from practicality. What may be permissible may not 
necessarily be practical or ideal. 
It is generally normal for girls to be apprehensive before marriage for various reasons. 
In many instances it could be the appearance of the boy or his conduct or his family 
etc. It should be understood that no boy is perfect. Even if you choose a perfect match 
for you, you will still be apprehensive in some way or the other. You will have to 
reach a point of compromise and trust in Allah for whatever has to happen. 
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In your case, there are some positives in the boy. You say his conduct is good. There 
is also humility in him. Your parents chose him for you. Surely they must have 
considered him to be  the most suitable for you based on their love for you and their 
experiences in life. 
Our advice is you change your mind-set and proceed with the marriage. Living 
together will give both of you the opportunity to win over each other’s hearts, which 
will dominate all negativities. If you trust your parent’s love for you then change your 
attitude and look forward to making the marriage a success. After adopting all 
possible means for a successful marriage, place your trust in Allah. 
Make lots of Dua to Allah to assist you in the marriage. 
  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Saleem Khan 
Student Darul Iftaa Bradford, UK 





Category: Marriage (Nikah) 
Fatwa#: 32362 
Asked Country: United States 
Answered Date: Mar 19,2015 





Here was my pervious question: 
http://www.askimam.org/public/question_detail/32049  
  
I went ahead with the marriage, when my heart wasn’t into it and a lot of things 
happen. First, I tried to give this marriage a chance and trying to get know my 
husband and built trust before getting intimate right away but..  
1.Mom threatens me (kick me out of the house) to consummate marriage when  I felt 
uncomfortable and didn't want to. She wanted to save face in front of his family. 
2.He emotionally blackmails here and there to consummate the marriage. 
3.He tells my mother everything, whenever she asked him if we consummated he says 
no, and then my mom emotionally blackmails me and hurts me.  
4.I ended up in a psych ward because I felt trapped and really betrayed by everything. 
They both knew I had my monthly cycle and I wasn’t ready. I told them it was in the 
quran that you shouldn’t force a woman or touch her when she’s in her monthly cycle 
but they didn’t seem to care.   
My ‘husband’ knew about my traumatic childhood experience but forced kissed me 
and touched when I was sleeping…i cried in the bathroom because I felt violated and 
hurt. I really do not like him, and I feel like I can’t full fill my duty as a wife towards 
him. How can I love someone when I was forced into this? Forced marriage is against 
islam. 
 
Everyday I come home - I feel sadness. I feel depressed and trapped in my own home. 
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I tried to give it a chance, but right now, I really can’t. I don’t find him sexually, 
emotionally and physically attractive. We also have culture differences and I just 
can’t make sacrifices for someone I don’t love.   
My parents told me to accept it  because allah made me get married for a reason, they 
said im acting out..but I am depressed and hurting inside. If everything happens for a 
reason..than why is there such thing as - forced marriages is against islam? Why can’t 
they see that?  
My parents expect me to consummate in summer when i’m suppose to go visit him…I 
just want to run away. I know i won't be able to full fill my duty as his wife, its not 
fair to me nor to him.  




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
  
Sister in Islam, 
We take note of your negative feelings in the marriage even after giving it a chance. 
We advise you to seek the intervention of some senior person in the family and some 
senior ‘aalim in whom your parents have confidence and confide in them. Explain to 
them how you feel and the negative consequences of moving ahead. Request them to 
assist you to amicably terminate the marriage through a talaaq. Make them explain to 
your parents that the negative consequences of moving forward in the marriage are 
probably more than terminating the marriage and it is in their interest to be part of 
amicably resolving the problem. 
  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Muhammad Haris Siddiqui 
Student Darul Iftaa Melbourne, Australia  
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APPENDIX 2: SUPPORTING FATWAS  
 
# 15104- G152 
# 17032- H153  
# 30630- I154 
# 18778- J155 
# 24644- K156 
# 27692- L157 
# 30959- M158 
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# 17012- O160 
# 28553- P161 
# 14847- Q162 
# 28092- R163 
# 31509- S164 
# 15840- T165 
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Full text of the Supporting Fatwas  
 
FATWA G 
Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 15104 
Asked Country: South Africa 
Answered Date: Apr 26,2007 






I am a newly married woman and my husband and I are having intercourse almost 
every night. I have been performing ghusl diligently each morning after intercourse 
and before my Fajr salaah. However, recently I have been suffering with sinus 
problems and mild headaches and I believe it is because of washing my hair every 
day. I previously never suffered with these conditions as I used to wash my hair once 
a week because of its length. Is there any alternative ghusl procedure I could follow 







In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatoh 
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It is permissible for you to make masah of your head instead of washing your head in 
ghusl if washing almost everyday is causing you serious headaches and other 
sicknesses Allaamah Shaami states “A woman should not withhold herself from her 
husband, i.e. out of fear of falling ill due to Ghusl (bath) becoming obligatory on her. 
Rather, she has been granted concession regarding washing her hair. (Raddul Muhtar, 
vol 1, pg 153)   
This Fatwa should not be abused for minor and trivial sicknesses. In that case the 
ghusal will not be valid 
And Allah knows best 
Wassalam 
Ml. Ya'qoob Dadabhai, 
Student Darul Iftaa 
Checked and Approved by: 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 




Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 17032 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Aug 18,2008 
Title: I have heard of the Islamic ruling concerning slave women and concubines. I 
have heard that slave owners may have sexual intercourse with their female slaves, 




I have heard of the Islamic ruling concerning slave women and concubines. I have 
heard that slave owners may have sexual intercourse with their female slaves, without 
marrying them. 
Please specify the ruling and specify situations where this is acceptable, how this is 




In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatoh  
  
Please view our standard answer on the issue. 
Wassalam  
Mufti Ebrahim Desai  
Darul Iftaa, Madrassah In'aamiyyah 
  
QUESTION: What is the Islamic law with regard to slave-women? Was It permissible 
to have relations with these slave-women without a formal marriage ceremony? 
ANSWER: Firstly, it should be borne in mind that slavery was not something that was 
introduced by Islam; on the contrary, it was something that had its roots planted long 
before the advent of Islam. It would not be an exaggeration to state that slavery is 
probably as old as war itself, because it is one of the consequences of war. Thus, 
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slavery apparently first reared its head with the first wars that took place an the face of 
earth. War is a factor that makes soft men stern, kind men harsh and delicate men 
rugged. A man who cannot bear to see the sight of blood under normal circumstances 
becomes capable of shedding the blood of hundreds under the pressure of war. Those 
who were not killed in warfare, used to be taken as prisoners of war. The pages of 
history will show that many alternative, expedient methods were used through the 
ages to deal with prisoners of war. Some used to be executed while others would be 
set free, with or without a ransom. Then, there were others who were neither executed 
nor set free. These were enslaved. 
When Islam came and prospered, its power was challenged by the enemies of Islam 
and the need to go to war arose. By that time, slavery had virtually become an 
international custom. It was also rife among the Arabs from the days of darkness and 
ignorance. Thus, abolishing it instantateously would have caused chaos and 
pandemonium among the Arab people. Hence, a process of gradual extirpation had to 
be implemented. Moreover, if the Muslims would set all their enemy-prisoners free 
and tolerate their fellow Muslims being captured and enslaved by the enemies, it 
would have lead to a sharp decrease in the Muslim military force and given a great 
advantage to the enemy forces which was something that the Muslims could not 
afford. Furthermore, it is a well known fact that warfare tactics used by one side are 
often countered by the opposing side in order to maintain a balance of power. Hence, 
wartime diplomacy necessitated the enslaving of prisoners. 
In the "Jihaads" (Islamic wars) that took place, women were also, at times, taken as 
prisoners of war by the Muslim warriors. These women captives used to be distributed 
as part of the booty among the soldiers, after their return to Islamic territory. Each 
soldier was then entitled to have relations ONLY with the slave girl over which he 
was given the RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP and NOT with those slave girls that were not 
in his possession. This RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP was given to him by the "Ameerul-
Mu'mineen" (Head of the Islamic state.) Due to this right of ownership, It became 
lawful for the owner of a slave girl to have intercourse with her. 
It may, superficially, appear distasteful to copulate with a woman who is not a man's 
legal wife, but once Shariat makes something lawful, we have to accept it as lawful, 
whether it appeals to our taste, or not; and whether we know its underlying wisdom or 
not. It is necessary for a Muslim to be acquainted with the laws of Shariat, but it is not 
necessary for him to delve into each law in order to find the underlying wisdom of 
these laws because knowledge of the wisdom of some of the laws may be beyond his 
puny comprehension. Allah Ta'ala has said in the Holy Quran: "Wa maa ooteetum 
min al-ilm illaa qaleelan" which means, more or less, that, "You have been given a 
very small portion of knowledge". Hence, if a person fails to comprehend the 
underlying wisdom of any law of Shariat, he cannot regard it as a fault of Shariat 
(Allah forbid), on the contrary, it is the fault of his own perception and lack of 
understanding, because no law of Shariat is contradictory to wisdom. 
Nevertheless, the wisdom underlying the permission granted by Shariat to copulate 
with a slave woman is as follows: The LEGAL possession that a Muslim receives 
over a slave woman from the "Ameerul-Mu'mineen" (the Islamic Head of State) gives 
him legal credence to have coition with the slave woman in his possession, just as the 
marriage ceremony gives him legal credence to have coition with his wife. In other 
words, this LEGAL POSSESSION is, in effect, a SUBSTITUTE of the MARRIAGE 
CEREMONY. A free woman cannot be 'possessed', bought or sold like other 
possessions; therefore Shariat instituted a 'marriage ceremony' in which affirmation 
and consent takes place, which gives a man the right to copulate with her. On the 
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other hand, a slave girl can be possessed and even bought and sold, thus, this right of 
possession, substituting as a marriage ceremony, entitles the owner to copulate with 
her. A similar example can be found in the slaughtering of animals; that after a formal 
slaughtering process, in which the words, "Bismillahi Allahu Akbar" are recited, 
goats, cows, etc.; become "Halaal" and lawful for consumption, whereas fish becomes 
"Halaal" merely through 'possession' which substitutes for the slaughtering. 
In other words, just as legal possession of a fish that has been fished out of the water, 
makes it Halaal for human consumption without the initiation of a formal slaughtering 
process; similarly legal possession of a slave woman made her Halaal for the purpose 
of coition with her owner without the initiation of a formal marriage ceremony. 
In short, permission to have intercourse with a slave woman was not something 
barbaric or uncivilised; on the contrary, it was almost as good as a marriage 
ceremony. In fact, possession of a slave woman resembles a marriage ceremony in 
many ways and both have a lot in common with each other. One similarity is this that 
just as a free woman cannot have two husbands simultaneously, a slave woman 
cannot be used for intercourse by two owners. Another similarity is that a free woman 
whose marriage is on the rocks, cannot marry another man until her previous marriage 
is nullified through divorce, etc. Due to the discrepancies between husband and wife, 
the marriage sometimes reaches a stage where it becomes virtually impossible for the 
couple to live as man and wife with the result that divorce is brought into force to 
nullify marriage ties. Similarly, if a slave woman was married previously in enemy 
territory to a non-Muslim, and is then captured alone, i.e. without her husband, it is 
not permissible for any Muslim to have relations with her until her previous marriage 
is nullified, and that is done by bringing her to an Islamic country and making her the 
legal possession of a Muslim. Bringing her into Islamic territory necessitates the 
rendering of her previous marriage as null and void by Islamic law because with her 
husband in enemy territory and she in Islamic territory, it becomes virtually 
impossible for them to meet and live as man and wife. That is why it is not 
permissible to have intercourse with a woman whose husband is also taken into 
captivity and put into slavery with her. Another resemblance between the two is that, 
just as a divorcee has to spend a period called "Iddat" before another man is allowed 
to marry her, similarly, a slave woman has to spend a period called "Istibraa" before 
her owner can have coition with her. 
Another similarity between marriage and possession of a slave woman is that just as 
the wife becomes a dependant of the husband and he has to provide a home, food and 
clothing for her, a slave woman also becomes a dependant of her owner and he has to 
provide a home, food and clothing for her. Yet another similarity is this that just as 
marriage makes the close relatives of the wife Haraam upon the husband; i.e. he 
cannot get married to his wife's mother, grandmother, sister, etc., similarly if a man 
has copulated with a slave woman the slave woman's close relatives also become 
Haraam upon the owner. With all these similarities it does not make sense to regard 
copulation with a slave woman distasteful whilst copulation with one's wife is not 
regarded as distasteful. 
A question that may still arise is that why does the owner of a slave woman not marry 
her before having relations with her? Well, this is impracticable because of a few 
intricate technicalities. Firstly, we know that a man has to give "Mahr" (dower-
money) to his bride. The Holy Quran says:- 
[ A r a b i c ] 
Trans: "And allowed unto you is whatsoever is beyond that, so that ye may seek them 
with your substance (i.e. with your dower-money). " - (4:24). 
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Thus, "Mahr" is a conditional prerequisite of Nikah. If a man has to marry his slave 
woman, it would not be possible for him to abide by this condition of 'Mahr' because 
by Islamic law, a slave does not have rights over any property, i.e. she cannot own 
anything. In fact, whatever she has with her too, i.e. her clothing, etc., is all regarded 
as the property of her owner. Therefore, If he gets married to his slave girl and gives 
her the 'Mahr' she cannot become the owner of it because she has no right of 
ownership. The 'Mahr' would bounce back to the owner of the slave girl and it would 
tantamount to giving the 'mahr' to himself. Hence, the owner would become the payer 
as well as the PAYEE of the 'mahr' which would only result in the mockery of the 
whole system of 'mahr'. It would be absolutely superflous to have such a marriage 
ceremony performed that makes a mockery of the 'mahr' system. Hence, the owner 
cannot get married to her while she remains a slave girl. However, if he sets her free, 
then he can get married to her on the basis of her having become a liberated woman. 
Although the owner himself cannot get married to his slave woman, without giving 
her freedom, he can get her married to someone else. If he gets her married to 
someone else, then only her husband can now have intercourse with her and the 
owner's right of having intercourse with her comes to an end. All these facts prove 
that the slave girl does not become an instrument of sex; on the contrary, her honour 
is upheld, in that only one man is allowed to have intercourse with her JUST AS only 
one man (the husband) is allowed to have intercourse with his lawfully wedded wife. 
Islam ensured that the slave girl's duties were not restricted merely to domestic chores 
but also gave her master permission to copulate with her. This concession created an 
atmosphere of love and harmony between the slave girl and her master. Islam thereby 
raised the status of the war captive-maidens close to that of wives. It was a 
psychological cure to her grief-stricken heart, being deprived of her family and 
thrown into the hands of a strange society. 
Rasulullah (Sallallahu Alayhi Wasallam) enjoined his followers to treat the slaves 
kindly, gently, and, above all, to regard them as members of the family. In this way, 
they were made to feel wanted; which was far better than treating them as outcasts 
and leaving them to wander the streets of a strange society in a peniless, destitute 
condition. Such treatment would have ultimately forced them to take up evil 
occupations such as prostitution in the case of slave woman in order to fill their 
hungry stomachs. The First World War in 1914 was a clear reflection of the evils 
involved in setting captive women free to roars about in a strange society with strange 
surroundings. During that war, German and English women prisoners on either side 
were set free to roam the streets with no-one to feed them. The result was obvious that 
they resorted to other unrefined and uncivilised methods of income on the streets. 
Thus, it is evident that the Islamic treatment of women prisoners of war was 
conducive towards better social relations and led to the refinement of their overall 
social lives…… [continued] 
 
FATWA I 
Category: Marriage (Nikah) 
Fatwa#: 30630 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Nov 16,2014 
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My question is with regards to spending the night with my wife before the ruksati, my 
father is of the opinion that i should not spend the night or go on holiday with my wife 
until the ruksati takes place, my wife and her family however find this as unjust but 
my father is doing so on the basis of it looking disrespectful before my wife has 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
  
In principle, once the contract of nikāh has been concluded, the husband is entitled to 
sexual intimacy with his wife. The wife has the right to refuse his sexual advances or 
to travel with him until he submits the mahr mu‘ajjal (the mahr due immediately). 
After submission of the mahr mu‘ajjal, the husband is at liberty to take her where he 
pleases.[1] 
“Ruksati” or “zifāf” refers to the customary handing over of the wife into the custody 
of the husband.[2]  The purpose of zifāf is to make it possible for the husband to fully 
exercise his rights as a husband. In traditional Muslim societies, sexual intimacy 
normally occurred after zifāf.[3] However, zifāf itself is not a condition for enjoying 
sexual intimacy with one’s wife.[4] 
If it is customary in your culture to wait until zifāf before consummating the marriage, 
or there isn’t a long time before zifāf takes place, it will be better to respect your 
father’s wishes and delay consummation of the marriage until zifāf. If it is not 
customary to wait until zifāf or there is a considerable amount of time before zifāf, it 
will be advisable to explain the above ruling to your father so that he approves of you 
spending time with your wife before zifāf. 
And Allah Ta‘ālā Knows Best 
Zameelur Rahman 
Student Darul Iftaa UK 




[Followed by Arabic references and footnotes].  
 
FATWA J 
Category: Character & Morals 
Fatwa#: 18778 
Asked Country: Canada 
Answered Date: Jun 29,2010 
Title: If wife does not want to have sex (because she feels pain in her private parts 
and also she is tired looking-after her small baby), then is it permissable for the 




If wife does not want to have sex (because she feels pain in her private parts and also 
she is tired looking-after her small baby), then is it permissable for the husband to 
masturbate? 
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Answer 
In the name of Allāh, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
Assalāmu ῾alaykum wa Rahmatullāhi Wabarakātuh 
  
In principle, it is not permissible for a man or woman to masturbate/self stimulate 
themselves. This is substantiated by clear juristic texts cited in various books. 
However, if a husband desires his wife to masturbate him, it will be permissible 
despite it still being regarded as an undesirable act. 
(Fatāwa Mahmudiyyah, Vol. 18, Pg. 636/7, Fāruqiyyah) 
(Hindiyyah, Vol. 2, Pg. 170, Rashīdiyyah)  
(Raddul Muhtār, Vol. 4, Pg. 27, HM Saeed)  
(Raddul Muhtār, Vol. 2, Pg. 399, HM Saeed) 
And Allāh Ta῾āla Knows Best 
Wassalāmu ῾alaykum  
  
Ml. Ebrahim Desai, 
Student Dārul Iftā 
Checked and Approved by: 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 
Dārul Iftā, Madrasah In῾āmiyyah 





Asked Country: Pakistan 
Answered Date: Mar 04,2013 





assalam alaikum warehatulla wabarkatahu! 
my wife is pregnent and 31st week has just started, few days back she was not feeling 
well and don't wanted to have sex; instead she caressed me which caused ejaculation. 
I want to know whether this act was sinful? 
Please guide me in this regard, shall i offer tauba salaat. 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful 
As-salāmu ʿalaykum wa-raḥmatullāhi wa-barakātuh 
  
The act in reference was not sinful. 
  
And Allah Taʿālā Knows Best 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 
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FATWA L 
Category: Jurisprudence and Rulings (Fiqh) 
Fatwa#: 27692 
Asked Country: Pakistan 
Answered Date: Dec 08,2013 





If a wife is pregnant in her later stages and can not fullfill the sexual needs of her 
husband or the wife generally does not feel like having sex then... 
1. Is it permissible for wife to masturbate her husband till he ejaculates?  
2. If husband wife  have shower together, can husband rub his penis into the wifes 
buttocks in & out and ejaculates at the same time (at no point inserting it into her 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
  It is permissible. 
  It is permissible[1]. 
Immad Bin Arshad 
Student Darul Iftaa California, USA 
Checked and Approved by, Mufti Ebrahim Desai. 
www.daruliftaa.net 
 
[Followed by Arabic references]. 
 
FATWA M 
Category: Marriage (Nikah) 
Fatwa#: 30959 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Oct 28,2014 





 I am after some guidance concerning my marriage. I have been married two years 
and there's a few things I am really unhappy about with my husband. Although me 
and my husband are from the same community and born and bred in the UK he has to 
much of pakistani culture in him. On the contrary he is very islamic prays 5 times 
goes in jamats and comes from a good islamic family. 
My husband today mentioned to me that his family are my family which I don't 
disagree with however when I said to him likewise my family is your family he said 
no they are my inlaws. I want to know from an Islamic perspective if it's true that the 
wife no longer belongs as such to her own family after marriage and the husbands 
family is hers but the same doesn't apply to the husband? I have never heard of this in 
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islam and assume this is a cultural thing? Also my husband doesn't keep marital 
relations with me I have spoken to him nicely argued with him even asked for divorce 
as from his part he doesn't show any intimacy only basic hugs and kisses now n then 
which just aren't enough. He knows he has this problem but is doing nothing to 
resolve it and it's leaving me bitter and frustrated in my marriage and towards him. 
I have been wanting a baby from a few months after I got married and I am unable to 
conceive as he won't make an effort unless I initiate first and also doesn't want a child 
till he's financially stable he states which I think is really unfair on me and my 
maternal instincts. I have tried talking to him broken down infront of him argued with 
him but he just acknowledges and nothing changes. 
I don't want to fall into haram out with my marriage I have told him this and he just 
listens he is not prepared to give me a divorce either and says things will get better. 
Please give me some guidance as am fed up of his way if thinking and doing things. 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
Preserving one's chastity is one of the noble objectives of nikāh. Since the need to 
preserve one's chastity is common to both husband and wife, the right to intimacy also 
belongs to both husband and wife. 
As a result, it is necessary for your husband to fulfill your needs to prevent you from 
falling into harām. Failure to do so without an acceptable reason would make him in a 
sinner in the sight of Allah. [i] 
Your husband has acknowledged that a problem exists. As a first step, give him the 
benefit of doubt and try to find out if there is an external factor such as stress, anxiety 
or another issue that is causing him to act like this. Perhaps it is something simple that 
can be resolved  but he is reluctant to speak about it due to the sensitivity of the topic. 
If you can gently coax him into sharing the problem you might be able to help him 
seek a solution Insha-Allah. However, if you cannot make any progress in finding out 
the underlying cause of his behavior then you should approach an experienced, local 
scholar for marital counseling. 
The wife of Abdullah ibn Amr (may Allah be pleased with him) when asked by her 
father-in-law about her husband mentioned that her husband was an excellent man but 
was not fulfilling her rights. When this was reported to Rasulullah (salallahu alayhi 
wa sallam), the husband, Abdullah ibn Amr (may Allah be pleased with him) was 
summoned and told that his wife had a right over him. [ii] 
Similarly, in the time of Umar (may Allah be pleased with him), a woman approached 
him and said that her husband fasts by day and prays by night and she did not like to 
complain about him. Ka'b (may Allah have mercy on him) was sitting there at the 
time and understood the woman's intention. He said that this woman's husband is not 
fulfilling her marital rights. 
Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) then appointed him to judge between the 
husband and the wife. Ka'b (may Allah have mercy on him) summoned the husband 
and told him that his wife had a complaint. When the husband mentioned his worship 
and being enthralled by the verses of the Quran, he was told that it was no excuse and 
he had to fulfill his wife's rights. [iii] 
As is evident from the above-mentioned incidents, if your attempts at getting him to 
share  the reason for his behavior are unsuccessful, the best way to resolve this will be 
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to pursue marital counseling. 
In addition, make duā (supplication) for yourself and your husband that Allah put love 
and harmony in your relationship and barakah (blessings) in your finances. 
You have also mentioned that your husband does not want to have children at this 
time. Rizq (sustenance) is from Allah and your husband should not be duly worried as 
long as he is making an effort and putting his tawakkul (reliance) in Allah. While azl 
(reversible contraception) is allowed for a number of genuine reasons, waiting until 
one is financially stable is not one of them. Further, your husband needs to take your 
permission before practicing contraception. [iv] [v] 
As for his statement that his family is your family while your family is his in-laws, 
this is incorrect. You are related to your husband's family by marriage and he is 
related to your family by marriage. Insha-Allah through marital counseling these 
minor misunderstandings should also be resolved. 
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Sohail ibn Arif, Student Darul Iftaa Chicago, USA 
Checked and Approved by, Mufti Ebrahim Desai. 
  
[Arabic Text follows]. 
 
FATWA N 
Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 23651 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Dec 20,2012 





Assalamu alaykum hazrat I wanted to know if it was permissible to use One hour Per 
week for some penis exercises which helps you solving premature ejakulation. I feel 
that my wife is not fully satisfied with the size and time it takes. I do all my Islamic 
responsibillities so i basically wanted to know whether this is haram. The exercise is 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
It would be best first of all to consult a physician to undergo proper treatment for 
premature ejaculation. 
  
It is also permissible to perform these exercises provided the following conditions are 
met: 
  
a.) It must not involve any haram – such as watching any sort of instructional video or 
reading any instructions which contain explicit images. 
  
b.) If the exercise involves any aid/equipment – or involves any touching of the penis 
– these should all be operated by the wife and not by husband to himself. 
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c.) The aid/equipment that is involved should not cause ejaculation. 
  
d.) The exercises should not result in any harm or bodily injury to oneself. 
  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Sohail ibn Arif, 
Student Darul Iftaa 
Chicago, USA 
Checked and Approved by, 




 Category: Worldly Possessions 
Fatwa#: 17012 
Asked Country: South Africa 
Answered Date: Aug 14,2008 
Title: When I tell my non-believer friends what girls cant practice polyandry while 
guys can practice polygny, I find it hard explaining it to them why Allah has 





When I tell my non-believer friends what girls cant practice polyandry while guys can 
practice polygny, I find it hard explaining it to them why Allah has programmed 
women to not be able to have multiple husbands. The insinuation here is, if it is not 
the religion that is sexist, it is your Creator who has made it biologically hard for your 
women to have more husbands. They argue, there are many women who have 
multiple boyfriends, and live happily. It should be the girl's prerogative whether or not 
to have multiple husbands, even if it may not necessarily be beneficial for her. But if 
the right has been given to man, women should get it too. 
The same inequality problem arises with testifying. Two women against one man's 
witness. The argument put forward is women are physically and mentally weaker. But 
we know there are significant exceptions in the modern world, and if women would 
have been allowed to build muscular body in gym, etc they too have just as much or 
more or less the same mental or physical strength to carry normal tasks. If women's 
periods are such a big deal, then how can you the religion generalize that men would 
not be falling sick either. Many men fall sick with flu, cold, etc. but in some parts of 
the world more than other, but that does not mean you take away the rights of doing 
something they are  probably" capable of. 
The question really is, maybe its hard for some women, maybe other women find it 
not so hard, but why the ruling only for women to not marry more than one, or carry 
additional burden. There are many men who would find it hard dealing with mental 
stress and physical pains too in general life, but why did the religion generalize? 




	   220	  
In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful  
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatoh 
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that it is difficult, rather impossible, to be 
rational with irrational and unreasonable beings; not to mention being it extremely 
detrimental to one’s Imān to maintain bonds of friendship with such people. Their 
obstinacy in rejecting the most rational, cogent and soundest of arguments will lead 
you to frustration, uncertainty and questioning in your own Imān. If your “friends” are 
christians or jews, they should already understand the impermissibility, innate 
contemptibility and irrationality of polyandry. If they are atheists, which can be 
deduced from statements such as “if it is not the religion that is sexist, it is your 
Creator who has made it biologically hard for your women to have more husbands,” 
how could it be expected of them to understand the rationale of the impermissibility 
of polyandry when they have failed or rather, chosen to fail to recognize the existence 
of their Creator? If they agree that women have been created and divinely 
programmed in such a way that inhibits polyandry, it would then be an exercise in 
futility to question why Allah chose to do so. What right does the feeble creation have 
to ask the sublime Creator why He created something in a certain way? As Muslims, 
we submit in totality to the will and order of Allah Ta‘ālā. We do not weigh the 
commands and dictates of the religion on the scales of our limited and scanty logic. 
Allah Ta‘ālā is Al-Hakīm (the Most-Wise) and His decrees are filled with wisdom 




Category: Beliefs and Practices (Aqeedah) 
Fatwa#: 28553 
Asked Country: France 
Answered Date: Mar 03,2014 





Have women only been created to satisfy their husbands? Is that the only reason to be 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa rahmatullāhi wa barakātuh. 
Just like their male counterparts, women were created for the purpose of worshipping 
Allah Ta‘ālā; that is, to do what is pleasing to Him and refrain from what is 
displeasing to Him. Allah Ta‘ālā says: 
 “I have not created jinn and man but to worship Me.” (51:56) 
The Qur’an emphasises the point that man and woman are not different in this respect. 
Consider the following verses: [Arabic text] 
 
  
“Verily, Muslim men and Muslim women, believing men and believing women, 
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devout men and devout women, truthful men and truthful women, patient men and 
patient women, humble men and humble women, and the men who give sadaqah 
(charity) and the women who give sadaqah, and the men….[fatwa continues…] 
 
And Allah Ta‘ālā Knows Best 
Zameelur Rahman 
Student Darul Iftaa UK 




FATWA Q- Excerpt provided 
Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 14847 
Asked Country: United States 
 
Answered Date: Jan 24,2007 
 
 




1) My name is technically "Kawthar" but because of where I come from it is 
pronounced "Kausar," Islamically, does this have any affect, as I've heard that names 
have an affect on people. 
2) I was reading the tafsir in Mariful Quran for Surah Nisaa, in which I understood 
that women were created for the comfort of men. How can something that has been 
created for something else be equal to it? I've always heard that men and women are 
equal in Islam depending on their actions, but I find it hard to swallow that the very 
nature of women is to be subservient to men? I feel that this is a very broad topic, so it 
would be greatly appreciated if you could direct to some books or other resources, 
specifically on the topic of Islam's overall view of women more than specific things 
like purdah, etc. I'm deeply disturbed by the presence of Hoor in the akhirah. I asked 
my Alima about this, as we have not discussed that chapter in Mishkaat yet, and she 
said that this will not affect the happiness of the earthly women in Jannah, because if 
a woman wants a man to be completely devoted to her, she will have it. From your 
site I get the impression that as long as a couple gets into Jannah, the women will 
always be with their husbands and the husbands will always have many wives. Are 
the woman's desires being dismissed? Or is this simply a desire that women are not 
supposed to have? My Alima said that I should ask a mufti if this is bothering 
me…..[Continues]…. 
Answer 
In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
1.    The pronunciation of your name as Kausar is correct. 
2.    Your objective is based on the assumption that all women are created for the 
comfort of men. That itself is incorrect as Allah says that women are a garment for 
you (men) and you (men) are a garment for them (women). It is clear from this verse 
that both (husband and wife) are a means of comfort for each other.  
	   222	  
 
The issue of hoors in Jannah can be addressed from many angles. Consider just one 
angle. A woman by nature is beauty conscious. She also tends to compare herself with 
other women. In her consciousness of her beauty, she generally regards herself to be 
superior to other women. In that she feels proud of herself. 
 
The Quran describes the hoors of Jannah to be very pretty and beautiful, but the 
women of this world will be superior to them. They lived in this world, brought Imaan 
on Allah and practiced deen. They bore the difficulties of this world. How can hoors 
of Jannah be superior to the women of this world? They did not bear the hardships of 
this world. 
 
Jannah and everything in it is created for the believers. The women of this world are 
not created for gifting purposes, rather they will be gifted. The hoors do not have that 
lofty stage of the women of this world. It is obvious that their beauty will outshine the 
beauty of the hoors. There can never be any comparison between the two……… 
 
 




Mufti Ebrahim Desai 




Category: Jurisprudence and Rulings (Fiqh) 
Fatwa#: 28092 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Feb 03,2014 





 Please can you advise me, if oral sex is permitted, me and my husband would like to 
know if we have commited a sin? I have heard according to some scholars, it is 
permissible, but majority say it is makruh tanzhi, can you advise me further, and also 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
It is encouraging to note that you have mustered the courage to ask about the 
permissibility of an action, which indicates to the fact that you would like to lead your 
life according to the commands of Allah. 
Shyness and felling ashamed should not be an obstacle in wanting to find out the 
commands of Allah. 
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Islam teaches us that every action of ours should display modesty, and there are many 
Ahadith which emphasise the same, for example: (Arabic text) 
Translation-Modesty only brings good (Bukhari, Muslim) 
Translation-Modesty is part of Iman, and Iman will take one to Jannnah (Tirmidhi) 
Allah has created in humans carnal desires, and he has also designated for us ways to 
fulfil these desires in which modesty plays a great role. Thus any way of fulfilling 
these desires which is devoid of modesty will not be allowed in Islam. It is for this 
reason that our Ulama have ruled that oral sex is impermissible. Make tawba and 
resolve not to commit the sin in future. 
  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Arif Omar 
Student Darul Iftaa Mombasa, Kenya 





Category: Jurisprudence and Rulings (Fiqh) 
Fatwa#: 31509 
Asked Country: India 
 
Answered Date: Dec 19,2014 
 
 







During haiz if wife insist to have sex using condom when there is very little or almost 
no bleeding during the three days wait period of haiz. 
Is it permissible in islam or not? There is no forcing or desire shown from husband for 
sex. It is only wife expectation. 
 






In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
Sexual intercourse during menses is haram even if one uses condom[1]. 
  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Immad Bin Arshad 
Student Darul Iftaa California, USA 
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Checked and Approved by, Mufti Ebrahim Desai. 
www.daruliftaa.net 
 
FATWA T (Excerpt provided). 
Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 15840 
Asked Country: United Kingdom 
Answered Date: Nov 10,2007 
Title: After sleeping with my wife when should gusal be performed, immediately 
after or can it be done, a few hours later, before fajar.... As a child age around 12 my 





1. A) After sleeping with my wife when should gusal be performed, immediately after 
or can it be done, a few hours later, before fajar. As I live in a small house, having a 
bath at night makes a lot of noise we don’t want to upset our parents by having a bath 
at night, they frowned upon my brother and sister in law, who now moved out, as they 
used to have bath daily.  
B) There are also young children in the house (ages 10, 14, 20) we don’t want to give 
them the wrong impression by having a bath at night or daily. Please advice? 
C) My wife is also in the fear that was her hair daily she might become ill, will it 
gusul be valid if she does masah of the head/hair?   
D) If after one has done gusul, the clothes that they wore before and during the time I 
slept with my wife how should these be handled? 
E) will I have to perform gusal again if I touch these clothes?  
F) I have to take them to the washing machine, back to bed room, how should this be 
done?  
G) If my wife is washing these clothes does she have to perform gusal again? 
2.  As a child age around 12 my father used to beat my mother regularly, sometimes 
as my mother would speak back to him other times for no apparent reason. My mother 
sustained many injuries broken bones bruised eyes etc.. This was done in front of me, 
brothers, sister and grand mother (who always made the situation worse) and 
sometimes in the locked bedroom (could hear my mother screen). My father would 
also beat me, brothers and sister (when she was 16/17) all for minor little things. I 
have always felt ashamed that I did not help my mother when this was taking place 
but I could only comfort her after.  My father read five time pay and has done so for a 
few years now, (has also finally stopped beating my mother) but whenever he speak 
to my mother, me, brothers and sister and sister in law he always shouts at us and if 
we were having a normal conversation but he is always shouting. He always belittles 
me (aged 26) and my brothers (aged 27, 23) and humiliates us at least once a week. 
Last year my older bother moved into his own house, only a few houses away but 
hardly every comes to our family home. My father tried to force him to marry his 
sisters’ daughter but unsuccessfully. My now new sister in law does come to visit a 
few times a week but she is, too used to shouting and belittling by my father. I have 
got used to this shouting, belittling and humiliation but my wife (who has a double 
relation to my parents, both our father are brothers and both our mothers are sisters) 
will not be able to put up with this. I am afraid the same will happen to her. My 
mother told me a few years ago that my father wanted me to marry his sisters 
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daughter but never once asked me that I should do this. When I proposed that I 
wanted to marry my cousin, who now is my wife, everyone was happy except my 
father. My father never told me that I should not marry her. During the time of our 
niqah, the few days before and after my fathers was not very happy. Even though my 
wife is the daughter of my fathers’ brother, the treatment by my father towards her has 
not been very good. She is currently in awaiting her visa for . I am afraid that the 
same treatment (shouting, belittling and humiliation) will be done towards her but 
much much worse as she is not his sisters’ daughter. I am not in a situation to move 
into another home. A) What should I do? Me and my two brothers have never stood 
up to our father was he was beating our mother and I feel totally ashamed at this. I 
feel the treatment by our father towards our mothers has been totally unjustified and 
only in the last few years have the beating stopped, again I feel totally ashamed at 
this. I have felt angered that I did not do anything. Me and my brothers have never 
talked to each other about his part of our life. All three of us felt that we could not 
stand up to our father during this time and even now at present, shouting. B) What can 
we do to calm our father down, now aged around 60. he read five time salah has 
peformed umrah and twice hajj but when he is at home he always gets angered at 
minor little things, he is shouting, belittling and humiliating our mother and all his 
children, and C)I fear will soon be my wife which I will not able to protect her from. 
My child hood into adult hood has had a great deal of effect on me. I have had 
counselling, after being referred from doctor, but felt that it was not doing anything 
and the counsellor was a non Muslim, not understand. D) How can I get over this 
situation as I feel this is a burden upon me? The only person I have every been open 
to is my wife, but I don’t want to burden her with my previous problems, E) should I 
tell my wife of the problem that may face her regarding my father, F) Should I tell my 
wife of my previous sins and my past with my parents so we can have a better 
understanding of each other and can move on? We have no other family in the , my 
father would never listen to any others advice. I don’t want to dislike/hate anybody, 
not even my father. G) I have recently seen similar traits in my older brother toward 




In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Assalaamu `alaykum waRahmatullahi Wabarakatoh 
1. 
A) It is better to make Ghusl as soon as possible and be in a clean state; however, 
there is no harm or sin in delaying the ghusl provided Salah is not neglected.  One 
who (in the state of janabat) delays ghusl until the time of salaah will not be sinful, 
because there is ijmaa’ (consensus) that the performance of wudu or of the ghusl (for 
one in janabat, a woman of haidh or nifaas) only becomes wajib 
(i) when salaah becomes wajib upon him/her,  (ii) when s/he intends to perform such 
an ibadat that is impermissible without wudu or ghusl; for example, when one intends 
to pray namaz, prostrate (sajdah), recite the Quran or touch it, and likewise perform 
other acts of ibadat—only then wudu or ghusl (according to one’s condition) will 
become wajib, and before this it is not wajib.  However, one should not delay ghusl as 
it is against that which is best. [umdatul-fiqh, vol. 1, p.175] 
It is permissible for a person in the state of janabat to sleep without ghusl or wudu, but 
it is better and mustahab to perform wudu prior to sleep. [umdatul-fiqh, vol. 1, p.176] 
B) See above C) If water, whether cold or hot, is harmful to her, and a reliable 
	   226	  
physician has prohibited her from using water then she may make Masah without 
washing her hair in an obligatory Ghusl.  D) If the clothes are pure and have no 
impurity on them, then one may wear them.  However, if there is impurity upon the 
garments, then it is necessary to wash them (washing it thrice and rinsing it after 
every wash purifies the garment). [khawaateen kai masaaail or unka hal, vol.1] E) No; 
merely touching impure clothes does not make ghusl compulsory. F) see above G) 
No.  
2. Jazakallah for sharing your painful experiences with us and for asking for 
guidelines as to how you could deal with the future. 
Allow me to mention at the outset that it is time that wives and children of men who 
are abusive towards their families are exposed and helped. 
Unfortunately, it has to be pointed out that Muslim men who beat up their families are 
not really practicing Islam.  This behaviour has nothing to do with Allah Ta'ala's 
commandments, nor does this behaviour have anything do to with the sunnah of our 
beloved Nabi (  Islam is clear about how each one of us are to .( ووسلم ععللييهه االلللهه صصللىى 
treat our fellow human beings. The treatment of wives and one's children is clearly 
described by our Nabi ( ووسلم ععللييهه االلللهه صصللىى ). The behaviour of a man who beats up 
his family is not in keeping with Islam, in fact it borders on the side of oppression.  
Brother, allow me to suggest that although your father has treated the family in this 
way and although all of you seem to bear the scars of his behavior, do find it in your 
hearts to forgive him. He is as much a victim as you and your family are. I shall 
explain later. 
However, it is also important that you, your brothers and your sister, seek professional 
help immediately………(continues)……. 
 
May Allah Ta'ala guide all of you and help you to find the way towards getting 
through to your father. Please feel free to write again if you wish. 
And Allah knows best 
Wassalam 
Sister Fadila (F1) 
Social Dept. 
Checked and Approved by: 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 




Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 19494 
Asked Country: South Africa 
Answered Date: Oct 13,2011 




Sister X and Brother Y were married for 7 years. Sister X consistently refused to 
consummate their marriage, with one exception, in the 3rd year, which resulted in the 
conception of their son, now 6 years old.  
 
After 7 years, the brother gave one talaq. The sister abruptly took the child to her 
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parents' home and telephones to say that she had spoken to lawyers and she was not 
bringing the child back. She refused to allow the brother to see his child for months 
until he had complied with all her legal, financial and material demands. They were 
legally divorced two years ago. 
 
Since then, she has had full legal custody of the child and has used the child as a 
weapon to force the brother to comply with her every whim, refusing any kind of 
access every time she believes the father is not obeying her 100%. The father has 
rearranged his entire life and commutes between two cities to be able to see his son at 
the weekend, a "privilege" which she sometimes witholds when she is annoyed with 
the brother. 
 
The brother would like to know the Shari position on his rights, and requests any 
advice on how to proceed. In the UK, where they live, the law automatically gives 
custody of a small child to the mother and it is very difficult to overcome this. 
Answer 
 
In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.  
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
Every form of oppression and abuse is totally prohibited in Shari’ah.  Emotional 
abuse is just as bad if not worse.  The prophet (salallāhu ῾alayhu wa sallam) said, 
“Fear oppression! Verily oppression will be a means of darkness on the day of 
judgement.”  
(Sahīh Muslim hadith no 2578) 
  
The sister in question has no prerogative to use the child as a weapon to emotionally 
abuse the father.  It is a fact of life that not every two people get along with each 
other.  This does not justify mistreating one another.  The consequences of such 
foolishness from the mother have a universal impact which she may be failing to 
perceive.  Her selfishness will damage the future of her very own child.  
  
The child needs his father just as he needs his mother.  The father provides something 
the mother does not provide and vice versa.  Consider the following statistics from the 
United States:……( fatwa continues) 
 
 
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Mawlana Faraz Ibn Adam, 
Student Darul Iftaa 
UK 
  
Checked and Approved by, 







Asked Country: United States 
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Answered Date: Mar 04,2014 






I had my nikah done w my husband on ...., 2013 The rukhshati was on end of...., our 
marriage was consummated on Sept 7, 2013. We had some marital issues durin the 
month of Sept and since I was upset i had refused to have marital issues w my 
husband since he would introduce me as his friend instead of as his wife to his 
coworkers. My husband claims that he spoke to an imam and since I refused sex to 
him it was considered the first khula. 
We tried to work on our relationship throughout the month, but than in October I 
found out he had married another woman thru nikah/court, he said he married the 
other woman because I cannot bear kids. The following week I had told him i had 
become pregnant, he had pressured me into getting an abortion which I refused. I 
moved back home w my parents in Dec since I was afraid of his pressure of abortion 
and asked him to decide on which wife he wants to keep. 
He claims the Imam told him that was a second khula I have been home at my parents 
house for 69 days now and I am 5 months pregant. My husband claims the Imam said 
the child is out of wedlock since i had refused sex a few times to my husband because 
i was upset. Now my husband says the baby is not his obligation and i am divorced. I 
had never spoken to an Imam or Judge askin for a khula even so how can this Imam 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
Sister in Islam, 
We are sorry to hear about the difficulties you are facing. May Allah Taala help you 
during these trying moments. 
Your husband has misunderstood the term khula and the advice he is getting is also 
incorrect. Khula is the money/wealth that is paid by the wife to the husband to release 
her from the nikah in the situation where the wife doesn’t want to continue with the 
nikah [1]. There is also no first and second khula. When a khula is agreed upon one 
talaq-e-bain (irrevocable divorce) takes place. [2] By you refusing to have conjugal 
relationship due to personal reasons with your husband does not mean the child you 
are expecting is illegitimate, nor does it mean you are divorced from your husband. 
  
  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Ismail Dawoodjee 
Student Darul Iftaa Zambia 




 19786 Category: Marriage 
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Fatwa#: 19786 
Asked Country: Canada 
Answered Date: Feb 22,2012 




What kind of sex is forbidden in Islam between the husband and the wife? I tried to 
open your website regarding this matter, but it is not opening. Nowadays, when there 
is glamour all over, so many newly married people ask this question and they refer to 
the Quranic verse in which Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta’ala says “Orat tumhari khatee 




In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
The verse of the Quran which you have refered to is as follows: 
  
… ِشْئتُمْ  أأَنَّى َحْرثَُكمْ  فَأْتُواا لَُكمْ  َحْرثثٌ  نَِساؤُؤُكمْ   
 “Your wives are a place of sowing of seed for you, so come to your place of 
cultivation however you wish.”  
(Quran 2:223) 
 “…however you wish” in this verse indicates that conjugal relationship can 
be done in any posture.  However, the only posture which is Harām is in the 
rear.  
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Mawlana Abdul Hannan Nizami, 
Student Darul Iftaa 
USA 
Checked and Approved by, 







Category: Jurisprudence and Rulings (Fiqh) 
Fatwa#: 28610 
Asked Country: Malaysia 
Answered Date: May 01,2014 
Title: Boundaries of the beard. Sunnah way to spend the first night with one’s wife? 







My first question: 
-What are the benefits of beard? 
-Does the hairs on cheek & throat counts in beard?  
-Can we trim our beard to make it look good? 
-Can we shave from specific areas of our cheek to keep the beard in good shape? 
 
 
My second question: 
-What is the best or Sunnah way to spend your first night with your wife?  
-Is it necessary to have sexual intercourse on the first night of wedding? 
-What is Haram & Halal in sex? (Anal sex & during wife's menstruation, this is 
clearly indicated as Haram) Is there anything else Haram? 
-Is oral sex allowed in Islam? (if yes), then is there any boundary restriction? 





In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. 
As-salāmu ‘alaykum wa-rahmatullāhi wa-barakātuh. 
We as the bondsmen and slaves of Allah are obligated to follow His commandments 
and obligations without knowing their wisdoms and benefits. Allah is Hakeem (Wise) 
and His commandments contain hidden wisdoms. He has not commanded us to carry 
out any act which is void of benefit. However, those benefits are in Allah’s infinite 
knowledge. At times, certain benefits are outlined in the Ahadith of Rasulullah 
Sallallahu ‘Alayhi Wa Sallam and at times, ‘Ulama through their understanding 
mention certain benefits………… 
……….. 
Intercourse on the First Night 
Engaging in intercourse on the first night is not necessary. If both the spouses feel 
they are ready for it, they may do so. However, one should keep in mind the comfort 
of his wife. If she is reluctant or anxious, the husband should not persist in trying to 
convince her. He should approach the matter with calmness. She is not prepared, the 
husband should take her feelings into consideration. 
  
Positions in Intercourse 
There is no restriction on this in Shari’ah. Allah says: 
 [8] ِشْئتُمْ  أأَنَّى َحْرثَُكمْ  فَأْتُواا لَُكمْ  َحْرثثٌ  نَِساؤُؤُكمْ 
“Your women are tillage for you to cultivate. Approach your tillage from wherever 
you wish.”……… 
 
And Allah Ta’āla Knows Best 
Nabeel Valli 
Student Darul Iftaa Lusaka, Zambia 
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Category: Misc. Fiqh 
Fatwa#: 18511 
Asked Country: South Africa 
Answered Date: Feb 23,2010 
Title: I would be very much greatfull if you could kindly tell me the definition of 





I would be very much greatfull if you could kindly tell me the definition of fatwa and 
its important. insyaAllah with ur sharing i will share the knowledge to my friends . 
 
Answer 
In the name of Allāh, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
 
Assalāmu ῾alaykum wa Rahmatullāhi Wabarakātuh 
 
  
If we research the literal meaning of fatwa in the Hans Wehr Dictionary, we would 
conclude that it is to structure a formal legal opinion or a deliverance of formal legal 
opinions. A fatwa is a legal declaration in Islam, issued by an Islamic law expert on a 
specific issue. The plural of fatwa  is fataawa. Usually a fatwa is issued at the request 
of an individual to settle a question concerning fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence. A 
scholar skilled in issuing fataawa is famously known as a Mufti. Issuing of  fataawas 
is a great responsibility. Fatwa (Judicial verdict) holds a vital role in Islam as it helps 
to explain Allah Ta’ala’s law in both religious and worldly matters. The Muftis are 
particularly cautious when announcing fatwa’s, due to their far reaching implications 
and the Ulama are well aware of the importance of fatwa, thus handling it as 
meticulously as possible. They have researched and analyzed every discussion of Usul 
al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), briefly or at great length, then ventured out into 
the field of Islamic law.   The usage of the word fatwa can be found in the Holy 
Quran: [if  
ُ  قُلِ  يیَْستَْفتُونَكَ   ااْلَكَاللَةِ  فِي يیُْفتيِیُكمْ  هللاَّ
 “They ask thee for a legal decision. Say: Allah directs (thus) about those who leave 
no descendants or ascendants as heirs. “(Surah-al-Nisa verse 176)    
 
ُ  قُلِ  االنَِّساءِ  فِي وَويیَْستَْفتُونَكَ   تِي االنَِّساءِ  يیَتَاَمى فِي ااْلِكتَاببِ  فِي َعليَْیُكمْ  يیُْتلَى وَوَما فيِیهِھنَّ  يیُْفتيِیُكمْ  هللاَّ  ُكتِبَ  َما تُْؤتُونهَھُنَّ  َال  االالَّ
َ  فَإنِنَّ  َخيْیرٍ  ِمنْ  تَْفَعلُواا وَوَما بِاْلقِْسطِ  لِْليیَتَاَمى تَقُوُمواا وَوأأنَنْ  ااْلِوْلَدااننِ  ِمنَ  وَوااْلُمْستَْضَعفيِینَ  تَْنِكُحوهھھھُنَّ  أأنَنْ  وَوتَْرَغبُوننَ  لهَھُنَّ   َكاننَ  هللاَّ
 َعليِیًما بهِھِ 
 “They ask you about women. Say, ―Allah answers you about them, and so does what 
is recited to you from the Book regarding orphaned women whom you do not give 
what is prescribed for them and tend to marry them, and regarding the weak from the 
children, and that you should maintain justice for the orphans. Whatever good you do 
Allah is aware of it. (Surah-al-nisa verse 127) 
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To issue a Shari ruling is a great responsibility and requires sacrifice, piety and great 
trustworthiness. Prior to Hazrat Umar (Radiallahu Anhu) issuing a ruling, he would 
gather the prominent sahaba and consult with them first, then would he issue the 
ruling having placed full trust on Allah Ta’ala. 
  
Dar-ul-Iftah is the fatwa institution. Another definition of fatwa is the Shariah’ law 
illustrated by a Mufti to an inquirer in a non-restrictive form. Hence, the inquirer is 
not restricted or bound by the law arising from the Mufti’s fatwa. The inquirer has the 
right to seek a fatwa from another Mufti or Muftis. Furthermore, he can apply the 
Fatwa from another Mufti, provided the Mufti is an ‘Alim or pious person and well 
qualified to issue rulings. 
 A Mufti is required to be academically honest. He should not discriminate against 
people when issuing a fatwa, for example by issuing a different fatwa for family 
members and the public. Fatwa, however, is an integral aspect of ibadah, so a Mufti 
can issue fatwas relating to cleanliness, salaat, zakat and other ibadaat.  
 
Rasullullah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) himself issued fatwa’s throughout his life. 
There is a rasaa’il (scripture) called Rasaa’il Muhammadiyah wherein, during the era 
of Nabi (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) people used to bring their personal issues and a 
ruling would be given to them. 
 A Mufti should be a pious person who is an expert in the field of Jurisprudence. He is 
also expected to analyze and research past fatwa’s as well as make reasonable 
choices. He should not be content with only extracting and narrating fatwa’s from 
other Muftis. Fataawa differ from one Mufti to another, depending on the academic 
level of the Mufti. Consequently, a person who wishes to obtain a fatwa should  base 
his selection on the level of mastery and piety of the Mufti. A Mufti who makes a 
fatwa founded on rumours and instincts will become a sinner and his action is haram. 
Such a Mufti is sinful because of his blatant lie towards Allah Ta’ala and Rasulullah 
(Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam). In a hadith Rasulullah (Sallallahu Alaihi  Wasallam) 
said: “Anyone who issues a fatwa without knowledge, will bear the sin of issuing the 
fatwa.” 
 In conclusion, issuing of rulings is a mammoth task and requires great determination 
and excellence in the field of Jurisprudence. 
  
We hope this symposium gives you brief insight and clarity on the topic of Fatwaas. 
  
And Allāh Ta῾āla Knows Best 
Wassalāmu ῾alaykum  
  
Ml. Ebrahim Desai, 
Student Dārul Iftā 
  
Checked and Approved by: 
Mufti Ebrahim Desai 
Dārul Iftā, Madrasah In῾āmiyyah 
  
DISCLAIMER - Askimam.org questions 
The Askimam.org Site answers issues pertaining to Shariah. Thereafter these 
questions and answers are placed for public view on www.askimam.org for 
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educational purposes. However, many of these answers are unique to a particular 
scenario and can not be taken as a basis to establish a ruling in another situation or 
another environment. To ensure this Askimam.org will start to flag such questions. 
Previous questions on Askimam.org do not carry such cautionary 
message.  Askimam.org bears no responsibility with regards to these questions being 
used out of their intended context. 
The Shar῾ī ruling herein given is specifically based on the question posed and should 
be read in conjunction with the question. 
The Dārul Ifta bears no responsibility to any party who may or may not act on this 
answer. The Dārul Iftā being hereby exempted from loss or damage howsoever 
caused. 
This answer may not be used as evidence in any Court of Law without prior written 
consent of the Dārul Iftā. 
Any or all links provided in our emails, answers and articles are restricted to the 
specific material being cited.Such referencing should not be taken as an endorsement 
of other contents of that website. 
 
DISCLAIMER - AskImam.org questions 
AskImam.org answers issues pertaining to Shar'ah. Thereafter, these questions and 
answers are placed for public view on www.askimam.org for educational purposes. 
However, many of these answers are unique to a particular scenario and cannot be 
taken as a basis to establish a ruling in another situation or another environment. 
Askimam.org bears no responsibility with regards to these questions being used out of 
their intended context. 
  The Shar's ruling herein given is based specifically on the question posed and 
should be read in conjunction with the question. 
  AskImam.org bears no responsibility to any party who may or may not act on 
this answer and is being hereby exempted from loss or damage howsoever 
caused. 
  This answer may not be used as evidence in any Court of Law without prior 
written consent of AskImam.org. 
  Any or all links provided in our emails, answers and articles are 
restricted to the specific material being cited. Such referencing should not be taken as 
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APPENDIX 3: ANALYTIC SCHEDULE FOR FATWAS 
 
 
1. Which country is the fatwa from? Is it a majority or minority context? 
 
2. When was the fatwa asked and when was it answered? 
 
3. How is the fatwa categorized by the askimam.org team in relation to the search title 
blurb? 
 
4. How is the question framed and constructed?  
 
5. Who is speaking about whom?  
 
6. Who is the author of both the petition and the answer?  
 
7. How does the mufti comprehend the question? Does he comprehend the question in 
a legal, pietistic or therapeutic way or a combination?   
 
8. To what extent has knowledge of local customs, colloquial language and linguistic 
nuances been understood? 
 
9. How is the answer appropriate for the context?  Which country is it from? Is it a 
majority or minority context? 
 
10. How is the solution framed? Is it framed in legal issue, family issue, community 
issue, health issue, or religious issue?  
 
11. Does the answer address women’s agency? Is it prescriptive or facilitative? 
 
12. How is language used and what rhetorical strategies have been employed and 
how? How do these strategies complement or contradict each other?  
 
13. What is the method of reasoning?  
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14. Who is the intended audience?  
 
15. What sources of reasoning has the mufti used and how?  
 
16. How is power located in the discussion? 
 
17. Who is speaking about what? 
 
18. Which words, terms or phrases are repeatedly used by the petitioner and the Mufti 
to describe/ refer to women’s sexual agency?  
 
19. What preoccupations, issues, and themes are common? 
 
20. What connections, links and associations are apparent in what people are saying 
about their situation and what they are saying to each other?  
 
21. What contradictions, oppositions, or competing viewpoints are apparent in what 
people are saying about their situation and to each other? 
 
22. What and how are women’s experiences relayed in the fatwas of askimam.org?  
 
23. How do petitioners’ experiences relate to the material social practices? 
 
25. How do women’s experiences relate to the power relations which structure them? 
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APPENDIX 4: ACCESSING THE ARCHIVE 
 
 
The askimam.org site was archived on 21 September 2015 at 6:33:07 PM, using 
Version 2.4.6 of the Sitesucker application downloaded from:  
http://ricks-apps.com/osx/sitesucker/archive/2.x/2.4.x/2.4.6/SiteSucker_2.4.6.dmg 
 
Sitesucker is an application that automatically downloads websites from the Internet 
and also duplicates the site's directory structure. The askimam.org website site was 
archived using this application and is available on a FLASH drive which is attached to 
the research. The following provides a summary for easy navigation of the archive.  
 
A: Reviewing the Full Archive. 
 
The site is stored on the FLASH drive under the askimam.org sub-directory.  
In order to open the site on the archive, the following steps must be taken: 
 
1.  Insert the FLASH drive into the USB drive 
2.  Using the file manager on the PC (on an Apple Mac this will be the Finder 
application), open the drive. 
3. Click on the askimam.org subdirectory.  
4. Double click the index.html file. 
The home page of the archive will open with the Internet browser in use on the 





B: Accessing Fatwas 
 
To access a particular fatwa: 
Insert the following text in the file explorer of your choice (This will be finder on the 
Apple Mac):  
file:///<XXX>/askimam.org/ public/question_detail/34061.html 
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XXX is the name of the drive and name of the FLASH drive on the particular 
computer. This will stay consistent for a particular computer.  For example, using this 
flash drive, the following is a sample on the browser of my PC: 
For Example on my PC, the text appears as follows: 
file:///Volumes/DISK_IMG/askimam.org/public/question_detail/34061.html 
 
The fatwa number above is 34061. By removing that number and replacing it with 
another, the other fatwas referred to in this research can be individually accessed.  
Appendices 1 and 2 provide a list of the relevant fatwa numbers.  
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APPENDIX 5: TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION. 
 
The table for the system of transliteration of Arabic words and names used by the 
Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University: 
 
B = بب 
 
t = تت 
 
th =  ثث 
 
j =  جج 
 
h} =  حح 
 
kh = خخ 
 
d = دد 
 
dh = ذذ 
 
 r = رر 
 
Z = زز 
 
s  = سس 
 
sh = شش 
 
 s}  = صص 
 
 d{  = ضض 
 
t} = طط 
 
z{ = ظظ 
 
 عع = ‘
 
gh = غغ 
 
 f = فف 
 
q = قق 
 
k = كك 
 
 l = لل 
 
m = مم 
 
 n = نن 
 
h = هه 
 
w = وو 
 





Short: a =   َ◌  ;  i =  ِ◌     ;    u =   ُ◌  
 
Long: a> = اا  ;  i> =  يي  ;    ū = وو 
 
Diphthong:  ay  = اا يي  ;    aw = اا وو 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
